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ABSTRACT
L ook at the three efforts to resolve public disputes over diesel passenger cars and urban air
quality management in South Korea, this dissertation explores the main obstacles in nascent
democracies to meeting the necessary conditions for successful dispute resolution prescribed by
Western scholars of consensus-building theory and practice. The first two cases did not resolve
the disputes. even though they produced a consensus agreement through deliberation. The
agreements were challenged and adjusted through regulatory processes. This type of unstable
c:Anselnsus building is regarded as one of pathologies of consensus building efforts in regulatory
decision-making.. This paper analyzes why this problem happened, with the new analytic
tramework. which incorporates Kingdon's multiple stream framework and the theory of
consensus building.
This paper found that the final dispute resolution was made in conventional politics stream by
adversarial power game in politics rather than in consensus building stream. Most cases did not
have necessary factors for successful consensus building effort. Most of all, the first two
consensus building efforts were strategically initiated by policy entrepreneurs. who were not
neutral in managing many other necessary factors of successful consensus building. As a result.
the efforts of dispute resolution were actually the processes of conflict expansion rather than the
authentic consensus building efforts. Non-neutral deployment of consensus building efforts \\as
ianifiested in idiosyncratic features of policy process and politics in South Korea. Policy
entrepreneurs strategic motives were a reaction to the unbalanced representation of weak
cnvironmental rationales in the existing policy making process of multi-level policymaking
venues. Thus. main obstacles to successfil consensus building in nascent democracies exist in
institutional levels, which play against the neutral initiation of consensus building efforts. One
way to secure the neutrality is to develop a new type of entrepreneurs, so-called 'consensus-
building entrepreneurs.
Dissertation supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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Chapter One
Introduction
Air pollution poses a serious threat to public health in major urban areas of the world
because a ubiquitous feature of urban life is exposure to a complex mixture of air pollutants
produced by the combustion of fossil fuels for transportation, power generation, and industrial
activities (Holman, 1999). Some scientists estimate that urban air pollution is killing some
800,000 people annually worldwide (Kenworthy and Laube, 2002).
The majority of this appalling number of victims is largely found in major cities in rapidly
developing countries, especially in Asia (Figure 1-1). Generally speaking, rapid urbanization
and motorization are regarded as the major forces driving severe urban air pollution in these
countries.
UAP dea
30 -060 -
100 - 150S150 -200200 oo- 230[No Data
Figure 1-1. Deaths from Urban Air Pollution (Source: WHO, 2005)2
'By the year 2025, it is estimated that 80% of 5 billion urban dwellers over the world will live in the developing
countries (UN, 1996). In China, a tripling of the vehicle fleet was expected in the decade 1990 to 2000 (Faiz, et al.,
1990).2 For a graph of UAP deaths, see the webpage http://www.who.int/heli/risks/urban/urbanenv/en/. The data is
cll~
Despite their common problem, each of these rapidly developing countries demonstrates
different compositions of air pollution sources; the condition of each city's air is a function of
economic, social, and technological factors.3 Approaches to managing each instance of urban air
pollution should be tailored to those factors in each country. In general, the problem is
complicated by the fact that financial, institutional, and technical constraints in developing
countries make management far more difficult than it is in advanced countries (Blackman and
Harrington, 1998).
However, regulators faced with the daunting task of crafting effective regulatory regimes
for urban air pollution in rapidly developing countries have at least one advantage over their
historical counterparts in the wealthy advanced countries, such as North America and Europe.
Several decades of environmental regulatory history4 in the advanced countries offer officials in
developing countries a range of examples and lessons that enable them to make decisions more
quickly and perform more effectively 5 (O'Connor, 1994; Hettige et al., 1996; Blackman and
estimated from the WHO's World Health Report (2002). For both mortality and morbidity of air pollution, the
measure of particulate matter (PM) has been used as the best overall indicator in many epidemiological studies
from around the world (California Air Resources Board, 2002).
3 In India, for example, two- and three-wheeled vehicles, such as motorcycles and scooters, accounted for over 70
percent of the registered motor vehicles in 1996, and they .were usually aged and ill-maintained (Ministry of
Surface Transport, India, 1997). Also in China, two-wheeled vehicles accounted for over 60 percent of the
registered motor vehicles in 1995. But, at the similar period, South Korea, a middle-high income country, had
fostered its own auto industries to produce private vehicles with four wheels, which accounted for more than 60
percent of the registered motor vehicles (AMA, 1998). In terms of fuel consumption and fuel quality, developing
countries also show different characteristics. In case of China, as the world's largest source of coal, there are
serious amounts of Sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions from coal combustion, which accounts for more than 70 percent
of fuel consumption in China (Tang, 2004). Most countries in Asia phased out leaded gasoline, but Bhutan,
Cambodia, and Indonesia still use leaded gasoline, which contributes to the high level of lead in the air (UNEP,
2005).
4 The advanced countries took seriously the episodes of catastrophic disasters, such as Donora Smog in
Pennsylvania of 1948, and London Fog of 1952, and managed to passed clean air legislations and other regulatory
actions aimed at reducing ambient air pollution from energy, industry and transportation sectors in their urban areas.
However, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that 129 million people live in areas that
violated National Ambient Air Quality Standards (EPA, 2002), nearly half the 280 million people in the U.S.
According to monitoring data gathered in 2000, approximately 52 million people lived in 30 metropolitan statistical
areas where the highest second daily maximum concentration violated the ozone NAAQS threshold of 0.12 ppm
averaged over one hour (EPA, 2002).
5 According to Iwami (2004), in large East Asian cities, despite rapid economic growth, air pollution is less severe
Harrington, 1998; Iwami, 2004).
The lessons distilled from the experience of those advanced countries, however, have been
mainly related to regulatory instruments, analytic tools, problem definitions, policy goals, and
strategies. In addition, academic discourse on urban air pollution has been dominated by
scientific and technical knowledge (Heymann, 2004)6 describing the complexity of urban air
pollution problem. Air pollutants from a huge and varied number of mobile sources, as well as
factory stacks, don't observe jurisdictional boundaries. Furthermore, emission reductions are the
function of air pollution control policy, energy prices, economic activity, technological change,
and weather patterns (Portney, 1990).
In acquiring this knowledge, regulators and experts in developing countries gain the ability
to develop emission inventories, enhance air quality monitoring, and establish integrated
assessment modeling by benchmarking the systematic ideas and the practices of urban air
quality management (UAQM) of advanced countries. These capacities can then be adapted to
the specific economic and technical situations in a developing country. Common approaches
vary from command-and-control regulations, such as technology forcing and standards setting
for fuel quality, industry emissions, and auto emissions to market-based mechanisms, such as
emission trading and environmental taxation. In practice, many rapidly developing countries
have already adopted the efforts of advanced countries to phase out leaded gasoline, install
catalytic converters in cars, and place desulfurization units in their stacks.7
than it was Japan in the early 1970s in terms of SO 2 emissions.6 Hyemann investigated the number of research projects on air pollution in Germany in the period 1974-1995,
funded by the German Federal Environmental Agency in engineering, the natural, and the social sciences.
Approximately 64% (3,215) of all projects were in engineering, approximately 34% (1,713) in the natural sciences,
and only approximately 1.5% (68) in the social sciences. The status of research efforts in other countries is not
likely to be different from this German case.
In general, reduction of SOx, CO, and lead in the air was followed by reduction of NOx emissions due to cost-
effective measures. Measures to reduce SOx emissions include 1) switching to fuel with low sulfur content, 2)
However, another important but overlooked lesson from the regulatory history of
advanced countries is about the contexts of learning, 8 especially the relationships among actors
and other institutional aspects of policy processes. Officials in rapidly developing countries with
severe air pollution need to know not only what the regulatory approaches are, but also how
various policy actors must work together to formulate and implement them.
The history of urban air pollution policy making in advanced countries shows that it is a
quite complex political as well as technical challenge. Many stakeholders compete to produce a
policy outcome favorable to their own interests. This process can lead to complicated disputes
among stakeholders.
Consider the issue of regulating NOx emissions from heavy-duty diesel engines in the
United States (Morris et al., 2004). Based on positions taken by various groups, we can predict
that legislative or administrative consideration of the problem will draw proposals from several
special interest groups.
For example, engine makers argue that the best way to reduce pollution is to mandate
cleaner fuel. Fuel refiners will resist this suggestion, insisting that improved engine design
offers cheaper ways to obtain reduced pollution. One set of environmental pressure groups
focused on global warming advocates technologies, including reliance on diesel, aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions as the top priority, while another group concerned about
particulate emissions rejects that technology. Natural gas producers will lobby for increased use
of their product as an alternate to diesel. Railroads will seek rules that will reduce the use of
desulturization of crude oil, and 3) end-of-pipe desulfurization. A shift to fuels with low sulfur content is less
expensive and, accordingly, more easily undertaken. Conversion of fuel makes no sense in the case of NOx, which
is generated by the oxidization of nitrogen in the air. Measures to control automobile emissions were developed in
accordance with strict environmental standards.
8 In his work on environmental policy in the Netherlands, Pieter Glasbergen (1996) proposes the learning model as
a supplementary perspective to enhance our understanding and to chart a path for the future. He stresses two aspects
of learning on his approach. First is about what is learned and Second, the contexts of learning.
long-distance trucks using heavy-duty engines of any type. Domestic trucking concerns will
point to Mexican trucks entering the U.S. as a more important source of pollutants than
domestic trucks and urge restrictions.
The EPA's air programs office argues for fuel additives to reduce emissions, but the
EPA's ground water office opposes some additives as potential ground water contaminants. The
Office of Management and Budget criticizes proposed actions as too expensive. The trucking
industry warns of lost jobs from higher costs. Retailers and just-in-time manufacturers resist
regulatory measures that increase trucking costs on the grounds that it will cause a general
economic slowdown. In many cases, these various special interest groups credibly claim to be
serving the public interest, despite the obvious disagreement among them about what the
standard should be. Some of their disputes are factual but difficult to resolve.
In the United States, a model of pluralistic democracy, regulatory processes for urban air
pollution have often been difficult and adversarial. The imposition of strict emission standards
and ambitious technology-forcing stipulations resulted in harsh resistance from business
interests, including automakers and utility industries, and led to bitter disputes among
stakeholders, more specifically, between economic development and environmental concerns
(Sabatier, 1988). This adversarial relationship among stakeholders produced very lengthy
disputes escalated by stakeholders' adversarial activities, such as political lobbying and legal
actions. Not surprisingly, in the mid 1980s, it was estimated that 80 percent of all major
environmental rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were litigated in
lengthy court battles that are the stuff of legend in environmental politics (Ruckelshaus, 1985).
What they learned from their own regulatory failures and from those of other countries
was that government should take a collaborative and participatory approach 9 that would
bypass adversarial interest group politics and technocratic insular public administrations
(Fredrickson, 1999; Fiorino, 2001; Fung, 2002). The EPA has tried to draft regulations that are
both workable and effective by experimenting with a new regulatory method, "regulatory
negotiation," to build consensus among stakeholders (Harter, 1982; Susskind and McMahon,
1985).
While benchmarking substantive air pollution regulations of the advanced countries, such
as the United States, or particularly of California, rapidly developing countries might also
investigate how they might avoid costly policy disputes. What can they learn from the
experience of the United States and other advanced countries in terms of public dispute
resolution around urban air pollution?
As Lowi (1972) argues, the contents of a policy, or more appropriately, the expectations
for a certain set of policy outcomes, will determine the politics surrounding the decision-making
process by determining the arena in which conflict will arise and consensus be reached. Some
scholars of comparative politics have argued that European countries such as the United
Kingdom and Sweden, have experienced much less conflict in their regulatory processes for
urban air pollution than the United States because their approaches demanded less than those of
the U.S. (Lundqvist, 1980; Vogel, 1986). They argued that because the demands were perceived
as reasonable, European industries were more likely to comply with environmental regulations.
9 According to the proponents of this alternative mode of decision making (Harter, 1982; Barber, 1984; Moore,
1986; Kasperson, 1986; Susskind et al., 1987, 1996, 1999; Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988; Cohen, 1989; Fiorino,
1990; Ostrom, 1990; Ozawa, 1991; Renn, Webler and Widemann, 1995; Daniels and Walker, 1996; Freeman,
1997; Healey, 1997, 1998; Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Sabel, Karkkainen, and Fung, 2000; Booher and Innes, 2002;
Connick and Innes, 2003; O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Fung, 2004), the alleged benefits of collaboration include
informational advantages, innovation in the methods of public problem solving, political empowerment of the
stakeholders, dispute resolution, joint learning, and enhancement of trust, implementability, legitimacy, fairness,
and efficiency.
However, the characteristics of a policy process may hinge on the extent to which they
involve democratic structures (Horowitz, 1989). 10 A country with an authoritarian regime may
not demonstrate much apparent resistance from regulated entities against any strict regulations,
hence little dispute. Even in a pluralistic democracy, absent an array of interest groups, social
movements, or perhaps cross-cutting networks of professionals and officials in adversarial
arenas of the policy process (Helco, 1978), policy making is less likely to be challenged and
some interests are more likely to prevail by capturing the policy subsystems most vital to them
(Fung, 2002).
Samuel Huntington (1991) contends that there is currently a widespread international push
toward democracy, called the "third wave," in many rapidly developing countries stimulated by
their burgeoning economies." Economic advancement has raised standards, levels of education,
and urbanization while also raising civic expectations and the ability to express them 12.
Therefore, learning from advanced country experience about how to make more effective,
fair, wise, and efficient regulatory decisions are the timeliest and the most relevant learning
rapidly developing and newly democratized countries should seek. They are not only facing
serious urban air pollution requiring appropriately tough measures, but also experiencing a
10 In the case of the policy process in developing countries, Horowitz (1989) made several observations cautiously.
First, many developing countries have a large state structure, which means that the state is inordinately important as
compared to the society. Second, there are often large groups of people excluded from participation in the policy
process. Third, the mode and channels of participation are often less well established or clearly circumscribed.
Violence, for instance, may play a larger role. Fourth, in developing countries, less weight is given to expert
knowledge before decision-making.
" The relationship between environmental quality (air pollution) and economic development is discussed by
Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) (Shafik, 1994; Seldon and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). The
hypothesis of the EKC states that the quality of the environment initially deteriorates with rising income, but later,
after income reaches a certain level, it begins to improve again. One of factors to explain the EKC is that, with
higher income, citizens become more aware of issues other than immediate material survival and induce their
governments to introduce stricter environmental regulation, hence more likely disputes between environmental
concern and economic development.
12 Some critics argue that institutional capacity for environmental governance is a better indicator for environmental
quality improvement than the level of income in the EKC model (Esty and Cornelius, 2002). They also argue that
significantly-improved governance is possible in poor countries. Thus, citizens of poor countries do not necessarily
face a long wait for major improvements in air quality (Dasgupta et al., 2004)
drastic increase in public disputes, due to enhanced political freedom.' 3
While it is natural for a newly democratized society to seek lessons for better dispute
resolution from the experiences of forerunners, it is important to understand why it is difficult
for the society to utilize such lessons. In other words, what are the main obstacles' 4 in nascent
democracies, at both the personal and institutional levels, to meeting the necessary conditions
for successful dispute resolution in response to urban air pollution? Answering this question
requires knowledge of the decision-making process, political culture, and actors which may be
different from those in the Western democracies.
In addition, if there is a successful case of resolving an urban air quality dispute through
collaboration in a nascent democracy, how was the society able to achieve it? Only by
answering these two questions can one then discuss more meaningfully how a newly
democratized society can improve its consensus-building efforts in urban air pollution
regulatory decision making.
The descriptive and normative questions above are not addressed adequately in the
literatures of political science, public administration, or policy making for planning. There are
too few empirical cases--failures or successes--of consensus building in newly democratized
societies.
13 In practice, many developing countries in the world are beginning to capitalize on and apply what has been
learned in the United States (Susskind, 2006). Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures seem to have very
successful in the USA and in Canada (Bingham, 1986; Goldberg, Sander, and Rogers, 1992), while so far they have
not been widely used in Europe (Weidner, 1998).
14 Apparently, a newly democratized country lack much experience of public participation and collaboration, as
well as relevant resources, such as supportive legal infrastructure, and third party experts in facilitation and
mediation. Thus, experiments of collaboration in fledgling democracies are more likely to fail to meet those
prescribed preconditions for successful consensus building in public policy making, hence the symptoms of the
very pathologies of consensus based rulemaking claimed by the skeptics. On the other hand, in the United States,
after a decade or more of experiments at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, among other agencies, Congress passed twin amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act and then
made them permanent in 1996: the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996 ('NRA,' 5 U.S.C. §§561, et seq.) and the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 ('ADRA,' 5 U.S.C. §§571, et seq.) (Bingham and O'Leary, 2004).
South Korea is an exemplary country from which to gain insight into these questions for
three reasons:
First, it is a leading rapidly developing country: '5 Since the early 1960s, South Korea
has achieved an incredible record of growth and integration into the high-tech, modern world
economy. Four decades ago, South Korea's GDP per capita was comparable to levels in the
poorer countries of Africa and Asia. In 1996, South Korea joined the OECD, and in 2004
entered the trillion-dollar club of world economies. Today, its GDP per capita of $20,400 is
equal to the lesser economies of the European Union (CIA, 2005). Also, South Korea has
incubated globally important automakers, such as Hyundai, KIA, and Daewoo, and became the
fifth-largest car-producing country in the world in 1996. These auto industries have been the
backbone of the South Korean economy.
Second, South Korea has a serious urban air pollution problem: The astonishing success
of South Korea's international development, however, has come with a price. In 2002, South
Koreans were shocked to learn that the World Economic Forum had ranked South Korea 1 35 th
among 146 countries in terms of the Environmental Sustainability Index. Among the categories
in the index, South Korea's air quality was ranked 120 th among 122 countries (World Economic
Forum, 2002).16 This shameful record could be traced to rapid urbanization and the exponential
growth of the vehicle fleet.
From 1970 to 1990, the population of Seoul, the capital of the nation, more than doubled,
reaching a panic-inducing 10 million. From 1990 to 2000, the population of the Seoul
15 For the status of South Korean economy in international stage, it is hardly deniable that the Korean economy
with a per capita income of $19,200 in 2004 is aiming at the certain level of advanced countries, beyond the title of
'developing' country. But, still South Korea is well known as one of 'Newly industrialized countries' or 'NICs,'
rather than an 'Advanced country.'
16 Although Korea advanced itself to 122nd from 135th among 146 countries in the 2005 index, Korea still ranked the
worst among all the 29 OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries in the list.
(World Economic Forum, 2005).
metropolitan area, covering 12 percent of the nation's entire area, increased by 20 percent to
almost 22 million, accounting for 46 percent of all South Koreans. More impressively, the
number of vehicles in the Seoul metropolitan area increased by 211 percent from 1.8 million in
1990 to 5.6 million in 2000 (Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea, 2004).
Third, South Korea is a newly democratized country: 17 Korean economic success is
based on the developmentalist paradigm, propagandized by repressive military regimes since the
mid-1960s (Moon and Lim, 2003). Social fatigue stemming from this "growth first, other values
later" principle triggered a painstaking and dramatic transition to democracy in 1987 after 25
years of iron-fisted authoritarian rule (Cotton, 1998) as other values, such as environment,
economic justice, labor, and anti-corruption, began to compete against the developmentalist
paradigm.
South Korea has been quite successful in democratizing its political system' 8 and has
developed a relatively vibrant civil society in a remarkably short period of time, to the extent
that the current administration calls itself the "participatory government." However, it has
recently been experiencing a drastic increase in public disputes due to enhanced political
freedom. The society has not been ready to handle public disputes in sophisticated ways.
For these reasons, South Korea offers a sort of "natural experiment" through which to
analyze how to resolve public disputes among many conflicting interests around urban air
pollution within the capacities of a newly established democracy, and to compare theory to
practice. A case study of an attempt at consensus building in resolving a public dispute in a
17 In general, newly democratized countries are rapidly developing countries, which lead the third world countries
in East and Central Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Those countries may include Poland, the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico, Chile,
Guatemala, South Africa, and so forth.
18 According to Freedom house (2005), South Korea belongs to the group of countries with highest political
freedom.
fledgling democracy (whether the attempt succeeds or fails) could be very useful for decision
makers in nascent democracies all over the world.
The next section includes descriptions of cases of public dispute resolution efforts around
urban air quality management in South Korea. Examination of these cases suggests two case-
specific questions applicable to more general questions about dispute resolution in newly
democratized countries.
Dispute resolution efforts around urban air pollution in South Korea
The story began in early 2002. During that time, urban areas in South Korea were
suffering from serious air pollution as were urban areas in many rapidly developing countries.
Air quality in the Seoul Metropolitan area was particularly serious due to the concentration of
economic growth and rapid motorization in the capital city.
While some pollutants, such as sulfur dioxides (SO 2), carbon monoxide (CO), and lead
(Pb) had been successfully reduced by government efforts, levels of nitrogen oxides (NO2),
particulate matter (PM), and ground level ozone (03) in the air remained high and had even
increased in the area as the growing number of mobile sources led to increased emissions. The
high PM level in the air posed a particularly serious threat to urban residents and was attributed
to the rapidly increasing number of larger diesel vehicles, such as SUVs (Sport Utility Vehicles)
on the streets. At that time, more and more people were buying diesel SUVs, not only because
diesel fuels were much cheaper than gasoline, but also simply because more people could afford
SUVs as additional vehicles.
The national environmental agency, which had been aware of the seriousness of poor air
quality in the metropolitan area, decided it was time to prepare a new, stringent, and long-term
policy proposal to tackle metropolitan air pollution. The agency believed that without taking a
harsh and urgent step, air pollution would reach disastrous proportions in the metropolitan area
in the foreseeable future. The agency, also responsible for regulating emissions from mobile
sources, also needed to define measures to deal with increasing diesel vehicles on the roads.
Meanwhile, the major auto industries such as Hyundai and KIA, traditionally the very
backbone of the national economy, were hoping to market more private diesel vehicles in the
domestic market. They needed a domestic market as a niche, or base camp to nurture their
production in preparation for exporting more private diesel vehicles to foreign markets such as
the European countries. The current emission standard for private diesel vehicles in South Korea
was so tough that the companies could not sell any private diesel vehicles in South Korea. They
needed a change. Other industries also argued that the agency's proposals for air quality
management in Seoul metropolitan area were too harsh.
Furthermore, national agencies, such as those regulating commerce, industry,
construction and transportation, also opposed more stringent proposals by the environmental
agency. These other agencies have traditionally been more powerful than the environmental
agency, and were defending the status quo, or at the most small incremental change in
regulations.
Other important actors were conspicuous. Some media outlets emphasized the
seriousness of air pollution by showing photos of brown skies in the metropolitan area. A
number of environmental NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) quickly created a coalition
and began rallying in the streets to criticize the government and the industries they considered
responsible for the horrible air conditions in urban areas.
On the last day of December 2003, when the chairman of the National Assembly of South
Korea banged his gavel down to proclaim the passage of the "Special Act for Seoul
Metropolitan Air Quality Management" (the Special Act, hereafter), it meant the resolution of a
two-year-long rancorous public dispute involving multiple stakeholders and multiple issues
around the regulation of diesel private vehicles and the improvement of air quality in the Seoul
metropolitan area.
It was a major success, notable amid an increasing number of costly disputes around many
public policy decisions in South Korea. The fact that a Task Force of 15 members including
governmental officers, experts from academia, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and business associations reached consensus through a two-month
negotiation was heralded, inside and outside the government, as an innovative, successful case
of consensus building in public dispute resolution in South Korea 19 (Ministry of Environment,
2004).
In the year prior to this achievement, however, two participatory and collaborative
attempts at consensus building had ended in bitter failure. These exacerbated rather than
resolved the disputes, even after participants in each effort had declared a consensus (Table 1-1).
Table 1-1. Summary of three cases of dispute resolution efforts
Name The Joint Commission The Environment The Task Force
Commission
Period MAY 24 - SEP 4, 2002 JAN 11 - FEB 8, 2003 JUN 4 - JUL 25, 2003
Issues *Reclassification of * Emission standards * Legislation of Special
SUVs for diesel private Act for Seoul
*Emission standards for vehicles metropolitan air
19 The Ministry of Environment (MOE) was awarded as the most effective ministry among all governments by the
Prime Minister office in 2004 for its success in making a consensus for air quality management.
diesel private vehicles * Energy price system management
*Energy price system * Energy quality * Conditions to allow
* Legislation of Special the sales of diesel
Act for Seoul private vehicles
metropolitan air * Energy price system
management
Participation MOE, MOCIE, MOE, Environmental MOE, MOCIE, MOF,
Environmental NGO NGO coalitions, Experts MOCT, NGO
coalition, major Auto from academic coalitions, Experts,
makers Business associations
Result Near unanimous Unanimous consensus Unanimous consensus
consensus from the from the Commission from the Task Force and
C ommission but but Dispute was not Dispute was apparently
Dispute was not resolved resolved
resolved
Note: MOE: Ministry of Environment
MOCIE: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
MOF: Ministry of Finance
MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation
As seen in Table 1-1, the three consecutive cases of dispute resolution differed slightly
from each other in terms of issues and participants and occurred under different organizational
titles: the Joint Commission, the Environment Commission, and the Task Force. These efforts
were related; each case affected that following it. However, as will be shown, those effects were
both positive and negative in terms of dispute resolution.
In each of these three attempts, a group of stakeholders was invited to participate,
meeting face-to-face with governmental agencies in an effort to resolve disputes and build
consensus about how to manage urban air quality. These were the first experiments in
participatory planning in the history of urban air pollution regulation in South Korea.
A preliminary review of the three cases suggested two case-specific questions. First, why
did those first two dispute resolution efforts fail even with apparent consensus through
negotiations? Second, how was the Task Force able to finally resolve the disputes even after
they were exacerbated by two previous failures?
The next chapter includes an examination of the literature on regulatory processes in
case of urban air pollution and the recent shift toward more collaboration and stakeholder
participation in the advanced countries, especially the United States. 20 The chapter also includes
a review of literature on the theory of regulatory negotiation and more specifically the theory of
consensus building developed in the United States. This body of knowledge can be used by
stakeholders in newly developing countries seeking guidance on how to resolve disputes that
arise around regulatory processes.
20 While some European cases, such as Auto Oil program (1993-1996), play role models of collaboration among
stakeholders in urban air quality management for many other countries, I intend to focus more on the US
experience for some reasons. First, European regulatory processes have strong trans-national, or international
nature, which is distinct from domestic decision making processes in general. The European Union (EU) is
increasingly determining environmental policy in its member states. For air pollution from private vehicles, the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has considered vehicle emission regulation since 1957.
During the 1970s, the European Commission, as the policy making bureaucracy that supports the European Union,
imposed the UNECE regulations as directives on member countries on a voluntary basis (SEI, 1999). Thus,
decision making processes in European cases incurred much more complex structure of disagreement among
international government, national governments, several layers of sub-government, and private stakeholders than
those of single country context. Second, US regulatory policy has been more ambitious and this has resulted in
greater resistance from business than voluntary initiatives, commonly used in European countries, which have often
been criticized for being too lenient on industry (Vogel, 1986). For the sake of public dispute resolution, not
prevention, US cases can give more tangible lessons.
Chapter Two
Literature review
The history of regulatory processes of urban air pollution in the United States
The enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970 created the basic framework for air pollution
still operative in the United States. During the past three decades, Congress has twice passed
major legislation reauthorizing the act; the courts have interpreted its provisions in scores of
cases; and the EPA has issued thousands of regulations and enforcement actions under its
authority (Coglianese, 2000).21 Most research into the creation and development of current air
pollution regulation and other programs in the U.S. have been based on congressional legislative
processes and EPA's rule-making processes.
To obtain a better understanding of the characteristics of decision-making processes
associated with the Clean Air Act and its regulations, this section distinguishes three distinctive
and overlapping eras 22 in air pollution policy and politics in the United States: the 1970s, the
1980s, and the 1990s. In addition to a highly abbreviated account of the regulatory history of air
21 The Clean Air Act is a comprehensive Federal law which regulates air emissions from area, stationery and
mobile sources. It establishes National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which set maximum pollutant
standards. The main pollutants covered by the Act are carbon monoxide, sulfu dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile
organic compounds and lead. The goal of the Act was to achieve NAAQS in every state by 1975. In 1977, the
Clean Air Act was amended and set out new goals for achieving NAAQS since most of the states had failed to meet
them by 1975. The 1990 amendment was aimed at addressing issues such as acid rain, ground-level ozone,
stratospheric ozone depletion and air toxins which had been previously neglected by the Act. States are permitted to
have more stringent standards than the NAAQS but they cannot promulgate weaker standards. The states are
required to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which contain a compendium of the regulations that they
will implement in order to clean up polluted sites. Individual states are also obliged to include the public through
public hearings in the development of each SIP. The EPA must approve the SIPs and, if they are not approved, the
EPA can enforce the CAA in the state. The EPA also assists states by providing scientific research and funds to
support CAA programs.
22 1 used both Kraft (2000)'s historical framework on U.S. environmental politics, and Fiorino (2001)'s learning
model scheme as US environmental policy making as reference.
pollution, the relevant literature applicable to each period is explored in order to reveal the
special characteristics of regulatory processes during each period.
Age of strona air pollution policy as technical learning:L 1970s
The 1970s in the United States were notable for the extent of public aspirations for
environmental quality 24 and bipartisan cooperation on the adoption of new and expansive
environmental policies (Kraft, 2000). While the affected industries and all other interest groups
had access to Congressional debate, emerging social and political forces 25 helped "policy
entrepreneurs" 26 in Congress and the administration to overcome resistance from the regulated
industries 27 and pass the 1970 Clean Air Act. According to Fiorino (2001), the Clean Air Act in
23 Fiorino (2001)'s article is based on Pieter Glasbergen's (1996) work on environmental policy in the Netherlands,
which distinguish three types of policy learning: Technical learning, Conceptual learning, and Social learning.
24 Membership in the leading environmental groups had grown significantly following the first Earth Day on 22
April 1970. For example, the Sierra Club's membership grew from 15,000 in 1960 to 113,000 by 1970, and then
rose to 180,000 by 1980 (Kraft, 1996). The newly energized and well-endowed environmental lobby was making
its presence felt throughout the policymaking venues. The massive countervailing strength and transformative
power of the environmental social movement could help to tip the balance toward more environmental goals
(Sunstein, 1990).
25 The effect of this stunning growth in membership was to push the politics in a direction greatly favorable to the
policies endorsed by the leading environmental groups. Mounting evidence of environmental degradation, reaching
the public through wider media coverage of the issues and through popular books such as Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring (1962), propelled the issues to new heights on the political agenda. Public confidence in the federal
government, a strong economy, and a skeptical attitude toward the business community reinforced the deep current
of new social values and public concern for the environment and public health have been growing throughout the
1960s. Especially, Mobile source regulations were technology-forcing regulations, which did not depend on the
industry's current ability to meet the standard. Indeed, the technology forcing approach was the result of
Congressional distrust of mobile source manufactures' claims about technological feasibility.
26 Nixon supported demanding clean air legislation, and even competed with Senator Edmund Muskie (D. -Maine)
in offering increasingly stringent proposals on the pending Clean Air Act Amendments in Congress.
27 During the negotiations of the Clean Air Act (CAA), US industry used several strategies to prevent the
legislation from being adopted. One argument was that costs incurred would be too high as compared to the
benefits to be accrued, and that the CAA would pose a danger to the whole American economy. In 1970, for
example, Ford Motor Company claimed that the CAA could prevent continued production of automobiles and is a
threat to the entire American economy and to every person in America (Ford, 1970). Regarding the regulation on
lead phase-out in gasoline, the American Petroleum Institute wrote in 1972 that the proposed regulations were
without foundation from the point of view of public health hazards (American Petroleum Institute, 1972). In 1990,
the National Manufacturer's Association stated that the CAA would put millions of workers at risk, put thousands
of small companies out of business, and weaken the American economy and limit its capacity to become energy
independent (National Manufacturer's Association, 1990) Major in the arsenal of argument used by industry was
the claim that there was not enough scientific evidence of the environmental impacts of the pollutants which were
the 1970s was built upon technical learning. 28 It was characterized by a high degree of technical
and legal proficiency, but also top-down adversarial relations among actors. After the passage of
the Clean Air Act, the adversarial relationships 29 between regulator and industries led to legal
formalization and distrust (Bardach and Kagan, 1982). The newly empowered federal
government, particularly the EPA, often battled fiercely with the business community, as well as
with state and local officials, as policies were put into effect (Kraft, 2000). The regulated entities,
such as industries, were regarded not as participants in policy making but as objects of
regulatory authority (Fiorino, 2001).
The scholarly literature on the Congressional legislative 30 and administrative processes of
the Clean Air Act in the 1970s identifies the characteristics of the adversarial relationships
among actors and tries to understand the processes within various policy-making frameworks.
Many scholars framed the Clean Air Act as the subject of intense interest-group struggle"3 at the
national level (Steward, 1975; Lowi, 1979; Ackerman and Hassler, 1981) and the local level
(Crenson, 1971; Jones, 1975). They regarded the legislation as the product of bargaining
to be covered by the Act. This was especially the case before the 1990 amendment, when industry questioned
stating that further research was needed before action could be taken. Industry denied the necessary of a Clean Air
Act to protect the environment either because it did not perceive any potential environmental harm or because it did
not see any correlation between pollution and environmental degradation. Industry denied that air pollution
threatened public health and accused the EPA of over-reacting without taking into consideration the effect on
industry.
28 Comparative analyses show that most Western nations initially approached environmental problems through
technical learning (Janicke, 1996; Dryzek, 1997). For many years, the United States was an exemplar of technical
learning, one that other nations strove to emulate.
29 Although this adversarial relationship was later seen as a weakness of the U.S. approach, it was deliberately built
into the design. Reacting to evidence of industry capture of economic regulators, policy makers designed a system
based on "adversarial legalism" (Kagan, 1995).
30 Case studies of individual statues have tended to dominate the literature on congressional efforts to control air
pollution in the 1970s and 1980s (Randall B. Ripley, "Congress and Clean Air: The Issue of Enforcement, 1963 in
Frederick N. Cleaveland and associates (eds), Congress and Urban Problems (Washington, D.C.; Brookings, 1996);
Helen Ingram 'The Political Rationality of Innovation: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 in Ann F.
Friedlaender (ed.), Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); Richard E. Cohen
Washington at Work: Back Rooms and Clean Air (New York; Macmillan, 1992)).
31 The pluralist/interest group framework is the policy process model that stresses the importance of interest groups.
In this view, legislation might be result of the pressure that interest groups are able to exert on government to deal
with a particular problem. According to Latham (1952), what may be called public policy is actually the
equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment.
between different interest groups.
Behind the struggles and bargaining lay a core assumption that economic and
environmental goals conflict. Opponents of expanded regulation argued that any expenditure on
pollution control was a deterrent to economic growth. Advocates of regulation assumed that
economic growth translated directly into environmental damage. The policy debate focused on
the conflicts between them (Fiorino, 2001).
For example, environmental groups have tried to persuade politicians that air pollution
warrants government attention. Business groups have often, though not always, sought to
dissuade government from taking action. 32 In fact, auto manufacturers promoted national
emissions standards in the late 1960s in order to forestall the introduction of state emission
standards (Rose-Ackerman, 1981). Most environmental groups have favored command-and-
control regulatory strategies to control air pollution. Business groups have promoted the efficacy
of economic incentives (Bailey, 1996).
However, some scholars point to limitations of the pluralist/interest group theory in
explaining the early federal environmental statues in terms of conventional interest group
politics. They say that no striking imbalance is apparent between the organizational presence
of environmentalists and industry in 1970 which might account for the stringent provisions of
the Clean Air Act (Elliot et al., 1985). These theorists explain the unfolding of urban air
pollution policies 33 as the products of goal-oriented government agency problem solvers
(Lundqvist, 1980; Bailey, 1998). These policy makers evaluated different alternatives in terms
32 See Matthew Crenson, The Un-politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-decision making in the Cities
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). He analyzes the way in which powerful interests are able to
prevent issues that are awkward to them ever reaching the political agenda at all. According to him, US steel in
Gary, Indiana was able to affect decision making by the city. He concludes that where cities have powerful
polluters, the issue of clean air is unlikely to emerge.
They use institutional rational choice framework as policy process model which places government institutions at
center stage and views politicians and bureaucrats as the key actors in determining the supply of legislation.
of their contributions to the achievement of air pollution policy goals.
Bailey (1998) delves into the role of Congress in creating the Clean Air Act. Kraft (1995)
argues that legislators supported clean air proposals to enhance their re-election prospects, rather
than because they believed in the importance of the issues. Hall (1987) suggests that some
legislators can have a strong interest in the issue of air pollution, wish to make a personal mark
on policy or simply want to exercise power.
Others try to expand the range of political actors beyond the interest groups or politicians
recognized as having an impact on legislative or administrative outcomes (Heclo, 1978;
Milward and Walmsley, 1984; Sabatier, 1991). They argue that air pollution control legislation
could be explained in terms of the interaction of a range of public and private groups operating
within a policy subsystem or network. For example, Sabatier (1991) argues that in the 1970s and
1980s, there were two distinctive advocacy coalitions in operation. He characterizes one of these
as the Clean Air Coalition dominated by environmental and public health groups; it promoted a
standard environmentalist agenda prioritizing health concerns over economic development.
Competing with this group was an Economic Feasibility Coalition which opposed effective air
pollution policies. This group was dominated by industrial sources of air pollution, energy
companies, their allies in Congress, several labor unions, some state and local pollution control
officials, and several economists.34
Political conflict and conceptual learninig: 1980s
The 1980s and the mid 1990s comprised an era of challenge and partisan conflict over the
34 But, Sabatier fails to explain why the clean air coalition rather than the economic feasibility coalition should
dominate the policy process during those periods (Bailey, 1998)
35 Conceptual learning: is a process of redefining policy goals and adjusting problem definitions and strategies.
Policy objectives are debated, perspectives on issues change, strategies are reformulated. New concepts such as
pollution prevention, ecological modernization, sustainability, enter the lexicon.
goals and values of environmentalism (Kraft, 2000). The business community, anchored in
concern for efficiency and effectiveness, had greatly improved its lobbying presence in
Washington, D.C. They argued that much of the environmental legislation of the 1970s had
overestimated the speed with which new technologies could be developed and applied,3 6 and
underestimated compliance costs and the difficulty of writing standards for hundreds of major
industries. In the early 1980s, they were emboldened by the arrival of Ronald Reagan's
Republican administration, convinced it had a mandate to reduce government intervention in the
economy.
The political battle over how to balance environmental and economic goals became fiercer
in the 1980s, when the Republican administration's strategy for legislative change was
frustrated by the Democratic Congress. The Reagan administration turned to an administrative
strategy of cutting environment budgets, trimming enforcement, instituting cost-based review of
agency rules by the Office of Management and Budget, and initiating rules to grant regulatory
relief to regulated firms. In this political climate, regulated industries tried to block the
implementation of environmental policies, while environmental organizations tried to speed it
up. Frequent legal challenges led to a large backlog of cases. 3
Further technical data was less important to breaking this impasse than were new
conceptual alternatives to regulation. Fiorino (2001) comments that, to cope with the difficulty
in balancing two apparently irreconcilable goals, policy makers in the 1980s turned to two new
36 Eventually, Nixon had to mollify core Republican constituencies in business and industry, who opposed tough
regulations on air pollution. In 1977, the Clean Air Act was amended and set out new goals for achieving NAAQS,
since most of the states had failed to meet them by 1975. Dissatisfaction with the air pollution control system grew
substantially after the late 1970s. By the late 1970s, the impact of new environmental regulations on the economy
began to create a backlash that would reach its full expression in the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
37 The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments explicitly required the EPA to substantially tighten diesel emissions
standards. Despite the 1977 Amendments requirement of increased regulation, the EPA continued to drag its feet on
issuing standards for heavy duty diesels. Ultimately the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) successfully
sued to force the EPA to issue final NOx and particulate standards.
approaches. First, they became interested in alternatives and complements to direct regulation.
Applied mostly to air pollution, instruments such as emission trading, the bubble policy, and
acid rain allowance trading incorporate a system of economic incentives into the existing
regulatory framework. These innovations provide some flexibility from the uniformity and
technology basis of the technical model by allowing firms to trade pollution-control
requirements and distribute costs more efficiently (Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whitehead, 1997).
Second, because part of the evolution from purely technical to conceptual learning is
dissatisfaction with adversarial and legalistic processes,38 there was a growing use of consensus-
based processes. The techniques of alternative dispute resolution were applied to a variety of
situations 39 (Bingham, 1986), such as regulatory negotiation. 4 0 The new learning responded to
what Philip Harter (1982) called the "malaise" of traditional rule making.4 1 Proponents of
regulatory negotiation argued that this would reduce litigation over the content of rules, speed
rule making, and produce better rules (Harter, 1982) because the negotiation process brings the
3" Critics point to a number of fundamental limitations of the traditional adversarial approach to environmental
regulations. They argue traditional environmental governance is dominated by industrial and environmental special
interests, wrought with excessive conflict (Kemmis, 1990; DeWitt, 1994; Shutkin, 2000; Sable, Karkkainen, and
Fung, 2000).
39 There was the steady expansion in the use of consensus-based techniques from a handful between 1974 and 1977
to an average of some 25 each year from 1980 to 1985.
40 EPA began its Regulatory Negotiation Project in 1983 and its first negotiations in 1984. In this process, agencies,
regulated entities, and other interest groups negotiated the content of the rule to be imposed before the agency
formally begins the rulemaking process. The first negotiated rulemaking is about noncompliance penalties (NCPs)
for heavy duty diesel engines. As emission standards tightened in the 1980s, meeting them became more costly and
more difficult for the engine manufacturers. Because failing to meet the standards could result in loss of
certification for an engine, a potential death sentence for an engine manufacturer, the engine manufacturers sought
flexibility from the EPA in meeting tightened standards. The EPA introduced several provisions allowing delays to
accommodate economic circumstances and the need for lead time. The EPA created noncompliance penalties
(NCPs) that allowed engine manufactures to continue to sell engine which did not meet emissions standards in
return for payment of fines. This provision resulted from the EPA's first use of negotiated rulemaking, with
agreement on the rule reached in four months.
41 Until the 1980s, administrative agencies in the United States carried out their regulatory duties almost entire
through traditional rulemaking. Agencies issued written regulations that informed regulated entities how the
regulated must conduct various aspects of their businesses. The regulated entities and other interest groups have the
opportunity to comment on proposals, interested parties may seek judicial review of the agencies' procedural and
substantive compliance with the relevant statutory framework as created by the legislature, and interest groups may
seek action by the political branches to alter the agency's actions.
main interest groups touched by a regulation's provisions into direct negotiations with the
agency.
Emerging capacity for Social learning: 1990s
Dissatisfaction with the typical adversarial relationships in U.S. environmental regulation
was widespread throughout the 1990s (Ruckelshaus, 1998). The EPA had been regularly sued
by interest groups over its regulation-by-rulemaking activities, over allegations that the EPA's
regulations were too lenient, too strict, or otherwise violate federal law.
However, dissatisfaction stimulates learning (Rose, 1993). While the political battles
between environment and economy continued in the 1990s,42 policy makers searched for
lessons to draw from their own experience or that of others to ease disputes around
environmental regulations. People turned to the European experience, especially in Scandinavia
and the Netherlands, of cooperative, integrated policy systems with a capacity for dialogue.
These systems may be seen in terms of social learning, 43 a process with direct implications
for a new concept of democracy (Fiorino, 2001). The shift to social learning depends on the
development of relationships among participants; it is characterized by continuous processes of
interaction between social actors, groups, and forces and semi-public organizations, institutions,
or authorities (Kooiman, 1993). In this model, government, industry, and others share
42 President George H. Bush maintained an executive order mandating cost benefit analysis for new environmental
regulations that was first issued in 1981 in the Reagan administration, and he supplemented that process with a new
White House oversight body, the Council on Competitiveness. The Council was widely criticized for providing a
back door for business groups eager to weaken environmental and other regulatory policies. Clinton as the next
President made repeated efforts to work with Congress to reform the major environmental statues throughout the
1990s, but policy gridlock prevailed from 1993 through 1998, and political conditions worsened with the election
of a Republican Congress in 1994. The Congress was eager to cut environmental budgets and weaken regulations
and the White House was rising to their defense.
43 Social learning emerged in response to the dynamism of problems and changes in the institutional, political, and
physical environment (Kooiman, 1993).
responsibility for achieving policy goals (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). For example, industry
is given more influence in setting standards and flexibility in deciding how to meet them, but it
shares more responsibility with government for achieving goals.
This kind of learning required changes in assumptions about particular roles and
relationships among actors, which was not easy. For example, EPA, an institution whose legal
mandates and political circumstances had forced it into an adversarial relationship with industry,
had to play the facilitator among the very interests whose behavior it had sought to control. The
representatives of U.S. industry, far more accustomed to seeing the EPA as an issuer of rules
and an enforcer, were asked to sit down cooperatively with that same EPA in a public forum.
Environmental groups generally were skeptical of this apparent transformation in the EPA's role
and its relationship with industry.
At the heart of social learning in the regulatory process was negotiated rule making. EPA
began several experiments with regulatory negotiations in the 1980s and gained supporters
within a variety of federal agencies. Finally, negotiated rule making was formalized by the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, and permanently established by the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (Harter, 2000). The EPA became one of the most aggressive
users of regulatory negotiation, completing 12 negotiated rulemakings through 1996.
The case study by Weber and Khademian (1997) deals with a regulatory negotiation
process for EPA's controversial reformulated gasoline (RFG) regulation in the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendment. Philip Harter, a proponent of negotiated rule making has pointed to the
averaging provision 44 in EPA's reformulated gasoline regulation combined with a somewhat
44 The averaging provision gave refiners more flexibility by allowing them to meet fuel standards on average over
entire stocks of fuel rather than gallon by gallon. In return for this flexibility, refiners were required to meet average
standards that were 10 percent more stringent, thus allaying some environmentalist' concerns.
more stringent standard as an example of a key conflict avoidance innovation that EPA would
not have developed had it not needed to find consensus.45
Regulatory negotiation had an auspicious beginning in the 1990s; its proponents claimed a
wide range of benefits based on reasonable theoretical speculation. In practice, it is questionable
whether all of these benefits could be realized (Coglianese, 2001). There is now considerable
debate whether the regulatory negotiation process has produced any of the proposed benefits
(Funk, 1997; Harter, 2000; Freeman and Langbein, 2000; Coglianese, 2001).
However, negotiated rule making has proven enormously successful in developing
agreements even in highly polarized situations and has enabled parties to identify the best, most
effective, or most efficient way of solving some regulatory controversies. Agencies have
therefore turned to it to resolve particularly difficult, contentious issues that have eluded closure
through traditional rule-making procedures. The next section describes negotiated rule making
in more detail including its core tenet, the theory of consensus building. The objective is to
introduce and apply this social learning process to policy making in the context of rapidly
developing countries.
Consensus-based regulatory negotiation as a policy process
Consensus-based regulatory negotiation still attracts a remarkable amount of scholarly
attention in the United States. However, it has also been the target of often vitriolic skepticism
from both practitioners and academic analysts 46 (Amy, 1987; Rose-Ackerman, 1994; Werhan,
45 Harter advanced this argument in remarks delivered to the administrative law section of the Association of
American Law Schools at its meeting on January 9, 1998.46 For example, regulatory negotiation proved unattractive to some administrative law scholars, who attacked it first
1996; Funk, 1997; Beardsley, Davies, and Hersh, 1997; Rossi, 1997; Harrison, 1999; Caldart
and Ashford, 1999; Coglianese, 2001).
Based on empirical evidence 47 that called the claimed advantages for regulatory rule
making into question, these critics contend that the consensus-building process fails to live up to
its purported benefits. They focus on the countless potential pitfalls that may turn worthy ideas
into political nightmares, such as the erosion of state authority,48 insufficient representation of
the public interest, 49 administrative incompetence,50 regulatory imprecision, increased time and
expense, the lowest-common-denominator problem, unrealistic expectations, new sources of
conflict due to shaky or fragile consensus, cooptation by powerful conveners due to political
inequality, 51 and so forth.
Advocates for consensus-based decision making in the United States (Susskind and
on theoretical and later on empirical grounds. For some, the mere idea of negotiating rules with stakeholders
seemed anathema to the traditional concept of the agency as a faithful agent of Congress. They argued by shifting
the decision burden to stakeholders who owe no duty to the public or to Congress, regulatory negotiation invites
agency abdication of responsibility. Thus, the process embodies what many administrative law theorists viscerally
fear: the last step from a system of arm's-length interest representation- which preserves the agency's hierarchical
authority- to one of direct interest group bargaining (Freeman and Langbein, 2000).
47 In practice, there was the EPA's sharp drop off in use of negotiated rulemaking after 1993.
48 The great failing of regulatory negotiation from the point of view of the agency is that institutionally negotiated
rulemaking reduces the agency's power relative to the regulated entities and other interest groups by granting them
a veto over the consensus required.
49 Apart from limited representation of general public in negotiation table, Judge Patricia Wald (1997) concludes
that regulatory negotiation restricts in some measure through its insistence on face-to-face negotiations, the
intrusion of political and extra-substantive considerations at all levels of rulemaking, agency and White House, and
from all sources, identified and unidentified.
50 According to Coglinese (2001), even when agencies do adopt regulatory negotiations, agencies do not do so for
their most important rules. Agencies have eschewed negotiated rulemaking for federal rules having the broadest
and most substantial impacts on industry and the public. The rules chosen for regulatory negotiation have stood at
least a notch below EPA's large programmatic rules in terms of their scope and importance. Each of the negotiated
rules has affected only a limited number of parties, at times just a single industry, precisely as the agency's own
guidelines suggest. Instead of selecting the most challenging rules, the agency has used negotiated rulemaking for
what an earlier EPA report called second-tier-rules or those rules affecting program implementation-rather than
rules establishing program structure.
51 Agency decisions on the relative merits of regulatory decision in particular cases may differ from those of
interest groups. Ellen Siegler (1997), commenting on the American Petroleum Institute's participation in two
regulatory negotiations concluded that environmental group participants have an advantage in regulatory
negotiation over industry participants because they were not required to educate other participants, did not have to
establish their credibility as experts, also enjoyed the advantages of having well-developed negotiation skills and
experience, did not have to check back with their constituencies at every turn.
McMahon, 1985; Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 1997; Healey, 1998; Susskind
et al., 1999; Freeman and Langbein, 2000; Harter, 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Booher
and Innes, 2002; Innes, 2004) reject such skepticism by calling for authentic dialogue that would
require the meeting of procedural conditions such as the inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
(important parties), fair process management, and some procedural safeguards mandated by
administrative laws, 52 in order to label a process "consensus building." These defenders claim
that critics have extrapolated from observation of poorly managed processes, in which the
conditions for authentic dialogue were not met.
In the heated debate over the pros and cons of consensus-based regulatory negotiation, it is
clear that some processes are successful and others fail. To increase the potential for favorable
outcomes, theorists and practitioners of consensus-based regulatory negotiation are working
toward a definition of the conditions necessary for successful consensus building in regulatory
decision making.
This chapter includes an analysis of academic theories related to consensus-based
regulatory negotiation. The terms "consensus-based negotiated rule making" includes three key
ideas: The first is "consensus building." Building consensus should be built through the second
idea, "interest-based negotiations." Third, these negotiations are embedded in a "regulatory or
policy process." To learn something meaningful from the history of negotiated rule making as
an alternative tool for public dispute resolution requires the understanding of the theories and
52 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA) of 1990 requires federal agencies to provide notice of regulatory
negotiations in the Federal Register (5 U.S.C. § 564(a) (1994)), to formally charter regulatory negotiation
committees (5 U.S.C. § 565(a)), and to observe the transparency and accountability requirements (5 U.S.C. §
566(d), (g)) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15). Any individual or organization that
might be "significantly affected" by a proposed rule can apply for membership in a regulatory negotiation
committee (5 U.S.C. § 564(b)), and even if the agency rejects their application, they remain free to attend as
spectators. Most significantly, the NRA requires that the agency submit negotiated rules to traditional notice and
comment.
practices that define these three important concepts (Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1. Understanding of negotiated rulemaking in the policy process
Consensus Buildin2
The theory of consensus building and its propositions as the backbone of regulatory
negotiation process has been developed over the last two decades by Lawrence Susskind and
others (1985, 1987, 1996, 1999). To address difficult environmental and other public policy
disputes, Susskind suggests a number of procedural steps and techniques that conveners,
facilitators, and stakeholders should take in building consensus. Susskind and his colleagues
contend that a consensus-building process should follow these steps:
* Conveners, usually government agencies, hire neutral and professional facilitator to
manage a consensus-building process.
* The neutral and professional facilitator conducts a conflict asse4ssment,
* The relevant stakeholders select their own representatives to participate in the
proposed processes.
* A set of ground rules to guide group participant behavior in and outside the process
is established.
* Joint-fact finding is used to address scientific disagreement and uncertainty.
* A strategy for implementing the agreement is defined.
The sections below detail each procedural step and relate them to the theory and practice
of regulatory negotiation.
Hiring neutral, professional facilitators
Conveners of a consensus-building process consider several factors in hiring neutral,
professional facilitators to assist in managing consensus building or negotiation processes
among stakeholders for two main reasons. First, in hiring a facilitator, conveners should seek the
consent of stakeholder representatives; this will help ensure neutrality. Neutrality in managing
processes is important because, in many cases conveners also can have stakes or hidden agendas
in negotiations. Stakeholder buy-in cannot be gained unless the management of the process is
perceived to be neutral. Stakeholders will more readily accept a facilitator's assistance in the
next phases of the process, such as conflict assessment, ground rule setting, and joint-fact
finding if that person is considered neutral. Second, facilitators can help negotiating parties
clarify for themselves and others the meaning behind their claims, statements, and arguments
(Moore, 1986).
Assessing Conflict
Conflict assessment by neutral facilitators should be conducted in order to identify the
conflicting issues and legitimate stakeholders (not representatives), figure out areas of potential
agreements by drawing an issue-stakeholder map, and even propose some initial steps for
consensus building among identified stakeholders. Before the issuing of the final report of
conflict assessment, all stakeholders should have the opportunity to review and comment on it.
The final report may imply that a consensus-building effort is not appropriate given the situation.
To do conflict assessment, a neutral facilitator or a group of facilitators may learn
something about the potential stakeholders from the conveners first but they should conduct
their own interviews to create a comprehensive list of relevant and legitimate stakeholders.
Identifying all relevant stakeholders and important issue areas is the first and foremost step
in a consensus-building process, because unidentified but important stakeholders can endanger
the consensus-building process at later stages by challenging the legitimacy of the final
agreement among negotiating parties. In this step, identifying stakeholders does not mean
selecting representatives from each of the stake-holding groups. Representatives in a consensus-
building process should be chosen by the stake-holding groups themselves. These
representatives should be able to represent the interests of the groups well and communicate
effectively with constituents.
Establishing Ground rules
Susskind and other scholars recommend spending a considerable amount of time and
resources at the beginning of the process on elements such as assessing conflict and setting
ground rules to make consensus building more successful. Ground rules will govern
representatives' behavior inside and outside of the negotiation process. For example, all
representatives together should discuss and consent to codes of conduct during deliberation (e.g.,
not to intercept or criticize other speaker's arguments); time management (e.g., maintaining a
schedule); roles of the convener, facilitators, and representatives; decision rules (e.g., whether to
use unanimity, supra-majority, voting for final package or each agenda); and communication
with media or the general public on the progress of the deliberations. These ground rules are
important safeguards against potential misbehaviors which could endanger the consensus-
building process.
Pursue joint fact-finding
Environmental policy making should be based on sound science. However, scientists are
sometimes unable to provide clear-cut answers to decision makers. When there are high stakes
on a certain environmental issue, scientific uncertainty can be utilized by stakeholders to block
implementation or support certain decisions. Moreover, partisans in public policy disputes are
unlikely to defer to experts selected by their opponents. So-called adversarial science is more
conspicuous in traditional rule-making processes and litigation. Stakeholders will attack the
assumptions or methodology underlying each other's self-justifying scientific models. This
common practice exacerbates tension and disputes among stakeholders.
To deal with this problem, consensus-building theorists recommend joint fact finding. In
this approach, stakeholders with differing viewpoints and interests work together to define a set
of questions to be answered, an analytic method, and a process to collect necessary data and
information; to select a group of experts to perform the research, analyze facts and forecasts,
and develop common assumptions and informed opinion; and finally, to use the information
developed to reach decisions together (Ozawa, 1991; Susskind et al., 1999).
Unfortunately, even when joint fact finding is used as part of carefully structured public
deliberation, dialogue--no matter how well facilitated--is unlikely to lead to agreement on public
policy choices. Argumentation, no matter how skillfully presented or corroborated by expert
advice, will rarely cause partisans in public policy debates to put their own interests (as they see
them) aside (Susskind, 2006).
Design a strategy to implement the agreement
The product of consensus building is a proposal, not a final decision. The proposal must
be acted upon by those with the relevant authority to do so. Thus, the product of most
consensus-building efforts, no matter how detailed, is almost always subject to further review
and action by elected or appointed officials. Of course, were those officials to significantly
modify the proposal, the groups involved would disavow their support. Also, representatives of
the agencies themselves typically participate usually in the entire consensus-building effort.
Their main concerns should have been addressed by the group (Susskind, 2006).
Stakeholder representatives at the table need to think clearly about how the agreement will
be shared with their constituencies. Negotiating parties should develop a strategy to handle
disputes and uncertainties about the proposed plan in the future and prepare the regulations,
guidelines, or legislation necessary to enable the implementation of the agreement. One way to
do this is to lay out a range of contingent commitments that will come into play only if
unpredictable events occur or milestones are reached. Another is for the agreement to spell out
monitoring requirements, incentives for performance, and penalties for non-compliance.
A regulatory negotiation process includes the consensus-building steps described above. 53
The agency, for example, EPA, retains an outside contractor to convene the negotiations and
53 EPA's process for the first negotiated rulemaking has been described in detail in Susskind and McMahon (1985).
recommends a neutral facilitator, subject to the committee's approval (Use of neutral,
professional facilitators). In the committee, affected interests could be represented by 15 to 20
people. They will invest the time and resources required to work through issues to reach a
consensus typically defined as "the concurrence of all interests represented" on the committee.
Once the committee is constituted, it has substantial control over its mode of operation,
composition, use of resources, and the terms and timing of its dissolution. At the outset, each
committee adopts its own protocols (Set ground rules). The committee also determines what
factual information or other data is necessary for them to make a reasoned decision, develop that
information, analyze the information, examine the legal and policy issues involved in the
regulation, and reach a consensus on their recommendations to the agency (Pursue joint fact-
finding). As part of the consensus, each private interest agrees to support the recommendation
and resulting rule to the extent that it reflects the agreement, and the agency agrees to use the
recommendation as the basis of its action (Design a strategy for implementing the agreement).
However, just as consensus-building processes complement conventional decision making,
regulatory negotiations complement, but do not replace, conventional rule making. They take
place within the notice-and-comment format prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Negotiating parties retain their right to judicial review of the final rule. Agencies also
charter the negotiating committees under the Federal Advisory Committees Act (FACA). This
legislation requires a number of procedural requirements regarding public notice, open meetings,
and summaries of the negotiating sessions. The agency participates as a party-at-interest in the
negotiations. Like any other party, the agency can block agreement or withdraw without
prejudice at any point. The protocols allow participants to discontinue negotiations at any time if
they do not appear productive. Participation does not prohibit a party from seeking judicial
review of a final rule later.
Working through interest-based negotiation
The theory and practice of consensus building is perfectly consistent with the spirit of
deliberative democracy 54 outlined in the political theory literature (Mansbridge, 1980; Cohen,
1983; Barber, 1984; Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 2000; Fung 2004) in which theorists argue that
legitimate law making can only arise from the public deliberation of the citizenry. However, it
should be noted that the theory of consensus building, in contrast to Habermas' (1981) discourse
theory, which distinguishes strategic and communicative action, 55 has deep roots in the practices
and theories of interest-based negotiation, mediation, and alternative dispute resolution.
Consensus building is based on approaches to planning and policy making (Fisher and Ury,
1983; Moore, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Innes, 2004) structures that do not require
the individual parties to act impartially but rather allow them to pursue their own interests.
Therefore, the theory of interest-based negotiation is embedded in the consensus-building
process.
The so-called "Harvard concept for successful negotiation" (Fisher and Ury, 1983)
emphasizes a rational basis for the process. Fisher and Ury suggest that emotions should be
separated from the factual basis of the problem; the parties to the negotiation should concentrate
on their interests instead of their positions; as many alternative solutions as possible should be
54 Deliberative democracy refers to any system of political decisions based on some tradeoff of consensus-based
decision making and representative democracy. It focuses as much on the process as the results (Elster, 1998).
55 The idea of communicative rationality is an epistemological view, parallel to the idea of scientific method. In this
model of ideal speech situation, where interests engage in dialogue, undistorted by power differentials and
information differences and where assumptions are challenged, a kind of truth is formed. Shared understanding
develops, reifications are broken down and interests work through their differences to produce more complete,
meaningful, and robust knowledge than scientific method or socially-constructed negotiations in situations where
controversies and multiple goals and contradictions abound. The participants are required to act impartially and to
be ready to change their preferences (Habermas, 1981).
developed and considered; and finally, the various options for solutions should be subject to
neutral criteria of evaluation.
Another key assumption that negotiation theory contributes to the consensus-building
process is explained under the heading of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement) popularized by Fisher and Ury (1983). People will come to the negotiation table (or
consensus-building process), stay at the table, accept a proposed agreement obtained through
negotiation, and/or implement the agreement as long as they believe negotiations (and/or the
agreement reached through negotiation) will produce an outcome for them that is as good as or
better than the outcomes that would result from other available methods of pursuing their
interests. Therefore, in theory, a consensus-building effort can be jeopardized when key
stakeholders either do not come to the table or opt out from negotiation based upon whether or
not they think their alternatives away from the negotiation table will produce better results56.
In the policy process
While the increased use of consensus building in public disputes reflects mediation and
negotiation rather than litigation strategies, negotiated rule making is distinct from consensus
building generally used to resolve public disputes in terms of purpose, scope, and complexity of
context. First, regulatory negotiation is more prospective in its orientation. Its purpose is less to
resolve specific disputes than to define general regulations that will influence later behavior
(Harter, 1982). Second, the disputes that negotiated rule making aims to resolve extend beyond
56 In practice, however, parties to a proposed negotiation may not be sure of their BATNAs and this uncertainty
may help bring them to the negotiation table. Unless all the key groups refuse to participate, any group that decides
to hold out and challenge the rule in court at a later time will face difficulty mustering allies for such a challenge.
And, convenors and facilitators reassure participants that the process is voluntary and that they can quit at any time.
That means that, even if the interest groups fail to get what they want from others, they know they could walk away
and block consensus. Thus, participation (or, coming to negotiation table) does not preclude stakeholders from
pursuing other options later (Susskind and McMahon, 1985)
particular geographic sites or concrete disputes and have broad policy applicability. Third,
consensus-based regulatory negotiation is inherently embedded in the larger context of policy
processes.
Negotiated rule making is a hybrid of the principles and institutional philosophy of
political pluralism in which traditional rule making is combined with consensus-building
techniques (Fiorino, 1988). In a traditional rule-making process, agency regulatory activity is
subject to political constraints 57 through appropriations riders, oversight hearings, and other
means. Agencies must also take the views of members of Congress and the President into
account in shaping regulations. In regulatory negotiation, agencies must both negotiate and
conduct a traditional notice-and-comment rule making after the negotiations conclude (Morris et
al., 2003).
Given the hybrid nature of negotiated rule making, one characteristic of the consensus-
building process makes negotiated rule making fragile: any participant, including an agency
representative, can veto the outcome. Even after consensus is reached, there is always the
possibility that others will revert to traditional tactics of litigation, a public-relations campaign,
or an appeal to political officials with the power to nullify the agreement.58
However, the ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) literature, including that on
consensus building, tends to concentrate for the most part on what goes on inside the procedure
57 Michigan Congressman John Dingell, for example, for years has exerted great influence over the EPA's
regulatory efforts regarding mobile sources. (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998). Dingell's relentless advocacy on
behalf the auto industry has undoubtedly reduced mobile source regulation and so possibly increased air pollution.
Adler (1992) discusses Congressman Dingell's efforts to force automobile companies and oil companies to stick
together on air pollution issues.
58 A research on regulatory negotiation in the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports a very
active post-negotiation period during which participants continue to communicate with the agency and with
members of their own organization and coalition, among others. Individuals reported communicating most often
with the EPA and others in their own organization. The reasons most frequently given for such communication
were: to provide or obtain information about some element of the rule (72% of responses), to try to effect a change
in the final rule (20%)1, or to plan strategy for the post-rulemaking period (9%). Only 25% of the respondents
reported that their post proposal communications resulted in a change in the rule (Freeman and Langbein, 2000).
of consensus building itself and does not give systemic attention to external factors that might
influence it during and after the negotiation. This literature argues that the important factors
rendering positions more flexible and consensus reachable are to be found at the negotiating
table (Holzinger, 2001). Lax and Sebenius (1985) argue that an actor's willingness to
compromise is not determined solely at the procedural level. In this view, the course of
negotiations and the final results of bargaining also, and perhaps even more, are determined by
what goes on "away from the negotiating table." 59 Exogenous shocks during and after
negotiations can be of considerable importance in explaining policy change and development,
because the shocks can mean more negotiating power for certain parties.
The consensus-building literature are clearly limited in explaining the significance of
dynamics outside negotiation processes. The next section outlines how theories of policy
process frame negotiation or bargaining in from another angle.
Consensus (or bargaining) in policy processes
A complete picture of consensus building through regulatory negotiation requires an
understanding of policy process or policy change, since external contexts can powerfully
influence the internal workings of a consensus-building process. Theories of policy process
explain how policy decisions are affected by interest politics and policy disputes among many
stakeholders.
Any policy-making process can be staggeringly complex and require a knowledge of the
59 For example, those within the EPA favoring a hard line against industry would have had little negotiating power,
when the Reagan Administration was generally unsympathetic to increasing regulatory burdens during the 1980s.
While Congress and the Administration were unlikely to allow the EPA to set strict standards that would harm
industries severely, the main obstacle for the EPA was the opposition of environmental pressure groups, who had to
be convinced that the EPA had not given away to industries. The negotiated rulemaking setting allowed the
industry to credibly convey financial information to the environmental pressure groups to prove it had not gotten
too good a deal from the EPA (Morris et al., 2004).
interests of many stakeholders each of whom actively seek to put a specific "spin" on events
involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues. The analyst of policy process must
find some way of simplifying the situation to have any chance of understanding it (Sabatier,
1999).
This analysis discusses two theories of policy process 60 widely acknowledged as the most
influential and coherent conceptualizations of policy processes: the Multiple Stream Framework
(hereafter, MSF) by Kingdon (1984) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (hereafter, ACF)
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993).
Kingdon (1984) elaborated the so-called stream model developed by Cohen, March, and
Olsen (1972) in order to explain the agenda-setting process. His idea is that decision making
consists mainly of a stream in which problems are discussed (problem stream), a stream in
which solutions are discussed (policy stream), and a stream consisting of things such as the
attitude of the public, campaigns by pressure groups, administrative change and ideological
contributions (politics stream). The three streams exist simultaneously and each develops
according to its own dynamics and rules.
Major policy changes are most likely to occur when the three streams become linked,
when actors with solutions in the policy stream encounter appropriate problems and find
political commitment. Such linkages can occur especially when there is favorable momentum,
termed a "policy window" by Kingdon.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's ACF (1993) is also an attempt to analyze these streams,
6" There are many theories of policy process. Although all theories were developed to encapsulate aspects of
policy-making in advanced post-industrial societies characterized by high degrees of bureaucratization and
professionalization, those theories do not necessarily travel well. For example, the advocacy coalition framework
works better both analytically and prescriptively in the United States while the policy networks framework works
better in Europe, because American politics tend to be more fluid and less institutionally rigid than European
politics.
particularly the policy and political streams, but it deals with the entire policy process, not just
agenda setting and policy formulation. ACF was developed to account for policy change over
periods of a decade or more.61 It integrates political scientists' traditional preoccupation with
elections, institutional rules, and socioeconomic conditions, and the concerns of Carol Weiss
(1977, 1979) and other scholars with the role of scientific information and policy analysis in that
process.6 2
The ACF defines a policy subsystem as the set of actors63 who are involved in dealing
with a policy problem; it does not describe how to arrange procedural matters. In a policy
subsystem, advocacy coalitions are built around a few shared core belief systems. Technical and
scientific information can be introduced into the study of belief change and ultimately of policy
change.
While proponents of these two models analyze policy processes through different lenses,
both models share several features. First, both frameworks describe coalition building as an
important phenomenon in the public policy process. In the ACF perspective, coalitions seek to
alter the behavior of governmental institutions in order to achieve their policy goals over time.
In the MSF view, potential coalition supporters are enticed into support by promises of some
benefit, and others climb aboard the bandwagon out of fear that they will be left without their
share of the benefits, in the event that something should pass.
Second, an eventual policy choice depends on a process of consensus building among the
61 TO complete at least one formulation/implementation/reformulation cycle to obtain a reasonably accurate portrait
of success and failure and to appreciate the variety of strategic actors pursue over time. (Sabatier, 1999)
62 All models assign some importance to the mobilization and deployment of technical knowledge. Theories of the
policy process or policy change need to address the role played in the process by technical information concerning
the magnitude and facets of the problem (Sabatier, 1999)
63 The ACF challenge the assumption that actor's organizational affiliation is primordial: there is something
fundamentally different from legislators, administrative agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, and
journalists.
advocates, coalitions, and specialists around a particular package of policies. According to the
MSF, while consensus is built largely through the processes of persuasion and diffusion among
policy experts in the policy stream, the political stream's consensus building is governed by
bargaining among politicians and their aides.64 In such bargaining, the discussion is more likely
to be "you give me my provision, and I'll give you yours," rather than, "let me convince you of
the virtue of my provision." 65
The general bargaining process in the political stream starts with participants who stake
out their positions somewhat rigidly, refusing to compromise on their principles, and peaks at
the point when rigid adherence to one's original position would cost one dearly. These times are
the real opportunities--the policy window--when compromise is in the air. The ACF emphasizes
the role of professionalized analytical forums including conferences of professional groups;
advisory committees, such as the National Academy of Science in the United States; and blue
ribbon technical advisory committees which provide ample opportunity for experts from
competing coalitions to justify their claims before their peers in order to resolve policy analytic
conflict exacerbated by advocacy science.
Such forums, dominated by professional norms, can facilitate learning across different
coalitions to the extent of altering their belief system, even if their core beliefs are not changed.
Changes in the distribution of beliefs within a coalition generally will start with individual
6" For a through discussion of bargaining, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and
Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), Chapter 12 and 13. It should be noted that policy specialists do not
have a monopoly on persuasion, nor do politicians have a monopoly on bargaining.
6:5 Kingdon (1984) took an example of bargaining developed between highway and mass transit advocates that
resulted in benefits to both. As interstate highways were being built, urban legislators became increasingly unhappy,
both because freeways were distorting land use in the urban areas and because a substantial program was underway
which benefited small town and rural areas and not cities. They first pressured for raiding the highway trust fund
for mass transit, and found considerable resistance to that idea. The controversy over that tack receded, however,
because of a not-so-tacit understanding that the highway advocates would support mass transit appropriations from
general funds if mass transit advocates would leave the highway trust fund alone. Each had its funds, and while
there were still disagreements around the edges, a powerful coalition was built to their mutual benefit. They had not
persuaded one another so much as they had generated a logrolling exchange.
learning or turnover, be resisted by group dynamics, and then become diffused throughout the
group.
Third, both frameworks acknowledge the influence of exogenous factors in policy
processes. Both theories acknowledge that much of the process is governed by large-scale
events and structures not under any individual's control, although in reality some exogenous
events are manipulated by active advocates for certain policy choice. External variables can
include national mood, regime change, 66 state of the economy, catastrophic events, and more
long-term elements of the political culture and traditions.
Those factors can make some policies possible and other policies impossible. For example,
budgets constrain outcomes. The state of economy can support more expansive governmental
programs at some times than at others. Some groups and socio-economic classes have more
political resources at their disposal than others, which limits the possible alternatives and agenda
items. According to the MSF, those external variables are found in the political stream. When
external variables are coupled with the right problem and policies, a policy window opens. The
opportunity for action presents itself only for a short time, and then the window closes.
The ACF tries to relate the MSF's windows of opportunity for major policy change to
specific types of changes in events exogenous to the policy subsystem. One hypothesis posited
by the ACF is that in addition to the accumulation of scientific evidence, changes in the
distribution of political resources is required to alter core aspects of public policy, and that these
changes arise from shocks exogenous to the subsystem. In short, coalitions in a policy
subsystem hope to gain power within the subsystem and wait for some external event to
66 Kingdon (1984) explains the advent of "Reagonomics" in the United States by watching the change in the
political stream, that is, the new administration representing quite a sharp turn to the right, and the greater
Republican strength in the Congress. He observes that those external events created an opportunity for markedly
more conservative proposals to be considered seriously, because Reagan administration officials were keenly aware
of the importance of striking while the iron is hot.
significantly increase their positional resources regardless of the extent of policy learning. 67
Fourth, both frameworks admit that another source of randomness in the policy process is
the importance of influential individuals. Kingdon calls these people "policy entrepreneurs,"
who invest considerable resources in bringing their conception of problems to officials'
attention, trying to convince them to see problems their way, and taking advantages of external
events. Those people include government officials, members of Congress, lobbyists, academics,
etc. The ACF suggests the concept of "policy brokers," who are usually bureaucrats adhering to
the tradition of "neutral competence." A policy broker's dominant concerns lie in keeping the
level of political conflict within acceptable limits and reaching some reasonable solution to the
problem, though many brokers will also have some policy competence.
These two well-known theories of policy process help place consensus building in the
context of the regulatory process characterized by coalition building, political bargaining, the
roles of expert, the roles of influential individuals, and the importance of external events.
However, those two theories do not seem to lend as much credence to the meaning of
"consensus building" negotiations as an alternative (or supplement) to traditional rule making in
regulatory decisions.
For example, while the MSF portrays the political consensus reached by politicians or
bureaucrats in the political stream as the important factor in a policy decision, it fails to
represent adequately the role of private stakeholders. These stakeholders may include experts
who are close to the ultimate decision-making authority of the interest they represent. They can
67 Sabatier (1993) shows that members of the Economic Feasibility Coalition around the Clean Air Act enactment
attempted to utilize the 1973-1974 oil crisis and the 1980 election of President Reagan to increase their resources
against the Clean Air Coalition on issues relating to the policy core incorporated into the 1970 Clean Air
Amendments. Although pressures for compromise generally result in governmental programs that incorporate
elements advocated by different coalitions, the 1970 Federal Clean Air Amendments incorporated to an unusual
degree most elements of the belief system of the Clean Air Coalition.
participate directly in face-to-face negotiations with government agencies, jointly developing
alternative policy options, producing scientific facts, and contributing to the final substantive
decisions.
The ACF describes the professionalized analytic forum, such as a secret science court, as
an important mechanism to produce the knowledge necessary for decision making. However,
such a closed forum excludes participation by a large fraction of important stakeholders. In a
consensus-building process, stakeholders and experts work together.
The above analysis of relevant theories of consensus building and policy process reveal
inadequacies in both fields for comprehensively understanding public decision-making (or
dispute resolution) by consensus-based negotiation in pluralistic interest politics. The theory of
consensus building ignores external factors in complex policy processes. Theories of policy
process neglect what is happening at the negotiation tables and the procedural steps of
consensus building in regulatory processes.
It is necessary to build a new analytic framework that would better conceptualize a
contemporary (or emerging) decision-making mode of consensus-based regulatory negotiation
by incorporating elements of consensus building and policy process theory. The next section
suggests such a framework.
New analytic framework for consensus-building
in regulatory decision-making
Based on the review of relevant theories outlined above, this section suggests a new
analytical framework for conceptualizing complex dispute resolution processes (or, consensus
building) in regulatory decision making. A conceptual framework should provide both broad
language and a form of reference capable of describing the reality of a complex and chaotic law-
making universe composed of large numbers of political actors, institutions, ideas, and events. It
should lead to the discovery of how policy could be made more effectively and wisely. Given
the transition from adversarial government to participatory collaboration in democratic decision
making, a new analytic framework should allow researchers to reconstruct the policy process by
helping them observe multi-party negotiations in terms of a new set of assumptions about
consensus building.
In so doing, the new analytic framework is expected to fill the gap between the two
relevant theories of consensus building and policy process, which are not now adequately linked
to each other. However, theories of both consensus building and policy process are
complementary and essential to better understanding of consensus building in public policy
making.
A first step in constructing the new analytic framework is to agree with advocates for
consensus that if specific conditions for or steps toward genuine consensus building are made,
the effort is more likely to be successful. Eleven such conditions and steps may be derived from
the literature of a consensus building. These may be sorted into two phases of consensus
building process: initiation and deliberation. Table 2-1 below shows the variables and the
rationales for using each variable. The initiation phase includes seven variables (I1 to 17) and the
deliberation phase, four variables (D to D4).
Table 2-1. The necessary conditions for successful consensus effort
[Phase Variable Rationale
Il: Use of a neutral,
skilled facilitator
12: Conflict assessment
13: Inclusion of a full
range of stakeholder
14: Establishment of
multiple issues to allow
trade-offs across issues
15: Participation by
organizations with
implementation power
16: Financial support
for process
17: Time pressure and
deadline
D1: Setting a ground
rule by participants
themselves
D2: Fair management
of process
Initiation
68 The game theory and negotiation literature often suggests that they who set the rules and define the agenda win
the game (Johnson, 1993)
Deliberation
Neutral and skillful facilitators can overcome suspicion of the
motives of the convening organization on the part of
stakeholders. A skillful facilitator can play a central role in
identifying stakeholders and issues, in ensuring that the parties
check back with their constituents, and that needed changes
after consensus are agreed upon by the entire stakeholders, and
in managing process more efficiently and fairly.
Conflict assessment conducted by neutral facilitators helps to
identify the conflicting issues and legitimate stakeholders, figure
out areas of potential agreements by drawing an issue-
stakeholder map, and even propose some initial steps for
consensus building among identified stakeholders. Identifying
all relevant stakeholders and important issue areas is the first
and most important step in a-consensus building process.
The legitimacy of a consensus-building process depends on the
public's perception that the effort is representative of all
interests and all points of view. It gives stability to any outcome.
Otherwise, any agreement is likely to be contested as
unrepresentative by excluded parties.
There must be two or more issues on the table so that parties can
maximize their overall interests by trading or bundling issues. If
there is less opportunity for trade-offs so that stakeholders can
preserve their interests, they are likely to resort to other options.
The participation of parties with implementation power can be a
key for a successful initiation and maintenance of consensus
building, because parties must believe that their agreement will
be implemented and that their participation will be worthwhile.
The most significant variable in the likelihood of successfully
implementing agreements appears to be whether those with the
authority to implement the decision support the process
(Bingham, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). If the
participating authority has options other than consensus building
to secure their interests, the process may be at risk.
Availability of financial resources can help disadvantaged
groups participate on an equal footing, hire technical
consultants, and trusted facilitators. Asking parties to pay for a
facilitator or an outside expert is sometimes one more barrier to
participation (McKinney, 1997).
Without a deadline, parties may purposefully delay or fail to
focus on reaching a settlement.
Stakeholders in a consensus-building process can feel that they
own the process by setting the ground rules for agenda setting,
deliberation, and implementation68 .
Participants appear more satisfied with consensus-building than
with their conventional rulemaking process and other unfair
processes not only if they think that the substantive outcome
will be a rule better than one that would have been promulgated
otherwise, but also because they see that the process itself is
managed fairly (Freeman and Langbein, 2000). Fair process
means equal opportunity to be heard and respected and to access
information. A fair process of negotiation appears to empower
all the parties in various ways and constrains the most powerful.
Joint fact-finding can ease tension and disputes aroused by the
tendency for stakeholders to attack the assumptions or
methodology underlying each other's scientific models.
D4: Communication If representatives at a negotiation table do not represent the
between interests of their constituencies or communicate with them, the
representatives and constituencies can challenge any agreement during or after the
their constituencies negotiation.
'To expand the theory of consensus building to include external factors during and after
negotiations in the policy process, several existing assumptions of Kingdon's MSF 69can be
modified and applied. The new analytic framework has four different premises derived from
MSF. (See Figure 2-2.)
In addition to Kingdon's three streams of problems, policies, and politics, the new analytic
fiamework includes a fourth stream, "consensus building." The original MSF includes two
opportunities for consensus making within the policy stream and politics stream. However,
while acknowledging the distinct set of actors in each of these two streams in generating policy
options and alternatives, and bargaining, the new consensus building stream suggests another,
independent set of functions. Participants in the new stream include an array of stakeholders
including technical experts, non-governmental organizations, business associations, and
government officials. By meeting in person they can revisit problems, discuss agenda-setting,
generate alternatives, and make a consensus agreement, rather than try to influence those
processes by means of political mobilization outside the consensus process.
Second, given the experimental or ad-hoc characteristics of the consensus-building process,
69 The literature search for policy process yield studies mostly on the United States, or inspired by United States
policy examples, than on any other country. It would not be implausible if the general conceptualizations of policy
processes that are put forward were more valid in the United States than elsewhere (Mooij, 2003). However,
Horowitz (1989) argues that the process - the constraints, the ripe moments that produce innovation, the tendency
fi:or policy to have unanticipated consequences and so on - has many similarities in developed and developing
countries, while there are some distinctive features in the third world policy process such as fragile state legitimacy,
large state structure, weak capacity to effectuate policy and so on. In his view, it is possible to understand many
policy phenomena in ternns of concepts already embedded in the emerging discourse on public policy in general.
Finally he makes the point that perhaps it is not so much the level of economic development that makes the
difference in policy process, but the extent to which there are democratic structures in place.
it can be initiated through a policy window by policy entrepreneurs who try to link three streams
(problem, policy, and politics) to advocate specific policy options for their interests. In so doing,
the variables in the initiation phase of a consensus-building process, such as the actors
participating, the issue to be discussed, and the supporting organizations engaged, will all be
affected by policy entrepreneurs' efforts to link the three streams.
Third, the confluence of the three streams should dramatically enhance the odds that the
consensus-building effort is initiated with a certain structure. But nothing about policy choice
through consensus agreement is automatic. The consensus-building stream does not replace
representative democratic practices, but supplements them (Susskind, 2006). Therefore, the
outcome of the consensus stream, whether disagreement or consensus, is not the final end
product; it is more like a punctuation mark in an ongoing deliberative process (Innes, 2004) and
vulnerable to bargaining in the politics stream. The consensus-building stream consists of
consecutive rounds, 70 marking phases in the narrative, or unfolding, of the policy-making
process.
Fourth, the consensus-building stream, even after its initiation, can be affected by changes
in the problem, policy, or politics stream. Those external factors can influence BATNAs of
stakeholders who are negotiating in a consensus-building approach.
70 See Teisman (2000) for different rounds model for research into decision making process.
Consensus Building stream
Note. (Vertical darker arrows indicate the momentums of consensus building initiation as linking three
separate streams. Vertical dotted arrows indicate the outcomes of consensus building efforts)
Figure 2-2. New analytic framework for regulatory process using consensus based negotiation
Because conditions from Il to 17 of the initiation phase are important in setting the tone
for successful consensus building, it is important to ask how those variables can be created, by
whom, and when. In the new analytic framework, this work is done by policy entrepreneurs
and/or conveners of consensus-building process by capturing situations or external factors in
three streams: problem, policy, and politics. Following the initiation of the consensus-building
process, deliberation factors from Dl to D4 play decisive roles in achieving the benefits of
consensus building. Figure 2-3 depicts the relationships between consensus building and the
policy process by showing various factors in each stream.
Problem stream:
* Indicators for certain conditions
* Focusing crises
* Range of problems
0***
Figure 2-3. Incorporation of Consensus building into policy process
Consensus-building stream
Initiation:
11: Use of neutral facilitator
12: Conflict assessment
17: Time oressure and deadline
Deliberation
DL: Ground rule
D4: Communication
Consensus
--- -- -- ---- --- -- --
Policy stream:
* Government proposal
* Selection criteria
* Scientific knowledge
* Policy decisions and impacts
from other policy subsystems
0**
Politics stream:
* National mood
* Coalition building
* Administration change
* Seats change in parliament
* Intergovernmental battle for
policy turf
* Rules change
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Chapter Three
Research Design
This chapter describes the research design that will shape the subsequent chapters. The
first section states the research questions guiding the analysis. The second section outlines a
research strategy. Then, a set of indicators are proposed to explore the middle ground between
the theory of policy process and the theory of consensus building. The final section describes the
methodology used to collect and analyze the data.
Guiding research questions
Two general questions underlie the research project as a whole; two specific questions
refer to case studies of public dispute resolution efforts around urban air quality management in
South Korea. Answering the case-specific questions will illuminate two larger theoretical
questions.
General questions
1. What are the main obstacles in nascent democracies, whether at a personal or
institutional level, to meeting the conditions necessary for successful dispute
resolution around urban air pollution?
2. How can a newly democratized society improve the consensus-building
component of regulatory decision making?
Specific questions
1. Why did two dispute resolution efforts fail even with apparent consensus reached
through negotiations?
2. How was the Task Force able to resolve the dispute on a third attempt, even after
the disputes were exacerbated by the previous two failures?
Using case studies
Case studies, unlike experiments or quantitative studies, can allow the researcher to track
decisions and impacts over time. Furthermore, public dispute resolution efforts in a nascent
democracy are rare events. Quantitative or statistical analysis of such a small number of cases
would not be particularly revealing.
Yin (2003) maintains that case studies should be the preferred strategy for answering
"why" and "how" questions. He adds that case studies are especially useful when dealing with
problems for which the context is hard to control. Conspicuous public disputes always play
themselves out in various venues, including the media, public hearings, public forums, and even
street rallies, while the stakeholders simultaneously meet in consensus-building processes (Innes
and Booher, 1999). Consensus-building processes usually take a year or more to produce results.
During that period, the external environment can change. For example, an administration can
change, the balance of power among stakeholders can shift, and government agencies may alter
their policy objectives.
Using case studies with rich descriptions of action, events, and contexts provides the
reader with more than statements of findings. It also provides information about the complexity
underlying those findings so that the reader may decide whether the findings make sense and
when and how they can be applied.
Research strategy
The new analytical framework constructed in Chapter 2 from elements found in Kingdon's
multi-stream framework and Susskind's consensus-building process theory creates a lens
through which to examine complex public dispute resolution processes in regulatory decision
making.
The research strategy includes two steps. The first, borrowed from the Kingdon framework,
is the concept of the "policy window" and the role of "policy entrepreneurs" in changing
policies. The new framework suggests that a new stream-the consensus-building process--can
be initiated by some policy entrepreneurs when a specific policy window opens. The new
analytic framework will be applied to the case studies to identify which conditions opened the
window to consensus building, who initiated the consensus-building process, and how they did
it.
Second, the idea of necessary conditions for a successful consensus building process is
used to assess the initiation and deliberation of each consensus-building process. Finally, I
intend to link the first and the second analysis in order to establish a relationship between the
two theories. In other words, multi-streams in conventional decision making provide a backdrop
for the activity of policy entrepreneurs, who use it strategically. Consensus-building streams
come into being under certain conditions. Initiation and deliberation elements in the consensus-
building process and outcome might be affected by those initial conditions.
Thus, the analysis combines variables in multi-stream framework with those of the
consensus-building process. (See Figure 2-3, Chapter 2). Based on this new conceptualization of
consensus building in a newly democratized country, I reconstruct three cases of consensus-
building efforts in South Korea. First, in each case, three streams of problem, policy, and
politics will be identified as external factors, all of which could influence the initiation of a
consensus building process. Second, eleven necessary conditions for successful consensus
building are explored in each consensus-building round. Finally, observations are made as to
whether consensus-building could resolve the dispute or not.
Guided by this analytic framework in deciding what data will be collected and how it will
be analyzed, the analysis was conducted without presuppositions, taking a grounded approach
(Glaser, 1992), based on interviews, observations, and written sources.
Data collection
This research draws upon original interview data, media articles, and government
documents including expert reports and accounts of the negotiation meetings concerning diesel
vehicles and the Special Act for managing Seoul metropolitan air quality. The interviews were
semi-structured but open-ended, took from one to two hours to complete, and were conducted in
person and tape-recorded. Twenty-two interviews with more than 30 active participants in the
consensus-building processes were conducted. Names were selected from the list of participants
in the Joint Commission for diesel private vehicles, the Environment Commission, and the Task
Force, and grouped into eight categories: the Ministry of Environment; the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy; the Ministry of Finance; Experts; NGOs; auto industries; oil
industries; and business associations. At least one representative from each category was
interviewed, and in some cases two or four. In all cases, interviewees were senior officials or
leaders of the organizations represented in the negotiations.
Interviews were conducted between May and July of 2004, and between May and June of
2005, in South Korea and in the US, 71 after negotiations took place. Several interviewees were
contacted again to clarify technical matters or to get further detail on the proceedings. Roughly
40 interview questions were designed to elicit information from each interviewee concerning
their knowledge of problems, their interests, negotiation strategies, their BATNAs, political
connections, satisfaction with the agreement, rationales for post-negotiation activities, change of
relationships, and trust through negotiations, their policy learning from meetings, and so forth.
Questions were designed specifically to obtain information associated with the initiation phase
variables and deliberation phase variables of the consensus-building process.
Documents were examined to track the flow of issues, to see what issues were prominent
and controversial, and to triangulate, or verify interview contents. The documents examined
included meeting summaries, group products, official government documents, confidential
government documents, and news articles.
Data reliability
Interview data relied heavily on participant's ability to remember events and interactions
that occurred three or four years in the past. Another limitation was the lack of documentation
that captured the moment-to-moment interactions among the participants. The meeting
summaries from each process were useful in capturing general events as well as what issues
were raised during any particular day and how these issues persisted and changed over time.
Some interviewees advised that the official documents revealed only a small fraction of the
71 Some participants were staying in the US, for example working at the World Bank or studying at a university.
interactions among participants.
A large number of interviews was conducted to minimize the possibility that important
interactions might be missed. Also, interview data was checked against other sources to verify
and contextualize the information. However, in general, the interviewees in the processes were
able to remember consistently situations and interactions underlying the information in the
official documents.
The following chapters contextualize information on policy making for the management of
urban air pollution and political institutions of South Korea as a background for the case studies
of public dispute resolution.
Chapter Four
Multiple streams of urban air pollution (1991 - 2000)
During the ten years of air pollution policies in South Korea prior to 2000, three
concurrent streams of problems, policies, and politics flowed sometimes independently and
sometimes interactively. This chapter provides an analysis of these three streams between 1991
and 2000 as a background for a case study in 2001-2003 focusing on similar streams that
emanated, but may be seen as distinct, from those streams. Understanding this background will
facilitate a systematic analysis of the case, a two-year-long public dispute resolution regarding
urban air quality management in South Korea.
The first section shows the types of issues that characterized the "problem stream." The
second section is a discussion of who in the "policy stream" responded to these problems, and in
what ways. The third section incorporates the "political stream," and demonstrates why certain
policy activities occurring during this period led to the specific status of air quality in 2000.
Problem stream (1991-2000)
Problems capture the attention of people in and around government in three ways: First,
people might interpret some specific indicator data from routine monitoring as indicative of a
problem. Second, a dramatic event, crisis, or focus event can reinforce some preexisting
perception of a problem. Third, people learn from the feedback from the operation of existing
programs. What constitutes a "problem" is a matter of interpretation. Change in an indicator --
or no change despite certain policy measures designed to produce change -- can be interpreted
as a problem (Kingdon, 1995).
Systematic indicator of air quality and problem in 1993
In 1982, the Ministry of Environment (MOE) issued a white paper on the environmental
status of South Korea and initiated regulatory monitoring of air quality. By January 1993, when
the first civil (nonmilitary) administration of Young-Sam (YS) Kim began, the growing and
ambitious MOE were able to gauge the effectiveness of urban air quality management by
reviewing some indicators for Seoul, the capital of the nation since 1990 (Figure 4-1).
The data from regular air quality monitoring in the capital city showed a progressive
decline in SO 2, CO, and Pb concentrations, but no improvements in PM 0o, NOx, and Ground-
level Ozone (03) levels. The main reason these latter pollutant levels remained unchanged was
the growing number of automobiles in Seoul. Diesel vehicles were particularly responsible for
continuing high levels of pollution.
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Figure 4-1. Change of air pollutants in Seoul since 1990
Experts in and around government had suggested since at least 1993 that diesel vehicles
were problematic. Diesel vehicles emitted 30 or 40 percent more particulate matter (PM), SO2
and NOx than gasoline or LPG vehicles. To make matters worse, the numbers of diesel vehicles
were increasing. By the end of 1992, they represented 37 out of 100 vehicles on the streets of
Seoul. This was a very high number compared to other countries.72 Large diesel vehicles, such
as freight-carrying trucks and buses, accounted for only a small fraction of all vehicles, but
emitted more than half of all emissions from mobile sources.
However, 60 percent of diesel vehicles were relatively small, for example, jeeps which
weighed less than one ton. Functionally, these were no more efficient than gasoline, or LPG
vehicles. Why were people choosing light-duty jeeps and other smaller vehicles powered by
diesel over less polluting engines? Experts and government officials determined that the reason
was fuel prices: Diesel fuel was quite cheap compared to other fuels. In early 1993, diesel cost
214 won per liter, while gasoline cost 610 won per liter, making diesel only slightly more than
72 In 1993, US had diesel vehicles, accounting for only 3% of the total automobiles. In case of Japan, only 18% of
the automobiles were diesel vehicles.
one third the cost of gasoline.
Diesel was so cheap in South Korea because, as explained by an official at the Ministry of
Energy, the government had been controlling the price very strictly out of concern that increased
diesel prices might negatively affect overall national price policy. Higher-priced diesel would
result in higher residential and public transportation costs for citizens. Industry depended on
cheap diesel to maintain their international competitiveness. 73 While other countries use diesel
fuel mainly for transportation, South Korea uses half of its diesel fuels for household heating 74
and industrial purposes. It had been politically important to keep the price of diesel under the
certain level.
Thus, in 1993 one dimension of the problem of urban air quality was framed as the
relationship between relatively cheap diesel prices and serious urban air pollution (Figure 4-2).
In an effort to better manage urban air quality, it was clear that the MOE should deal with
the emissions from large diesel trucks and buses first, and prevent the number of diesel vehicles
from increasing. Energy policy was clearly a factor in such a strategy. One MOE officer argued
that the government should reduce the price gap between gasoline and diesel to encourage
consumers to choose gasoline or LPG when purchasing a new vehicle. 75
73 Mr. Kim, Dong-Won, Department head of Oil policy at the Ministry of Energy. Interview with Chosun Ilbo
(Newspaper) (1993. 1.28).
74 Especially, since the mid 80s, diesel boilers began to dominate households heating system in South Korea.
75 Chosun Ilbo (1993. 1.28).
Relatively cheap diesel fuel
Consumer preference to diesel vehicles
Increased share of diesel vehicles
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Figure 4-2. The relations between fuel price and air pollution identified in 1993
Recurring and worsening problems from 1993 to 2000
Following the discovery of the downward trend in urban air quality in 1993, the problem
not only failed to improve, but worsened 76 (See Table 4-1). In 2002, South Koreans were
shocked to learn that a report issued by the World Economic Forum ranked South Korea 13 5th
among 146 countries in terms of the Environmental Sustainability Index. Among the categories
in the index, South Korea's air quality was ranked 12 0 th among 122 countries (World Economic
Forum, 2002). 77
By 2000, the MOE knew that automobiles were still responsible for 51 percent of total
NOx emissions and 58 percent of total PM emission (Table 4-1). Diesel vehicles, which
accounted for 30.1 percent of all vehicles, contributed 100 percent of total PM emissions and 75
percent of total NOx emissions from mobile sources.
76 However, SO2, CO, and Pb concentrations kept decreasing to the satisfaction of the MOE.
77 Although Korea advanced itself to 12 2 nd from 13 5 th among 146 countries in 2005 index, Korea still ranked the
worst among all the 29 OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries in the list.
(World Economic Forum, 2005)
Table 4-1. Emissions Inventory (2000) (unit: tones/year, (%))
Pollutant SOx NOx PMlo VOC CO
Source•
TRW 74,562 292,470 15,328 270,468 342,595
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Energy industry 15,771 18,764 263 1,432 9,754
(Power generation, local (21.2) (6.4) (1.7) (0.5) (2.8)
heating, oil refineries)
Non-industry sector 9,723 39,177 772 1,514 18,865
(Residential, and commercial (13.0) (13.4) (5.0) (0.6) (5.5)
heating)
Industrial sector 29,700 16,642 2,911 536 3,058
(39.8) (5.7) (19.0) (0.2) (0.9)
Manufacturing process 5,737 6,444 184 8,795 1,637
(7.7) (2.2) (1.2) (3.3) (0.5)
Energy transportation and - - - 7,384 -
storage (2.7)
Use of organic solvents - - - 151,868 -
(56.2)
Road mobile sources 3,446 150,165 8,885 49,055 292,071
(4.6) (51.3) (58.0) (18.1) (85.3)
Non-road mobile sources 9,326 53,959 2,144 5,849 16,076
(12.5) (18.4) (14.0) (2.2) (4.7)
Waste management 859 7,320 168 11,733 1,134
(1.2) (2.5) (1.1) (4.3) (0.3)
Biogenic sources - - - 32,302 -
(11.9)
As more indicators became available, experts in and around the government, recognized
that between early 1990s and 2000 some air quality problems had persisted and others had even
been exacerbated. The urban situation became worse, with the percentage of emissions from
mobile sources in Seoul exceeding 80 percent in the late 1990s (Table 4-2, Figure 4-3).
Table 4-2. Percentage of emissions from mobile sources in Seoul (from the MOE data)
Year Mobile sources emissions
(%)
1985 27
1990 49
1992 61
1994 77
1996 80
1998 82
00
00
Automobile
Heating
N Industry
I Power generation
Figure 4-3. Air pollution emissions inventory in Seoul in 1997 (from the MOE data)
The share of diesel vehicles in the total mix of vehicles remained about the same
throughout the decade. As shown in Table 4-3, the share of diesel dropped somewhat between
1993 and 1997 (blue), but rose again between 1997 and 2002 (red).
Table 4-3. The change of percentage of diesel vehicles among all automobiles (1993-2002)
Year Share of diesel vehicles (%)
1993 32.1
1994 30.8
1995 29.7
1996 28.7
1997 28.3
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002 33
While diesel fuel price had been raised to 53 percent of gasoline price from 1992 to 2002,
the gap between the prices of gasoline and diesel fuels was still not narrow enough to dissuade
consumers from buying diesel vehicles (Table 4-4).
Table 4-4. Relative ratio of transportation fuel prices between 1990 and 2002
Year Gasoline Diesel LPG78
1990 100 47 -
1991 100 47 -
1992 100 36 -
1993 100 34 -
1994 100 36 -
1995 100 39 -
1996 100 44 -
1997 100 45 39
1998 100 49 32
1999 100 44 24
2000 100 49 29
2001 100 50 34
2002 100 53 36
By 1995, diesel vehicles representing 34 percent of the total vehicles were emitting 65
percent of air pollutants from mobile sources. Large diesel trucks and buses, which were only
six percent of the total vehicles, emitted more than half of vehicular emissions. In 1999, diesel
78 The government started to categorize LPG into two types starting in 1997: for general use, including
transportation; and for heating at city level.
vehicles were emitting 85.9 percent of the total NOx emissions, and 98.4 percent of the total PM
emissions from vehicles. Large diesel vehicles such as trucks and buses, representing only 4.3
percent of the total diesel fleet, accounted for 65.9 percent of the total NOx emissions and 63.9
percent of the total PM emissions from mobile sources (Figure 4-4).
NOx emissions from mobile sources PM emissions from mobile sources
666
666
66
I Large diesel (trucks, buses)
Mid -size diesel
Others (Gasoline and LPG)
* Large diesel (trucks, buses)
Mid -size diesel
Others (Gasoline and LPG)
Figure 4-4. Contribution of diesel vehicle emissions to the total NOx and PM emissions from
mobile sources (1999)
Of course, diesel vehicles were not responsible for all of the air pollution. In general, the
number of automobiles in South Korea had increased exponentially from the late 1980s. In 1985,
there were one million vehicles. By 1997, the number had reached 10 million. While growth
was stalled during 1997 and 1998 due to the Asian financial crisis, the number kept growing
through 2002 (Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5. Increase in number of registered automobiles according to fuel type79
However, the rate of increase in the number of gasoline vehicles slowed gradually after
1991 and the share of gasoline vehicles among all automobiles dropped after 1997. Meanwhile,
the share of diesel vehicles and LPG vehicles increased steadily (Figure 4-6).
79 Data excerpt from 2003 Korea Transportation Statistics (KOTI, 2004)
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Figure 4-6. Share of automobiles according to fuel type.
The change in the proportion of vehicle by fuel-type was clearly related to the change in
fuel prices. As shown in Table 4-4, the price of diesel (blue numbers) increased between 1992
and 1997 when the price was stabilized. In addition to the low price of diesel, increased gasoline
prices also prompted consumers to turn away from gasoline vehicles in favor of diesel. For
example, when the price of gasoline rose by 27.9 percent(from 373 won per liter in 1990 to 477
won per liter in 1991), the sale of diesel jeep-type vehicles increased by 89.5 percent (from
39,897 in 1990 to 75,595 in 1991). 80 The higher gasoline prices rose, the more diesel jeep-type
and recreational vehicles (RVs) were sold. The hike in gasoline prices between 1995 and 1998
certainly affected the decisions of South Korean auto consumers (Figure 4-7). Even as the
number of large diesel vehicles on the road dropped, it was offset by rapid sales of small and
mid-sized diesel RVs particularly since the mid-1990s.
80 1997.11.4. Chosun Ilbo. "With increased gasoline price, the demand of diesel jeeps soared."
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Figure 4-7. Change of transportation fuel prices between 1990 and 200281
From 1993 to 2000, faced with recurring problems in almost every year, officials at the
MOE and experts in research institutes and academia had to remind themselves that controlling
automobiles was the key to curbing urban air pollution and protecting public health8 2 and that
problematic diesel vehicles should be dealt with. What had the government been doing to solve
these problems? What solutions were other policy experts advocating?
Policy stream (1993 to 2000)
In the policy stream, people propose and refine policy proposals through academic
meetings, public hearings, or government brainstorming sessions. They often generate solutions
81 One US dollar is exchanged with 969 South Korean won in 2006.82 According to the research by the Korean Environment Institute and Soong-Sil University (1998), the social cost
of air pollution from automobiles amounted to almost USD 1.9 billion. The social cost includes the medical costs of
respirational patients and the costs of lost labor during hospitalization. Among the total cost, the costs associated
with PM were about USD 1.2 billions. (Chosun Ilbo, 1998.7.22)
that are then applied to a range of problems. 83 Policy communities include experts in
government and consulting on government issues, 84 environmental groups, and private
industries. Politicians are also potential generators of solutions. However, in South Korea air
pollution policy instruments are usually identified and developed by officials and experts within
the MOE.
Urban air quality policy makers within the MOE had been very busy since the 1990s. They
had been very successful in reducing SO 2, CO, and Pb concentrations but were still wrestling
with the issue of emissions from the rapidly increasing number of mobile pollution sources,
especially diesel vehicles. Since the 1990s, they had developed policy to address mobile
sources and were gradually bringing them to fruition.
Introduction of CNG buses for conventional diesel buses
Beginning in 1991, the MOE with the help of other ministries provided USD 20 million in
R&D funds to automobile research institutes to develop low-emission core technologies related
to CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) engines. With CNG buses, PM could be reduced by 60
percent to 97 percent and NOx by 25 percent to 86 percent, compared to conventional diesel
buses burning high-sulfur fuel. In addition, the price of importing natural gas was 50-70 percent
less than that of crude oil. The CNG bus project was designed to stimulate energy source
innovation in the transportation sector. As a result of this research program, four CNG buses
83 Kingdon's favorite example is the case of urban mass transit, which is a constant policy proposal, and has been
promoted as a solution to the problems of traffic congestion, then as a solution to the problem of air pollution.
84 Each government agency operates its own research institute for the purpose of policy generation, and evaluation.
For example, the Korean Environment Institute is sponsored by the MOE all the time. Also, the National Institute
of Environmental Research (NIER) is directed by the MOE for scientific research associated policy measures.
Other major research institutes in South Korea have strong ties with specific government agencies. Government
officials review their research reports all the time. Other experts are from universities. Some professors often have
contracted with government agencies for their research.
were finally deployed on real bus routes for an evaluation in 1998. To encourage participation
by local governments and relevant industries, the MOE provided three types of support: 1)
reducing natural gas prices 85 and subsidizing bus purchases (2.25 million won per vehicle, about
one quarter of the total price of a CNG bus); 2) installing refueling facilities on publicly-owned
lots and constructing bus parking lots; and 3) streamlining relevant regulations for tax support.86
Three years later in November 2001, 232 CNG buses were running, supported by 11 gas stations
in South Korea 87
Installation of Diesel Particulate Filters (DPF)
As with the case of CNG buses, MOE policy makers adopted a technology fix for the
pollution emissions of other diesel vehicles. Seeking an end-of-pipe technology to directly
reduce particulate matter they realized that DPF (Diesel Particulate Filter) technology could
prevent 80 percent of PM emitted by conventional large diesel vehicles. The Ministry began
funding research to develop the technology in 1992. Several private industrial entrepreneurs
undertook the challenge.88 Their research efforts led to much lower priced filters, but not low
85 Heavy investments are required because the CNG buses are more expensive than diesel buses and the
construction of gas stations is necessary. It is therefore imperative to consider the reasonable profitability and return
for initial investment by bus owners and operators. It is with reasonable profitability in mind that fuel prices need to
be considered. The price of CNG must be set in tandem with other fuel prices, including diesel fuel, and the price
range must satisfy both bus owners and gas suppliers.
86 Some relevant laws were modified to exempt those who purchase CNG buses from value-added and acquisition
taxes. As a result, the CNG bus among goods for environment protection has become a sole item exempt from VAT.
If viewing the tax deduction as financial aid, it is worth USD 9.2 million in year 2000 and USD 167 million by
2007. In addition, environment improvement charges imposed on diesel vehicles were obviously exempted for the
CNG buses.
87 In 1999, the MOE planned to replace all 20,000 city buses nationwide by the year 2007. (1999.2.19. Chosun
Ilbo). In September 2005, the total number of CNG buses was 7902. (2005.11.29. Donga Ilbo).
88 Five industries, such as Yukong, Mando, Doowon, Hyundai, and Changwon ventured into the DPF (Diesel
Particulate Filter) market by developing their own filtering technology in 1992, when US companies failed to
enough to entice bus companies to purchase their products. They needed government support to
reduce installation costs. According to a newspaper interview with a chief researcher in a
laboratory devoted to DPF development: 89
"There are people who argue for the development of clean diesel engine rather than
DPF technology as a priority to solve air pollution from diesel vehicles. However, it
will take more than 10 years for South Korean automakers to develop the clean
diesel engines, which are currently available in advanced countries. Should the
public put up with such serious air pollution for ten years or more until the clean
diesel engine is available? Also, in benchmarking the technology, we will have to
pay enormous royalties to those advanced countries. Thus, the DPF technology we
developed is a more viable and cost-effective option for the current situation.
Consider the pain the public isfeeling from exhaust gases from diesel vehicles and
the social cost associated with it. It's a national problem, which requires
government action. The only problem for the DPF is the still high installation cost.
We need the investment from the government and the society to lower the price so
that bus companies may buy the filters. "
In 1996, the MOE began to issue certification to companies developing DPF technology.90
In a pioneer project, the Ministry purchased DPFs for 1,400'city garbage trucks. It also used
loans to lower the cost of installing DPFs on Seoul city buses. However, the MOE and DPF
industries were unable to induce city bus companies to install DPFs on their vehicles at that
time. 91 The fund from which the loans were derived was redirected to the CNG bus project in
1998.
popularize their filters due to the high price (almost USD 10,000 for installing a filter) and few consumers. In the
US, diesel vehicles accounted for only 3% of automobiles. These South Korean companies saw the potential of the
diesel particulate filter in South Korean market, given that there was a large share (over 30%) of diesel vehicles
among automobiles and those vehicles were regulatory target for their enormous contribution to air pollution.
89 Chosun Ilbo (1997 1.09). 'Automobile emissions tackled with domestic technology' In a newspaper interview,
Chung, Hyun-Jong, a chief researcher at Yukong Energy and Environment Institute.
90 Chosun Ilbo (1997.2.27). 'Competition of four companies for DPF market"
91 However, the MOE's effort became fruitful when the Special Act for Air Quality Management in Seoul
Metropolitan Area went into effect in 2006. The MOE and the local government provided subsidy to cover almost
all cost of installation of DPF for fleet owners and individuals with old diesel vehicles. The installation of DPF
became mandatory if the vehicles fail to pass emission test starting 2006.
Imposition of environment improvement charge on diesel vehicles
In March 1994, the MOE began to impose an environment improvement charge as a
negative economic incentive on 1.9 million non-commercial diesel vehicles such as jeeps,
Recreation Vehicles (RVs), vans, and personally owned trucks. Six months later, the MOE
announced that it would gradually raise this assessment by 2.5 times by July 1997, and would
include diesel dump trucks and mixer trucks which were originally exempted from the charge. 92
As diesel fuel prices increased between 1994 and 1997, the environment improvement charge on
diesel vehicles also helped raise the management cost of diesel vehicles. Little by little, the
share of diesel vehicles among the total number of automobiles dropped (See Figure 4-6).
Improvement of fuel quality
The MOE successfully introduced unleaded gasoline in July 1987, leading to the complete
elimination of leaded gas in early 1993. Meanwhile, the high sulfur content of diesel fuel
continued to contribute to high PM emissions. Recognizing that low-sulfur fuel was also
essential for clean diesel engines in the future, the MOE focused on increasing the supply of
low-sulfur fuel. Since the early 1990s, the sulfur content in diesel fuels had been gradually
reduced. In 2000, the MOE negotiated an agreement with the oil companies 93 that they would
reduce sulfur content in diesel fuels from 500 ppm to 430 ppm in 2002, and to 50 ppm in 2006 94
(Table 4-5). From this measure, the MOE expected a reduction of 2,600 tones of PM (3.5
percent) from diesel vehicles.
92 Chosun Ilbo (1994.3.10).
93 Chosun Ilbo (2000.03.05).
94 They also negotiated that the sulfur content in Gasoline would be reduced from 200 ppm in 2000 to 130 ppm in
2002, 30 ppm in 2006.
Table 4-5. Change of maximum sulfur content in diesel fuel since 1991.
Application period '91.2. - '93.1 - '96.1 - '98.4 - '02 - '06.1
'92.12. '95.12 '98.3 '02.1 '06.1
Sulfur content (ppm) 4000 2000 1000 500 430 50
Creation of the Air Ouality Management District
In June 1997, the MOE created the Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Management District
(SMAQMD) by merging Seoul and 17 adjacent cities in order to develop consistent regulations
for the whole area. The plan was similar to the US's SIP (State Implementation Plans). Local
governors, on the basis of public hearings, prepared plans to reduce air pollution; the plans were
submitted to the Minister of the MOE for his/her approval.95
Upgrade of emissions standards for newly manufactured automobiles
The emissions standards for newly manufactured automobiles have been strengthened
numerous times by the MOE in order to force the auto manufacturers to develop engine
technologies that generate fewer pollutants. However, South Korean standards lagged far behind
those of advanced countries of North America and Europe. For example, for gasoline
automobiles in 2000, Korean standards were equivalent to EURO II of the European Union and
TLEV of the United States. For diesel vehicles, an important change in emission standards was
made in 2000. This was critical to the development of the dispute to be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.
95 Chosun Ilbo (1997.6.30).
Other important policy proposals
Policy makers and consultants proposed several solutions to the problem of urban air
pollution based on their individual definitions of what the problems were. They tried to generate
public interest in their proposals through media dissemination of indicators showing the scope
of the problems. In fact, these solutions did not represent new ideas. Most of the suggested
measures were based on the experiences of other countries and the recommendations of
international organizations.
Some experts advocated manufacturing more mini cars, or compact cars, which polluted
less than large-sized passenger cars with high fuel efficiency (Table 4-6). They sought
government incentives to help overcome the preference of South Korean customers for large
passenger cars symbolizing high social status.96
Table 4-6. International comparison of the share of mini passenger cars
Country South Korea ('96) Japan ('95) France ('95)
Share 4.5% 14.6% 39.0%
Other policy experts supported investment in public transportation, extending metro lines
and enhancing bus services to increase the use of public transportation and reduce the mileage
traveled by personal vehicles in South Korea (Table 4-7, Table 4-8). Some suggested
compulsory "no-car days" (an experiment attempted in Mexico City) when the Seoul city
government issued several ground-level Ozone pollution alerts on consecutive days during the
96 In 1992, Daewoo Motors Company manufactured the first Korean mini car, Tico. The model was popularized for
its low management cost with high fuel efficiency. However, even if the government imposed less tax on the model,
the demand did not grow to the expectation of the government and auto industry. In 1994, only 3.4 % of the
passenger cars were mini cars. While the share of mini cars increased up to 14 % of all passenger cars in South
Korea in 2003, the number was still very lower than those of other advanced countries such as Italia (45%), France
(36%), Japan (26%) and England (17%).
summers of 1997 and 1998. 97
Table 4-7. Comparison of the mode share of public transportation in 1995
City Seoul Tokyo New York
Share 66.5% 81.7% 86.0%
Table 4-8. Comparison of the Vehicle Kilometers Traveled (VKT) in the country in 1995
Country South Korea Japan US
Distance 23,000 km 10,200 km 14,700 km
Gradual increase in diesel fuel price
The problem of the relatively lower diesel fuel price had been raised consistently in and
around the MOE. s98 Several times, the MOE announced its intention (or wish) to discourage the
increase in diesel vehicles by raising diesel fuel prices. 99 However, control of energy prices lay
in the jurisdiction not of the MOE but of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
(MOCT) and of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). For this reason the gap between diesel and
gasoline prices was not narrowed until 2000 despite the advocacy efforts of environmental
NGOs, the MOE, and other experts. 100
In September 2000, the government announce officially that the relative ratio of three
energy prices (gasoline, diesel, and LPG) would be adjusted to 100:75:60 until July 2006 (Table
97 In 1997, there were 96 violations against PM standard in Seoul.
98 In March 1997, Mr. Cho, the Mayor of the city of Seoul, announced that the city government would rather
manage its air quality independently from the central government, commenting that current government policy
could not be up to the problem of air pollution in Seoul. In South Korea, decentralization began in 1995. Thus, the
elected Mayor could be more influential then before. Mr. Cho asked for the government to increase diesel fuel price
by 41.2%. (Chosun Ilbo, 1997.3.22) 'City of Seoul may restrict diesel vehicle registration'
99 Chosun Ilbo (1999.9.27). '[MOE] proposed to increase diesel fuel price against the increase of diesel vehicles.'
100 In practice, absolute diesel fuel price had been increased (Figure 4-7). But, I focus on the relative ratio of the two
fuel prices.
4-9). The next chapter explores how this proposal became possible and how this adjustment
during 2000 and 2001 led to the dispute to be analyzed in the case study.
Table 4-9. Proposal to adjust the relative ratio of three transportation fuels (2000)101
Year Gasoline Diesel LPG
2000.7 100 47 26
2001.7 100 52 32
2002.7 100 56 38
2003.7 100 61 43
2004.7 100 66 49
2005.7 100 70 54
2006.7 100 75 60
The above two sections have described 1) what kinds of problems and their causes were
identified during the 1990s, and 2) what kinds of solutions were advocated and tried during
those years. The next section shows how the politics of this period made these solutions possible.
These three streams-problems, policy development, and politics-represent "conventional"
elements of problem solving, in contrast to a new, innovative stream through which consensus-
building processes with multi-stakeholder participation contribute to the resolution of public
disputes. The case-study chapter explores the value of including this new stream in decision
making.
Politics stream (1993 to 2000)
According to Kingdon's model of policy change, policy outcomes depend on how the
three streams (problem, policy, and politics) merge to create a resolution in the end. The stream
101 MOCT (2000). 'Proposal to rationalize energy price'
of politics which ran through the 1990s paralleled the stream in which policy entrepreneurs
grappled with methods to control air pollution. The politics stream runs independent of policy
and on its own terms. Political events include changes of administration or in Congress; shifts in
national moods; interest group campaigns; and other external events such as financial crises.
Kingdon's model posits that there are moments when a problem is recognized, a solution is
available, and the political conditions are right so that the three streams can be brought together
by policy advocates entrepreneurs. The moment represents an "open policy window" as defined
in previous chapters. This section outlines factors in the politics stream which were external to
and independent from the problem and policy streams, but affected the policy-making processes.
External focus event
Kingdon first deals with focusing events that occur in the problem stream. Such an event
can increase the visibility of an issue, and move it up on the governmental agenda. Focus events
such as crises, disasters, or symbolic events can reinforce preexisting perceptions of a problem
and focus public attention on it (Kingdon, 1995). However, it is also possible to consider such
external events as factors in the politics stream insofar as policy makers and advisers can utilize
them as opportunities to further their ideas.
One example of an external focus event was the 1988 Summer Olympic Games hosted by
South Korea. The air quality of Seoul, which had been seriously compromised by the late 1970s,
suddenly became an urgent policy issue when Seoul was awarded the Games in 1981.
Decision makers and the public wanted the city to appear clean to thousands of visitors
from around the globe. 102 To improve Seoul's air quality, the South Korean government
102 China is doing similar things for 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing.
immediately began to supply lower sulfur content gasoline in 1981; strengthened vehicle
emission standards in 1987; and mandated the supply and use of clean fuels, such as LNG
(Liquefied Natural Gas) in large cities in 1988.
Another interesting opportunity in the late 1990s forced South Korea to give more
attention to urban air pollution. South Korea was chosen in 1997 as one of the two countries to
host the 2002 World Cup Soccer Games. Decision makers adopted several temporary steps to
ensure an environmentally friendly World Cup venue for June 2002. The MOE began
retrofitting diesel buses in the hosting cities with Compressed Natural Gas (CNG)
technology; 103 helped the oil industries supply low-sulfur (less than 15 ppm) diesel in the Seoul
metropolitan area during the games; and encouraged people not to drive their cars every other
day during the games. As a result, the level of PM in Seoul in June 2002 fell by 22.2 % from the
same month of 2001 (81- 63 fg/m'per day).
Encouraged by the success of these temporary measures, the MOE then implemented the
post World Cup Environmental Measures, pushing to put even more CNG buses on the road.
The goal was to retrofit all of the 20,000 diesel buses under its jurisdiction by 2007.104
The MOE was abetted in the movement to clean up urban air for the 2002 World Cup by
environmental NGOs, which had not been active in the effort to improve air quality for the 1988
Olympics. The three major environmental NGOs 105 in South Korea formed the a "Blue Sky
2002"coalition on April 22, 2001, Earth Day. The objective was to inspire public support for
103 As of June 2002, 2,046 buses were distributed for operation mostly in host cities. (MOE website)
104 From the MOE website. 'Environmentally Friendly World Cup
http://eng.me.go.kr/user/policies/l_policy.html?msel=b1
105 Korean Federation of Environmental Movement, Citizens' Movement for Environmental Justice, and Green
Transport.
clean venues for the World Cup Games. The NGOs began monitoring air quality in the hosting
cities, made air pollution maps, and conducted campaigns to use more public transportation.
Ironically, the 2001 coalition was the foundation for the core alliance of environmental
groups for the issue of diesel passenger cars later, which was the major actor in the consensus
building efforts in my case. Thus, while the World Cup Soccer event did not inspire
fundamental change or affect urban air quality management, the establishment of the NGO
coalition triggered the civil organizations to initiate their own programs and stimulate public
interest in managing urban air quality.
Symbolic moment of the era of ten million automobiles
By July 1997, South Korea had 10 million automobiles on its streets. This dramatic figure
symbolized a new era to the Korean public. There had been only one million cars in the country
in 1985. Some considered the rapid growth of automobile ownership an indication of economic
prosperity of which South Koreans might be proud. Others saw in this development a threat to
the quality of life from traffic congestion and air pollution.
The Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Construction and Transportation
(MOCT), and the MOE each seized this moment to generate policy proposals for a
"comprehensive program for transportation and pollution in the era of 10 million automobiles."
The MOI declared that it would build 21,000 km long bicycle roads and 10 million bicycle
parking lots throughout the nation by 2010. The MOCT announced that it would extend city
railroads, including subways, metro, and light trail by 1,461 km by 2011 in the country's six
major cit106major cities
106 Chosun Ilbo (1997.7.14).
The MOE proposed a comprehensive proposal for automobile pollution. The Minister of
the MOE said that the goal of the proposal was to reduce automobile emissions by 45% by 2000.
The objective for PM concentrations in Seoul was a reduction from 72 ,pg/m' in 1997 to 50
m'/m ' in 2000 to 40 mrn/m in 2005. Ground-level Ozone was to be reduced from 0.16 ppm to
0.12 ppm in 2000 to 0.10 ppm in 2005.
To achieve these programmatic goals, the MOE proposed that automakers should devote
two percent of total production to ultra-low emission vehicles, such as CNG buses every year
beginning in 2000 and that diesel particulate filters (DPF) would be installed on 65 percent of all
operating large diesel vehicles (about 550,000) by 2001. The MOE used this moment to
investigate a wide array of policy options and instruments. The most interesting proposal was to
increase diesel fuel prices to 80 percent of the price of gasoline by 2000.
However, these ambitious goals were not met. In 2000, PM and 03 levels were still high
and diesel fuel was still only 49 percent the cost of gasoline. Mandatory installation of DPF in
diesel vehicles was not realized until 2005.
Cycle of long-term government plannina
Sometimes, the initiation of government proposals is embedded in the cycle of long-term
government planning. When a cycle ends, the government evaluates its programs prior to
making its next long-term proposals. People in government know when their budgets are rising
or falling and what problems directly affect them through the budget process (Kingdon,
1995).More proposals by a certain ministry mean it will receive more funding. As each new
cycle of long-term planning begins, policy analysts work hard to promote their own solutions to
problems.
In October 1990, the South Korean Parliament enacted the Framework Act on
Environmental Policy. According to the Act, the Minister of the Environment is required to
formulate long-term plans every 10 years' 107 and mid-term plans every 5 years. 108 The first long-
term environmental plan in South Korean history was made in 1992. The plan enabled the MOE
to initiate R&D funding for the development of CNG and DPF technologies in that year.
The first mid-term plan (for 1997 to 2001) was written at the end of 1996. This explains
the timing of the large number of proposals for air pollution mitigation in 1997. By
coincidence, the year 1997 also included the symbolic moment when the number of automobiles
in South Korea reached 10 million. Implementation of the second mid-term plan was
complicated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In addition, the commencement of the
new administration of Dae-Joong (DJ) Kim, the so-called, "People's government," in February
1998 precipitated personnel changes in the MOE. These two factors led to adjustments to the
second mid-term plan in terms of timing (from 1997 - 2001 to 1998 - 2002).
During 2001 and 2002 the MOE prepared new urban air pollution policy measures for the
third mid-term planning period (2003 - 2007), as well as for the second 10-year planning period
(2003 - 2012) prior to the inauguration of a new government in February 2003. As a rule, an
administration is most powerful in its first year when it embarks upon its mission and announces
its vision to the public. If a policy agenda is not enacted in the early period of a new
administration, it is less likely to be enacted at all unless dramatic events thrust the issues
addressed in the original agenda into the public eye.
The circumstances of 2001-2002 offered a major opportunity for the MOE to promote its
policy proposals and gain a major share of the budget and manpower resources coveted by other
107 Article 12 of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy
o08 Article 14 (2) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy
ministries while, at the same time, promoting cleaner skies.
Financial crisis
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 exposed longstanding weaknesses in South
Korea's development model and caused the growth rate to plunge to a negative 6.9 percent in
1998. South Korea recovered strongly, with a growth rate of 9.5 percent in 1999, and 8.5
percent in 2000. However, during the economic difficulty, a downturn in consumer spending
affected the trends associated with urban air quality management.
People bought fewer new vehicles and turned toward relatively cheap diesel fuels. Thus,
stalled economic activities had the effect of lowering PM and NOx in 1998 (Figure 4-1).
However, growth in the share of diesel vehicles and the relatively low price of diesel fuel
negatively changed from 1997.
While the external financial crisis was not directly associated with urban air pollution, it
conveyed alarming signals to the policy community concerned with urban air quality
management. Despite the MOE's efforts up to 1997, a whole new and problematic situation
began due to the financial crisis. Its impact partly explains why the air quality in 2000 was
similar, or worse than that in 1993. The MOE had to do something to correct the unexpected
downward trend in air quality.
Issue attention cycle and budget issue within the MOE
Because a government agency cannot do everything at once, it is necessary to explain why
it should emphasize one issue over another at any given time. The MOE deals with air, water,
soil, forest, waste, and so forth. The budgets for each of these bureaus are not always evenly
distributed. Some receive more attention and leverage than others at any particular time. For
each particular timeframe affecting the case studies, it is necessary to determine which specific
issues were dominating attention at the MOE.
South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games stimulated public attention to
urban air pollution prior to the events. After 1988, no major events associated with urban air
pollution happened in South Korea. 109 However, in 1991 a water-related environmental disaster
hit the country.
On the night of March 14, 1991, 30 tones of phenols were inadvertently discharged to the
Nakdong River for eight hours from the Doo-san Electronics facility located in the city of
Goomi. No one at the factory reported this mishap to government officials. As a result, the
phenols penetrated the drinking water supply facility of the city of Taegoo. City residents
immediately noticed an obnoxious smell emanating from their tap water. In an effort to alleviate
the public's anger, and distrust against the government, only two weeks later, on March 28, the
MOE announced policy measures to prevent further mishaps.
This disaster was the first environmental accident to affect the urban public, and forced the
MOE to focus its energy on water issues. Accordingly, the MOE established the Comprehensive
Measures on the Provision of Clean Water in 1993. Some of the measures were very costly,
such as construction of waste management facilities, which tied up most of the MOE budget in
water quality management.
This emphasis continued to occupy most of the attention of the MOE. Considerable energy
and funding was devoted to establishing the Comprehensive Water Quality Management
Measures for the Four Major Rivers 110 between 1998 and 2000. To ensure the smooth
109 Before 1991, environmental disaster was a word for rural residents living nearby industrial complex. They
suffered from wasted water and air pollution from industrial facilities. But, urban residents could not feel directly
the severity of such problem in their urban areas.
110 The four major rivers are the Han River, Nakdong River, Geum River, and Sumjin River, which meet the water
implementation of these measures through legal backing, the MOE used its influence to support
enactment of the Special Act on Watershed Management and Community Support between
1999 and July 2002. The officers at the MOE, including the Minister, had been engaged on
water quality issues in 420 discussion forums, and public hearings with stakeholders including
residents, local governments, and experts over a period of five years from 1998 to 2002. From
1991 until 1998, the MOE spent USD 17 billion on water management, accounting for almost
70 percent of the total budget for the MOE.
What was the fate of the budget for the air bureau? The budget for air quality management
had been less than five percent of the budget for water quality management (Table 4-10). Of
course, the budget is only one of the factors underlying the power of the bureau, and does not
always reflect the level of attention on, or importance of the specific issue. However, given the
assumption that the budget for the MOE was constrained at a certain level, water quality
management issues had gained a disproportionate share. Many experts complained about this
trend in the MOE, arguing for more resources to address serious urban air pollution'l.
Table 4-10. Comparison of the budgets (USD million) for water and air quality management of
the MOE (1998 - 2002)
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Water 1,131 1,153 1,302 1,414 1,433
Air 7.4 (0.7 %) 9.5 (0.8 %) 46.5 (3.5%) 61.5 (4.4%) 64.7 (4.5%)
Once the MOE finalized its major water quality management by successfully enacting the
Special Act on Watershed Management and Community Support, the air bureau was able to
needs of more than 40 million Korean people.
"' Chosun Ilbo (1998.12.12) 'Ignored air pollution'
request a greater share of the total MOE budget in 2002. Having completed its major thrust in
water quality, the Agency needed a new focus.112 Air quality was an appropriate candidate.
Rivalry between the MOE and the MOCT in regulatory processes
For an environmental regulatory proposal to go into effect as a regulation, it must first be
circulated around other Ministries which may have stakes in the content of the proposal. After
coordinating with other Ministries, the MOE puts the adjusted proposal through a public notice
and comment period. After adjusting the content of the proposal according to public comments,
the MOE sends the final proposal to the National Assembly, where politicians debate and
convert the proposal into a regulation. Thus, in the course of a regulatory process, there are
many points of coordination and communication where conflict might arise.
An analysis of the processes behind regulations passed by the National Assembly
revealed some cases of political disputes on the issue of environmental regulations during the
1990s. Enactment of many environmental regulations was delayed by political gridlock in
committee meetings. Such regulations included proposals on the designation of natural
conservation areas, the siting of waste treatment facilities, the conservation of wetlands, and the
protection of riverheads as water source. These proposals had in common aspects which might
have affected localized interests. Several politicians representing those local constituents in their
jurisdiction blocked the passage of the regulations.113
At the level of the National Assembly, there were no conflicts on regulations for air
'2 Sometimes people in government feel they have solved a problem. Even if it is questionable whether
governmental officials have solved a problem, they sometimes feel that they addressed it by passing legislation or
making an administrative decision. If they have, they turn their attention elsewhere, and then that subject drops
from their agendas (Kingdon, 1995).
113 Chosun Ilbo (1997.7.19) '[National Assembly] Most environmental bills pended', '[Environmental bills]
Drifting environmental bills due to conflicts of interests among local constituents'
quality management, not only because air pollution is relatively insulated from localized
interests, but also because the general public since the mid 1990s considered urban air pollution
the most serious environmental problemon the national agenda.114 However, a tougher challenge
to the air pollution proposal by the MOE came from the Ministry of Commerce. Considering the
web of interests that the two Ministries pursue, their conflicts seem unavoidable. The MOE
sought to regulate, by a command-and-control process the emissions of automobiles, forcing
technical development through standard setting. Automakers saw themselves as constituents
of the Ministry of Commerce, mandated to boost economic development by helping industry.
As the economic situation in the '90s became worse, the Ministry of Commerce pushed back
hard against the MOE.
For example, when the MOE showed its intention to require the installation of DPFs on
large diesel vehicles such as city buses, introduce CNG buses, and construct more than 300
CNG gas stations in 1997, the Ministry of Commerce opposed fiercely the proposal. The
Ministry of Commerce argued that the proposed MOE plan would burden the auto industries
and bus companies at a particularly bad time by requiring them to install expensive filters in the
context of an economic downturn and consequent overstocking of products. The powerful
Ministry of Commerce said that the MOE's plan should be postponed, considering the
contribution of the auto industries to the national economy.' 1 5As a result, the MOE's plan was
not fulfilled as quickly as the MOE intended.
114 The public poll for residents in Seoul in 1997 conducted by the City of Seoul revealed that 31.8% of the people
considered urban air pollution the most serious problem, 26.8% believed waste problem as the most serious, and
26.6% of the people selected water pollution as the most serious problem. In addition, there was a poll survey for
481 foreigners residing in Seoul with the same question. 40.2% of the foreigners indicated urban air pollution as the
biggest problem of Seoul. For the water pollution, only 13.5% foreigners said yes. That trend continued until 2000.
The public poll in 2000 said that 97% of the people thought that urban air pollution was in very serious condition.
s15 Chosun Ilbo (1997.4.10). '[MOE vs. Ministry of Commerce] Conflict on the automobile regulations'
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Ineffective coordination system within the government
How did the MOE navigate tough situations with private stakeholders as regulatory targets,
such as auto industries and oil industries, and with other Ministries within the government? First,
when businessmen complained about regulation, the MOE often had private meetings with
company officers to hear their opinions, explain its intention, and sometimes make deals with
them. Second, the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OGPC) was available to
function as a mediator, when conflict arose among government agencies. However, the chief
officer of the OGPC presided only over Vice-ministerial meetings and could not extend his/ her
influence at the ministerial level. When no accommodation could be reached among the Vice
Ministers, the conflict was transferred to the higher level of Ministers. A power game among the
Ministries ensued. The more powerful Ministers, usually of the economy or finance-related
Ministries, could wield considerable power over the policy outcomes. At this stage, Ministries
usually attacked other Ministries by using the media and tapping into other political sources
(Environmental Journalist club, 2001)116
Multiple streams (1991-2000) and Implications for the next chapter
The previous sections described policy making about urban air pollution during the 1990s
in South Korea by using Kingdon's multi-stream framework of policy change. This analysis will
also form the backdrop for the upcoming case study of public dispute resolution between
200 land 2003.
116 The environmental journalist club (2001). "The reason why salmons do not return."
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While Kingdon's model is grounded on American politics and policy making, it is very
helpful in figuring out why some policy proposals to alleviate urban air pollution in South Korea
came about in a specific period of time, why others did not, and why some policy measures
were implemented well and others less well. Many premises of Kingdon's model could be
applicable to air pollution policy making in South Korea during the 1990s.
Experts and MOE officers wanted to demonstrate that solutions generated by the policy
community were applicable to real problems which could be addressed through the policy
process. They continuously revealed negative indicators of serious air pollution to the media,
even when the data implied that the MOE had not done a good job in its mission. They also
compared South Korean air pollution to that in other countries, especially in the advanced
world.11 7 They were successful in branding diesel vehicles as powerful symbols for very dirty
air and diffusing this image of diesel vehicles to the public.
In the meantime, external factors in the politics streams, independent from the problem
and policy streams, arose. These factors affected the behaviors of policy entrepreneurs and
hence the policy outcomes. When a "policy window" opened, policy entrepreneurs tried to join
the streams together and push their proposals. When the window closed, they had to wait for the
next chance.
As Kingdon (1995) suggests, there was no single-factor explanation for policy making to
combat air pollution in South Korea during the 1990s. Several things had to come together at
once for policy to be made. The model is so probabilistic that we can only guess the odds that
something might happen, rather than say that something will happen. This helps to explain air
117 If one is not achieving what others are achieving, then the relative disadvantage constitutes a problem. The mere
fact of being behind in the greatest country on earth is enough to constitute a problem for some people (Kingdon,
1985)
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pollution policy making during the 1990s, which does not map well onto a rational decision-
making process model. The Kingdom framework also helps explain why a problem of urban air
pollution, such as emissions from diesel vehicles, persisted until 2000, even though everyone
had known there was a problem and what the solution was since at least 1993 (Figure 4-8).
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What the MOE formulated and tried to implement were policy instruments such as
setting emission standards for automobiles and clean fuels, encouraging the development of
clean technology like CNG, and DPF; these lay within the MOE's jurisdiction. However,
changing fuel prices was not under the jurisdiction of the MOE, but rather the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy, and the Ministry of Finance. Thus, unless the other
Ministries coordinated with the MOE in changing fuel prices, it would be difficult to
achieve the MOE's goals. 1 8 Also, even though the MOE tried hard to curb urban air
pollution, the rapidly increased number of vehicles offset the emissions reductions achieved
through policy implementation. Those two factors may explain the continuity of serious air
pollution until 2000.
What are the idiosyncratic features of South Korean policy making to reduce urban air
pollution during the 1990s? In the next table, I will compare distinct South Korean features
with general features of Kingdon's policy stream and politics stream (Table 4-11).
First, in Kingdon's policy stream, specialists (or, experts) constitute policy
communities. They are usually from research institutions, academia, inside government,
private companies, NGOs, and congressional staffers. In the issue of urban air pollution in
South Korea during the 1990s, policy communities were mainly composed of technocrats
within the MOE, technical experts from government research institutes, and university
118 Coordination among Ministries is necessary to implement effectively CNG bus projects. The MOE takes
part in developing the CNG technology and encouraging its distribution. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry,
and Energy (MOCIE) should lower the price of National Gas. The Ministry of Construction and
Transportation (MOCT) should facilitate the selection of the site of natural gas station. Finally, the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) should streamline the tax regulation as economic incentive to CNG buses.
105
professors, whose research was sponsored by the MOE. Sometimes, researchers in a private
company participated in developing clean technology.
Technical experts dominated the policy stream in the 1990s because air pollution
policy requires scientific and technical expertise as well as economic expertise. There was
far less participation from experts than from NGOs 9 or congressional staffers in
developing ideas, selecting ideas, and debating the merits in the policy communities. Not
until 2001 when NGOs built a coalition prior to the World Cup Soccer Games that the issue
of urban air pollution attracted the attention of environmental groups. 120 Thus, the role of
the MOE was the most important in the policy community. South Korea was built on
government initiatives, a fact that ran very deep in the public's thinking during the 1990s.
In Kingdon's terminology, those policy specialists were influential in arenas such as
public hearings, mass media, and academic proceedings, where they could build consensus
on the list of possible policy options by arguing the merits of certain policy options,
criticizing others, recombining old elements of previous policy options, educating others,
narrowing alternatives, and diffusing ideas.
The list of options for urban air pollution policy making was already on the table.
They had been developed elsewhere, usually in advanced countries, and needed to be
evaluated for the South Korean context in terms of technical, economic, and political
feasibility. Technical and economic feasibility were usually evaluated by policy experts
119 Policy experts associated with NGOs are usually university professors.
120 During the 1990s, only one event was held with NGO's participation as to air pollution. That issue was
about long-range transboundary air pollution in East Asia. So, environmental groups from six countries
(China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongol, South Korea, and Taiwan) built a network for air quality (The
Atmospheric Action Network for East Asia).
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within the government. The MOE dealt with political feasibility by listening to the reaction
to their statements from stakeholders in the media, and by contacting stakeholders in public
hearings and in private meetings. The process of constructing regulations as a quasi-
legislative function had been totally hidden from public view.
An interesting feature in South Korea during the 1990s is that while it did not seem
difficult to build consensus within the policy community on the list of policy options, other
Ministries such as the MOCIE, and MOCT often challenged consensus proposals
emanating from the MOE. Because conflicts among Ministries were addressed within the
government, there did not seem to be palpable public disputes involving environmental
groups and business sectors on the issue of urban air pollution during the 1990s.
According to Kingdon, the role of a policy community is to produce a short list of
possible policy options ready for policy makers to consider. That's the first consensus in
the policy stream. Another consensus building occurs in the politics stream when
politicians in Congress negotiate final policy instruments based on political considerations
rather than on merits or theoretical grounds. In other words, political constraints govern the
outcomes. In this consensus building, actors are often motivated by pressures such as
lobbying influences or election impacts. Coalition building among actors is a very
important element in consensus building in the politics stream.
In the case of urban air pollution in South Korea during the 1990s, few politicians
appeared in either the policy or politics stream. Politicians not only lacked science-
intensive environmental policy expertise, but also were not concerned with issues lacking
local interest elements. Because urban air pollution was a national, not a local issue, it was
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of greatest political concern at the Ministerial and National Assembly levels of government.
High level governmental officials met with stakeholders hidden from the public view,
making deals and trading off policy options from their own political perspectives. Power
rather than merits were more important in such games.
Table 4-11. Features of South Korean policy and politics streams on urban air pollution
during the 1990s
Consensus in Policy stream Consensus in Politics stream
Who Specialists (Experts) in policy High level officers rather than
communities: Usually researchers in politicians
government research institutes,
government agencies, or private
companies, university professors
(Few experts from civil society)
Where Policy Primeval Soup (Public High level official meetings, usually
hearings, mass media, policy hidden from the public
speeches)
What Evaluation of policy instruments, Deal, trade-off
which existed already in other
countries' experience.
Recombination of old elements,
narrowing alternatives, and
consensus on a few options for
decision agenda
How Not much argumentation and Based on political situation rather
persuasion, than merits or arguments.
Educating, and learning from, others Power game: applying pressure,
Little dispute lobbying influence, calculation of
electoral impact, coalition building
with higher-ups.
This analysis of the idiosyncratic features of multiple streams in South Korea during
the 1990s regarding urban air pollution provides a context for understanding specific cases
108
of public dispute resolution for the management of urban air pollution. During the 1990s,
the conventional multi-stream perspective is adequate as the multiple stakeholders
including government officers, businesses, and environmental groups gathered to build
consensus on complex urban air pollution policies in an ad-hoc fashion in the name of
governance. The stakeholders tried to generate policy options, evaluate policy options,
build consensus on policy options, and decide policy options all together. Even though they
did not have constitutional authority to make a final decision, their activities encompassed
the policy streams of conventional multi-streams. Another implication from the
conventional multiple stream model is that there are external, and unexpected factors in the
politics stream which actors in the policy process try to utilize. Thus, it is a very important
task to understand how such entrepreneurial activities around the politics stream affects
consensus-building efforts initiated by stakeholders during and following the conclusion of
consensus building. Insights from this analysis should facilitate public dispute resolution in
the urban air pollution regulatory area and beyond.
The next chapter further details the South Korean context for a case study of public
dispute resolution on urban air quality, because context matters. Public dispute resolution in
a certain country hinges on the context of its democratic development, as well as its
political institutions. For this reason, the chapter will explore the power of civil society,
political culture, decision-making processes, presidency, bureaucracy, legislature, and
judiciary system in South Korea since its democratization in 1987.
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As the new millennium began, the new concept of multiple streams, including the
consensus building stream, is more applicable. Environmental groups became powerful
actors. The policy and politics streams began to change in 2001 and 2002.
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Chapter Five
Idiosyncratic features of Korea's political institutions
(1987 to 2002)
Context matters. A clear understanding of the rules that govern key political
institutions, including the legislature, executive, bureaucracy, judiciary, and party systems,
as well as a sense of the willingness of citizens to utilize these institutions during the
policy-making process is necessary in order to better understand the context within which
social actors formulate and carry out collective decision making,
In general, East Asian democracies have undergone political democratization without
the simultaneous economic crises that have limited civil society's political options and the
budgetary resources available to the states in Latin America or Eastern Europe (Linz and
Stepan, 1996). Therefore, the region represents an important litmus test for the potential of
newly established democracies. In contrast to Latin America, Korean civil society activism
took place within the context of robust economic growth during the first decade of
democracy (1987-97). As a result, the new democratic regime in Korea had significantly
more resources than its Latin American counterparts to devote to non-economic policy
concerns.
To better situate questions about urban air quality management in South Korea, I
introduce the idiosyncratic features of Korean political institutions in which civil society
actors have tried to access the policy process in this nascent democracy. An analysis of
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political institutions in South Korea underpins a case study of public dispute resolution on
diesel vehicles and the special act for Seoul Metropolitan air pollution in later chapters.
The Legislature
The roles of legislature in a democracy are to enhance the legitimacy of decision
making through policy debate, to balance political power by monitoring the executive and
bureaucracies, to serve as a key mechanism to channel and represent civilian interests, and
to manage potentially destabilizing social disputes (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1989;
Diamond and Shin, 2000).
The Korean legislature has operated in a quite impressive fashion since
democratization began in the late 1980s, especially compared to its role under the military
regimes of the past (Shin, 1999). However, compared to advanced Western democracies,
the Korean legislature remains immature as a policy-making institution. Key impediments
include limited policy expertise, limited autonomy, disrespect for legislative procedures,
under-resourced committees and an under-developed culture of political debate.
Limited professionalism and under-resourced committees
One professor of public policy in Korea who has participated in a civilian ministerial
committee criticizes Korean legislators scornfully for their lack of policy expertise and
boasts of his civilian watchdog role in evaluating policy proposals:
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"Politicians in the National Assembly don't really have policy expertise. Some
from academic backgrounds or NGOs do, but because party discipline is so
strong, they are not really allowed their own voice and I think mainly they are
not interested. Contrasted to this, the evaluations regularly undertaken by
unpaid civilian ministerial committee members where we review all the details
and critical issues before reaching a decision are better. If only our national
assembly committees were like this we wouldn't have to worry about our
politics. If elected politicians spent their afternoon talking about such issues
rather than secret ideas such as who hates who, fighting over who is most loyal
to the president, and things like that, then our democracy would be fine. (Kwon
Huck-Ju, Interview conducted in 2000 by Jones (2004))
Concurring in this view, the public does not trust Korean legislators and regards them
as the least competitive sector in Korea. Many scholars of Korean politics indicate that
there is strong party discipline. It is built around a regionally based and personality-focused
party system, and hinders the development of ideologically-based party platforms as well as
in-depth policy debate (Park, 2000).
Like a father in a traditional Korean family who, alone, makes all the important
decisions, every party boss exclusively controls the nomination of his party's candidates for
each and every electoral district of the National Assembly. Once the candidates are elected,
the boss tells elected representatives how to vote on every major issue, and censures them
when they defy the guidelines (Shin, 1999). Powerful party leaders control the nominations
for political offices almost exclusively. Similarly, promotions tend to be awarded based on
loyalty rather than merit.
In terms of monitoring functions, the Korean legislature has failed to live up to the
1987 constitutional reforms, which authorized annual reviews of executive performance
and an inspection of all ministries (Korean Constitution, Chapter 3, Article 61). While the
letter of the law has generally been respected, civic groups and political analysts have
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suggested that these reviews tend to be symbolic and cursory. Only 20 days per annum are
allocated to monitoring the bureaucracy and few Congress members approach the process
professionally, focusing instead on civil service scandals, which attract greater media
attention.
While the quality of the monitoring process has improved somewhat since 2000 due
to an initiative12 1 led by the People's Solidarity for Participation Democracy (PSPD), one
of the most influential Korean civic groups, existing legislative rules and procedures often
fail to ensure that societal issues and related policy demands are thoroughly debated. The
committee system remains rudimentary and limited in scope, while the deliberations that do
occur often degenerate into partisan skirmishes (Park, 2000). These problems are further
exacerbated by the inadequate quantity and quality of staff resources, as well as a cultural
tendency to avoid public disagreement.
Despite members' expanded freedom of speech, it is hard to say that floor debate
serves its intended purposes. Legislative members rarely raise concise and genuine
questions. Cabinet ministers do not seem to provide sincere answers to the questions raised.
Exchanges thus remain tedious, unmoving, and no more than a blunt warning against
executive mismanagement (Park, 2000).
Committee meetings are often plagued by absenteeism and socializing, while
networking is given priority over policy expertise. As a result, legislative reviews tend to be
121 NGOs assign themselves to congressional committees and rank congressional members' input to the civil
service monitoring process. Results are released to the media, serving as an important monitoring and
evaluation tool (Yoon Jung Sook, 2003 interview)
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rushed and most modifications cosmetic, especially for bills introduced by the executive.
Limited autonomy
Although civilian control over the military was firmly established by the early 1990s,
the Korean legislature has been less successful in securing independence vis-A-vis the
executive. The president and close Blue House aides generally set the major legislative
agenda and floor strategies, while legislative staff relies mainly on bills drafted by the
bureaucracy, constituent parties, or civic groups. In the case of the budget, the legislature
has rarely suggested substantive changes to executive proposals, reinforcing the
legislature's role as a passive reviewing body (Park, 2000).
Disrespect for legislative procedure and immature political debate
A democratic legislature is charged with developing procedures that encourage
effective debate as well as policy expertise. A plethora of formal rules and regulations
concerning legislative proceedings, internal order, and discipline has ensured some degree
of professionalism in the Korean case (Shin, 1999). However, political parties continue to
rely on extra-legal and illegal obstructionist tactics to influence the legislative process. The
ruling party has employed extra-legal blitzkrieg tactics to ram through legislation rather
than compromise on controversial bills. In retaliation, opposition parties often focus on
uncovering presidential impropriety, or scandals among rival party members, and are quick
to resort to illegal disruptive measures such as sit-ins, hunger strikes, and boycotting
plenary or committee meetings for extended periods of time (Shin, 1999).
115
Due to these limitations, the Korean legislature has had problems developing as a
policy-making body. Since committees do not devote significant time and resources to
scrutinizing legislative proposals, the content of legislation generated by the executive or
bureaucracies is often enacted as proposed. Some legislation has been passed without
adequate consideration of its broader societal implications or whether the existing
infrastructure can effectively accommodate additional burdens. An officer in the Ministry
of Environment explained in an interview in 2004 that in other countries they make a law
and a corresponding administrative system together, but in Korea first they make the law
and then subsequently they have to make the system or infrastructure (Mr. Ahn, SC, 2004
interview by Kim DY).
The strategy of "Let's make the law first, then amend it" has been utilized quite often
by relatively weak proponents of legislation; otherwise they would never get through the
tough resistance from strong counterparts. Even one NGO leader for gender issues points
that there is some advantage to the lack of political debate and rapid passage of laws,
saying "in Germany they spend years on one law and in some cases it will not get through
but in Korea, the Sexual Harassment Act actually took just a few hours." (Kim Young Hee,
MDP gender expert, 2000 interview in Jones (2004)). These idiosyncratic features have
enabled South Korea to earn the dubious title of "the world's fastest law-making machine."
Bureaucracy
During the military regimes of the 1960s through the 1980s, the policy process in
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Korea was not at all participatory. Usually only elite bureaucrats participated in making
decisions which were politically endorsed afterward. Business people and professionals
were consulted, but they had no direct influence on the articulation of policy. Their
suggestions were often discounted because they were presumed to be in favor of business
interests and the well-to-do, rather than trade unions and the alienated. It was a dominant
concern in policy making that priority should be given to national economic development.
Those governments were largely hands-off regarding issues of wealth distribution and
social justice, as well as issues of the environment, gender inequality, or discrimination
against the disabled (Kim S, 1998).
In addition, Korean civil servants in those days were widely considered to be one of
the most conservative groups in society. Until public sector reforms in 1998, the civil
service system was entirely closed. Whereas civil service personnel in other countries may
accept positions in academia, non-profit, or the private sector before subsequently
reentering the bureaucracy, entrance into the Korean civil service has historically been by
examination only with little value attached to alternative experiences or career paths. Based
on a long cultural tradition of a merit-based bureaucracy that honors civil servants as part of
the social elite, Korean bureaucrats continue to be regarded with high, albeit diminishing,
respect. The bureaucracy is still hierarchical, rule-bound, and resistant to outside influence.
Competition in civil service entrance exams is fierce, with just a two percent annual
passage rate (Evans, 1995). Though the number of bureaucrats has multiplied over the past
three decades (from 9.5 to 18 per 1000 inhabitants), their relative numbers remain low in
comparison with western democracies (Woo-Cumings, 1995).
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Not surprisingly, the policy-making process has been largely elite-controlled.
Through the 1980s, Korean bureaucratic elites played a substantial role in formulating
national development strategies (Park 2000; Evans 1995). As the bureaucracy has enjoyed
considerable autonomy vis-a-vis the legislature, not only did the majority of parliamentary
statues originate within the bureaucracy, but also the legislature's oversight role has been
historically weak, leaving the bureaucracy largely unaccountable (Woo-Cumings 1995;
Park, 2000). Historically, Korea's bureaucratic culture has been also characterized by strict
adherence to senior colleagues' instructions, leaving little room for policy innovation.
While some authoritarian regimes collapse because they are unable to meet their
country's economic development needs (e.g., Argentina), the Korean military government
fell apart because its economic model generated too much success. As citizens shifted their
focus from the immediate demands of securing the necessities of survival to more quality-
of-life issues, the Chun regime (1981-1986) lost its legitimacy -not only with those at the
forefront of the democracy movement, students and workers, but also with the middle class
(Kim S, 2000). In other words, a "crisis of success" propelled Korea's democratic transition.
Because this is a special kind of transition, there has been limited pressure for a major
overhaul of the bureaucracy (Hahm and Plein, 1997). Indeed, historical stability and
continuity have minimized the level of violence and instability generated by the transition.
At the same time, the absence of a radical break with the past and status quo politics have
meant that promised democratic reforms have been difficult to implement (Hahm and Plein,
1997; Woo-Cummings, 1995). Accordingly, while the dominance of the presidential-
bureaucratic nexus has declined in importance due to the growing independence of the
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legislature, judiciary, and civil society, the bureaucracy continues to exercise significant
influence over policy formation and implementation. Because the limited professionalism
of the legislature frequently results in the passage of overly broad laws, the important task
of interpretation is left to bureaucratic officials responsible for drawing up all-important
implementation ordinances. That is, it is ultimately bureaucrats who concretize new legal
and policy principles and decide whether or not to adopt an activist or conservative reading.
As Cho Young Sook, a NGO representative points out:
"Sometimes the law is good but the implementation guidelines are bad-
sometimes the meaning of the law vanishes. So although we first focus on the
national assembly, we have to immediately turn and monitor whether the
governmental officials follow the meaning of the lawfully or do they just ignore
its real significance. In that case, we have to monitor and push and
negotiate...[this process] can last 3 months, 6 months.., but we know that the
shihaengiyoung [enforcement ordinance] is sometimes more important than the
law itself (2000 interview by Jones (2004))."
While this is the prevailing view, a closer look at post-transitional political dynamics
suggests that bureaucratic access points may be considerably more dynamic. Not only are
new personnel being recruited into the civil service (including former anti-authoritarian
activists), but partly in response to civil society demands, new channels of civic
involvement are developing, ranging from participation on ministerial advisory committees
to the establishment of new mechanisms within the state to represent specific societal
interests, like women's groups.
The DJ administration (1998-2002) undertook several reform initiatives in 1998. In
order to encourage academics and non-profit sector workers to join the civil service, an
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expert recruitment system was introduced in which a limited number of positions were
designated for contract-based appointments. This allowed an unprecedented, but admittedly
still small, number of activists to enter the civil service, push for reforms from within the
state, and build coalitions with activist NGOs to address social policies.
Because of the important role that bureaucracies in nascent democracies play in
formulating legislation, concretizing general legislative principles into detailed
implementation ordinances and overseeing the policy implementation process, it seems
imperative that civil society groups invest as much in engaging critically with civil service
officials as in seeking legislative reform or aiming to influencing the content of party
platforms.
With the rising pressure generated by civil organizations during the 1990s as well as
increasing networking between the bureaucracy and NGOs, the role of civil society in
dealing with such social concerns as environment and gender issue has risen (Kwon, 2000),
as compared to NGO displacement of bureaucratic control over economic policy. (Hahm
and Plein 1997).
The Presidency
Post-independence authoritarian leaders in South Korea promoted the image of the
president as the father of the nation whose wisdom in leading the country towards
prosperity demanded filial loyalty from the citizenry. This powerful legacy of personalizing
political authority continues to have a strong residual effect, facilitating considerable
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executive sway over bureaucratic and legislative agendas. Bureaucrats, ruling party
legislators, and party officials are generally anxious to demonstrate acceptance of new
policy directions when the president expresses an interest in a specific policy area, whether
it be globalization in the case of YS (1992-1997) or human rights in the case of DJ (1997-
2002) (Kim Samuel, 2000).
The end of economic growth as the primary source of presidential legitimization and
the diversification of post-transitional citizen demands have required presidents to take a
more active role in setting social and welfare policies (Kwon, 1999). Accordingly, there has
been a fragile but nevertheless important trend in Korea towards increasing executive-civil
society cooperation. The Korean presidency has become an increasingly important ally of
progressive civil society groups with each successive presidency. The election of Kim, DJ
in December 1997 represented a watershed for state-civil society relations. Voted in with
only a 40 percent plurality and lacking the support of the powerful business community, the
Kim, DJ administration placed a heavy emphasis on its partnership with civil society.
Former activists were recruited to key positions within the ruling party, the bureaucracy,
and the presidential advisory circle (Shin Heisoo, 2000 Interview by Jones (2004)). This
level of state-civil society interaction has been enhanced in the current Noh, MH
administration.
Thus, while it probably would be misguided to assume that presidential support
translates neatly into expanded political opportunities for civil society, if a president
champions a particular social-reform issue, civil society is likely to play an important role
in securing its place on the political agenda as well as the intensity with which it is
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promoted. In other words, given that presidential office holders still enjoy substantial
control over the policy agenda and deliberation processes, if the interests of civic groups
coincide with the personal commitments of the president, executive support may tilt the
balance of power in favor of reform proponents.
Political parties
Under the military regimes, the threat from North Korea thwarted the development of
a diverse party spectrum: Embryonic left-wing parties were crushed, restricting domestic
politics to a rightist, pro-American stance. During the Park regime (1961-1979), opposition
parties were state-sponsored and represented in a largely powerless Congress. Because
parties competed in elections with predetermined outcomes, party organizations lacked
experience mobilizing popular support and were without a grassroots base.
During the democratization process, political parties have made the least progress
among Korean political institutions. The party system remains far from the institutionalized
model discussed in the democratization literature. The conditions for effective
institutionalization of a party system include low electoral volatility, 122 minimal party
fragmentation (the number of parties), and limited ideological polarization (Mainwaring
and Scully, 1995; Payne et al., 2002). In the Korean case, no parties have survived between
electoral periods. The party system has been extremely unstable. Although frequent party
122 Electoral volatility is measured by the net change in seat (and vote) shares of all parties from one election
to the next.
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name changes conceal a considerable degree of continuity associated with the major party
leaders, the cycle of creating and disbanding political parties remains.
Although Korea has only had a mean number of 2.95 parties during democratization,
it scores poorly in terms of disproportionality (i.e., the ratio of congressional seats to vote
share) (Croissant, 2002). There has not been a single legislative majority in any of the four
recent national assembly elections, resulting in the so-called yeoso-yadae (ruling minority,
opposition majority) phenomenon. In terms of ideological polarization, in order to appeal to
voters in the Seoul-metropolitan area (45 percent of the national total), where regional ties
are weaker, parties adopt catch-all centrist platforms. Party platform and legislative
positions are calculated efforts to curry favor with broad voter groups and are generally
devoid of ideological commitments. (Lee MiKyoung, 2003 interview by Jones (2004)).
Party bureaus make only limited efforts to retain contact with civic groups outside of
electoral cycles. While officials may respond to particular citizen and NGO demands, they
do not have a strong community presence. This assessment is backed up by low rates of
party membership (approximately 12 percent in 1996) and the associated inability of parties
to be self-financing. As a result, party leaders have relied heavily on business elites for
illegal donations, especially as elections usually deplete some 50 percent of total party
resources.
In addition, the acceptance of parties and elections as legitimate mechanisms for
governing is an important dimension of party institutionalization. However, the Korean
political party system has fallen short of the institutionalized ideal associated with effective
democratic governance. Parties tend to be elite-dominated and have lost public legitimacy
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due to repeated scandals involving slush funds and bribery. Only 27 percent of Koreans
agree that parties serve the interests of the public, while 71 percent characterize Korean
political party performance as either "non-democratic" or "mostly democratic" (Shin, 2000).
This condition of the Korean party system explains citizens' low levels of party
identification.
Judiciary
The Korean judiciary has undergone significant reforms during democratization.
Change is occurring in the way the populace perceives and interacts with legal procedures
and the courts. Legal scholar Youm (1994) argues that judicial review is emerging as one of
the most important institutions in democratic Korea.
In response to demands for greater judicial independence and more effective
protection of civil and political rights, the Constitutional Court was established in 1989 and
revived the practice of judicial review suspended during authoritarian rule. By soliciting the
help of progressive lawyers, 123 civil society groups can draft reform bills and represent
themselves as plaintiffs in court cases. At the policy implementation phase, the judiciary
and bureaucracy constitute the main arenas of influence. In contrast to many other fledgling
democracies, the Korean judiciary has afforded a significant new point of entry for
organized citizens.
123 In May 1988, a collective of former political dissidents and civil rights lawyers called "Lawyers Group for
the Achievement of Democratic Society" (MinByun) emerged. Boasting a membership of over 300 attorneys,
this group has been actively involved in promoting "full democratization" by assisting civil movement
organizations.
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Chapter Six
Portents of dispute on urban air pollution in policy stream
As stated in Chapter four, many factors in the problem and politics streams portended
tension between the MOE and other economic Ministries. The levels of NOx and PM10 in
Seoul in the early 2000s were still high and increasing, even though the MOE had
implemented several policy measures during the 1990s. Second, environmental groups had
become more involved in urban air pollution, with the 2002 World Cup Soccer Games
coming to South Korea. Third, based on the evaluation of previous long-term planning, the
MOE was preparing new policy proposals for the second 10-year term environmental plan
and the third 5-year term plan, to be announced at the end of 2002.
Two changes in the policy stream exacerbated the public dispute as tension in the
problem stream and politics stream erupted during 2000. The first change was initiated by
automakers and the second change by the MOE.
Change in policy stream from the side of auto industries
Auto industry as powerful actor
At the beginning of the new millennium, the automotive industry in South Korea was
a powerful actor in the policy stream. This industry, which includes automobile and
auxiliary parts production, had become a core driver of South Korea's economic growth
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despite its short history, 124 Globally, it rose to the level of having the world's fifth largest
manufacturing capacity in 1996 (KAMA, 1996). Even with the financial crisis of 1997-
1998 in South Korea, the auto industry was ranked first in the nation in terms of export
sales, employment, and tax revenue pool 125 (Hyundai Motor Company, 2004). The auto
industry also sustains indirect employment in associated industries, such as insurance, tire,
iron, chemicals, glass, oil, and after-service. Including these numbers, the auto industry
contributes to eight percent of national employment (Hyundai Motor Company, 2004).
These numbers show why the South Korean auto industry has exerted enormous
influence in formulating South Korean economic policies. For the government, the auto
industry appears to be the force that will enable South Korea to reach its goal of US
$20,000 GDP. 126
Change the symbolic image of diesel vehicles!
On September 19, 2001, Hyundai Motor Company (hereafter, Hyundai), as a leader127
among other South Korean industries, held a public symposium on the "high technology of
passenger car diesel engine" with Bosch Corporation. There, Mr. Lee, the vice president of
Hyundai Motor Company maintained that diesel passenger car engine technology was so
advanced that diesel passenger cars were no more environmentally harmful-in fact, they
124 The first South Korean automobile, the "Pony" was made by Hyundai in 1976.
125 It was responsible for 11.1% of national manufacturing capacity, 7.9% of national employment, 12.0% of
national export sales and 18.2% of national tax revenue pool in 2004. According to the Korea Automotive
Research Institute, the automotive industry directly employed 210,000 people, exceeding 170,000 employees
in the second largest industry, semi-conductors, by far.
126 Weekly Korea (2005.12. 28). 'Top ten news for auto industry in South Korea 2005.'
127 In 2004, Hyundai Motor Company accounted for 53% of the total number of automobiles exported and
contributed to 7% of the national export (Hyundai Motor Company, 2004).
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emitted 30-60 percent less CO2--than gasoline vehicles.128 Hyundai was trying to change
people's preconceived image of diesel vehicles as symbols of dirty air and major culprits in
air pollution into an image of environmentally friendly transportation.
Why diesel passenger cars now?
Originally, diesel engines were the economical choice for large vehicles such as long-
haul trucks, buses, heavy industrial equipment, or SUVs. Diesel engines remained rare in
passenger cars, because diesel engines were regarded as noisy, slow, and graceless. Most of
all, diesel vehicles were notorious for black exhaust fumes, including an especially high
level of particulate matter. South Korean auto industries had once manufactured a few
models of diesel passenger cars, but failed to create much market demand for them during
the late 1980s129 . They could not change the image of the dirty and noisy diesel vehicle
with their experiments.
Why, then, did Hyundai want to manufacture diesel passenger cars in South Korea
again in 2001? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine global market conditions
for automobiles during the late 1990s. From a managerial point of view, industries have to
be sensitive to changes in external environments to survive. Rapidly developing South
Korean auto industries observed in 1996 that export of their automobiles had begun to
exceed domestic sales. Furthermore, in the course of overcoming the financial crisis, which
128 Korean Economy (Hankyung) (2001.9.19)
129 In 1980, Daewoo motor company manufactured passenger cars, called "Royal Records" with diesel
engines. They sold only 12,000 vehicles for eight years, and terminated manufacturing the model. Afterwards,
Kia motor company ventured to manufacture a model of diesel passenger car ("Concord"), but it went the
same way as the Daewoo product.
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stormed Asian countries in 1997 and 1998, the auto industry had to look for new foreign
markets to offset decreases in profit in domestic markets.
External conditions, however, were not promising for expanding sales. First, foreign
markets were expected to become more competitive. There was worldwide oversupply of
automobiles. In 1999, auto industries in the world supplied 77 million vehicles, of which
only 55 million were sold, leaving 22 million unsold (KAMA, 1999)130. Second, the
exponential growth of the Chinese auto industry'31 threatened all the other auto industries.
Third, North America-centered marketing strategies proved risky as economies in the
region slowed.
Faced with these conditions, South Korean auto industries turned toward the
European Union (EU) market, the second largest in the world, and sensed a distinct trend in
the EU auto market: the rapid increase of diesel passenger cars (Table 6-1). 132 The number
of diesel passenger cars, which accounted for only 14 percent of total vehicles sold in the
EU market in 1990, increased to 22.6 percent in 1995, 32 percent in 1997, and reached 40.9
percent in 2002.133 Then, why did environmentally sensitive and progressive European
people want to buy more and more diesel passenger cars?
130 KAMA (1999). Prospect for 2000 auto industry
'13' Auto Industry Research Vol 140. (2006.1.5).The Chinese auto industry manufactured 0.2 million
automobiles in 1980, and increased the number from one million in 1992 to 2 million in 2000.
132 In Japan, diesel passenger cars only share 1.5% of the total passenger vehicles. In the US, diesel passenger
cars account for only 0.2%.
133 JoongAng Ilbo. Economist #621 (2002.1.22).
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Table 6-1. Share of diesel passenger vehicles ('99-'00) in European countries
Austria Belgium Spain France Italy Germany Netherlands
62% 54 % 49% 48% 33% 29% 24%
Clean diesel engine?
One answer lay in the technological development of clean diesel technology' 34 for
passenger cars. The new diesel engines had some environmental advantages over other
types of engines. Of the five major emissions from internal combustion engines (CO, HC,
CO 2, PM, and NOx), diesel emits only small amounts of the first three. Most importantly,
diesel passenger cars emit 20-50 percent less CO 2 than gasoline cars. However, the new
diesel engines still emit much more NOx and PM than gasoline vehicles (Table 6-2).
Table 6-2. Comparison of emissions from diesel and gasoline passenger cars (unit: g/km)
Model 13  Fuel Displacement CO HC NOx PM CO2  Fuel
(liter) efficiency
Avante Diesel 2.0 0.129 0.016 0.326 0.033 170.0 15.5
XD Gasoline 2.0 0.24 0.03 0.04 -- 223.0 10.5
Lavita Diesel 1.5 0.16 0.011 0.417 0.036 163.4 16.4
Gasoline 1.5 0.92 0.03 0.07 -- 213.7 10.9
Source: MOE's presentation on May 17, 2002 at public forum.
In Europe, the solution to the problem of high particulate matter emitted from diesel
engines was to provide clean diesel fuel with a low sulphur content of 50 ppm. Lower
sulfur fuel can reduce particulate emissions without the addition of any exhaust control
134 Advanced new technologies, such as electronic controls, common rail fuel injection, variable injection
timing, improved combustion chamber configuration, and turbocharging have made diesel engines cleaner,
quieter, and more powerful than past diesel vehicles.
135 To compare the emission from diesel and gasoline passenger cars, Hyundai's two models are used.
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device, as well as improve the performance of engine systems. 136
Another reason for the popularity of diesel passenger cars in the EU is economic.
Today's diesel engines provide 20 to 40 percent better fuel economy' 37 and offer more
torque at lower rpm than their gasoline counterparts. Also, soaring but unstable gasoline
prices stimulated consumers to buy passenger cars working on diesel fuel, which was
relatively cheaper than gasoline.' 38 Using diesel also means reducing dependence on
foreign oil. Thus, global leaders in the auto industry believed the future of the auto industry
lay in the reduction of the engine displacement in gasoline vehicles, and the improvement
of diesel engines in order to survive stringent environmental regulations, at least until there
is the development of new alternative energy in the future.' 39
Diesel engine is the future!
Observing the potential of diesel passenger cars in the future auto market,'14 Hyundai
and Kia quickly responded by venturing into the development of its own diesel passenger
cars in 1999.141 Apart from the market potential of diesel passenger cars in Europe, their
136 Diesel Technology Forum, 2005: Meet Clean Diesel, www.dieselforum.org/meet-clean-diesel/what-is-
clean-diesel/).
137 Diesel is a petroleum-based fuel with higher energy content than gasoline. This greater energy content,
coupled with the efficiency of compression ignition, explains why diesel vehicles get better gas mileage.
138 Fuel price is influencing factor when consumers buy a new car. Although England belongs to the European
market, diesel passenger cars are not that famous, accounting for only 14% of the total passenger cars,
compared to other European countries. That's because diesel price is not competitively lower than gasoline
price. In the case of US, the relative price ratio between gasoline and diesel is 100:111. Expensive diesel price
partly explains why there is low share (0.2%) of diesel passenger cars in the US.
139 Joongang Ilbo. Economist #664 (2002.12.3).
140 It was expected that diesel passenger vehicles would share more than 50% of the total passenger cars in the
world.
14' Hyundai ventured jointly with US Detroit Diesel Corporation in developing diesel engines for passenger
cars and contracted with German Bosch Corporation for Common Rail system which can reduce emissions
remarkably from diesel engines.
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rationales for the development of diesel passenger cars also came from a concern for the
CO 2 regulations in Europe. Their rationales were explicitly expressed in the interim policy
report of the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM) sponsored by Korean
Automobile Manufactures Association (KAMA) in December 1999:
'Regulation of C0 2 in Europe is literally the eye of the hurricane for the auto
industry. According to the convention, automobiles should satisfy the CO2
standard of 140 g/km from 2008. South Korea will be a member of the
convention from 2009. However, given that the current level of engine
technology in South Korea emits over 180 g/km, South Korea should focus on
the development of appropriate technology. To satisfy the C0 2 convention, an
ultra high fuel efficiency vehicle is necessary and at this moment, diesel
passenger cars are the best solution... therefore, for this reason, diesel
passenger cars should be encouraged in South Korea' (KIMM, 1999)142
Hyundai143 (Kia144' s strategies
To accomplish its new business mission, Hyundai pursued four strategies. First, it
decided to quickly finish developing diesel engines clean enough to satisfy the European
emission standards for diesel passenger cars, so-called "EURO-3" starting in 2000. Second,
Hyundai needed a market for diesel passenger cars in South Korea. This strategy could
enlarge production capacity sufficiently to effect economies of scale, improve technologies,
and maintain its competitiveness in the EU auto market. Third, to do that, Hyundai needed
to change consumers' images of diesel passenger vehicles and engines by advertising the
142 KIMM (Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials), as a government-funded research institute, is
the main research institute to be consulted on automobile emission standards by the MOE, as well as
KAMA.
143 In 2004, Hyundai Motor Company accounted for 53% of the total number of automobiles exported and
contributed to 7% of the national export (Hyundai Motor Company, 2004).
44 Major South Korean auto industries are Hyundai, Kia, Renault-Samsung, Ssangyong, and Daewoo. In the
wake of financial crisis during 1997-1998, Hyundai Motor Company bought out Kia Motors Corporation in
1999. Samsung motor company was merged with Renault and Daewoo motor with GM.
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benefits of new diesel technology. Lastly, Hyundai hoped to protect its domestic market
during the development period for new diesel passenger cars from foreign diesel passenger
cars equipped with relatively superior technologies.
These strategies are well described in KIMM's policy report in 1999:
'Diesel passenger cars hold a key for future auto market. Therefore, it is
absolutely necessary that active domestic market for diesel passenger cars
should be created...However, creating domestic market for diesel passenger
cars will be never easy because diesel vehicles (mostly large and heavy
vehicles) are branded as major contributor to urban air pollution. At this point,
it is necessary to create conditions for domestic market by easing public's
distrust against diesel passenger cars. In addition to that, the auto industry
needs certain amount ofpreparation time because it is now in the course of
development of technology. Thus, for the next emission standards for newly
manufactured diesel passenger cars in South Korea, it is recommended that the
government set the standards as the level of EURO-4 or above to block diesel
passenger cars (including foreign cars) from penetrating into domestic market.
Then, within two years, when the auto industry can manufacture new diesel
passenger cars with appropriate technology, the new rational emission
standards, (probably, the level of EURO-3), can be discussed again. It is agreed
that the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the auto industry, and other experts
agreed to participate in the next review.'
As Hyundai had hoped, things progressed favorably. The company developed diesel
engines equipped with advanced technology such as the Common Rail system, which
reduced many emissions compared to conventional diesel vehicles. On November 25, 2000,
Hyundai declared that its new diesel passenger cars capable of satisfying EURO-3
standards were ready to be sold. 145 Finally, Hyundai and Kia began exporting their four
new models of diesel passenger car to the European market in February 2001 and had sold
a total of 53,533 by 2002.
145 Hankook Ilbo (2000.11.25). 'New era coming for diesel passenger cars'
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Officers of the industry were very busy promoting the vision of diesel passenger cars
as cleaner than most people expected. To change people's perceptions, Hyundai used the
media and public symposiums. For example, the company held a symposium with a
multinational industry, BOSCH, to advertise the potential of new diesel engine technology
on September 19, 2001. Also, Hyundai showed off to the media a new model of diesel
passenger car, "Avante X," equipped with a new common rail diesel engine, hoping to
prove that the new diesel passenger car was not only less noisy but also more comfortable,
as well as much cleaner.146
Most importantly, based upon the recommendation of KIMM's report, the Ministry of
Environment (MOE) announced the advance notice in April 2000 of an amendment to the
Clean Air Conservation Act which would increase emission standards for newly
manufactured diesel passenger cars. The amendment's comment period was to close in July
2002. As Hyundai wished, the MOE upgraded emission standards for newly manufactured
diesel passenger cars to a level foreign vehicles could not satisfy.
Too strict emission standards
Looking at the newly established emission standards for newly manufactured diesel
passenger cars in 2000, which went into effect in July 2002 (Table 6-3), one might be
astonished by the numbers: The South Korean emission standards were 25 times stricter in
NOx, and five times in PMl 0 than the Euro-3 standards. In other words, no existing diesel
passenger cars in the world could satisfy the South Korean standards thus making it
146 Hankook Ilbo (2000.11.25). 'New era coming for diesel passenger cars'
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impossible for foreign diesel passenger cars to be sold in South Korea. South Korea became
the most environmentally strict country at least for diesel passenger cars at that time.
Table 6-3. Comparison of emission standard for diesel private vehicles (Unit: g/km)
Nations CO HC NOx PM
South Korea (Jan, 2000) 1.2 0.25 0.62 0.05
South Korea (April, 2000)' )  0.5 0.01 0.02 0.01
Europe (2000, EURO-3) 0.64 0.56 0.50 0.05(NOx + HC)
US Federal (1999, LEV ) 2.13 0.05 0.13 0.05
California LEV 2.13 0.05 0.03 0.006
(1999, LEV-2) ULEV 1.06 0.025 0.03 0.006
Japan (2002) 0.63 0.12 0.30 0.056
Source: MOE's presentation on May 17, 2002 at public forum.
~): In April 2000, MOE announced a advance notice of the amendment on emission standard for new diesel
passenger vehicles, which would be effective since July 2002.
2): LEV (Low Emission Vehicle)
3): ULEV (Ultra Low Emission Vehicle)
The sudden tightening of the emission standards for new diesel passenger cars was
initiated in April 2000, when the Ministry of Environment (MOE) announced the advance
notice for the amendment of the Clean Air Conservation Act (Table 6-4). The amendment
was to make existing emission standards for NOx 47 times stricter.
Table 6-4. The evolution of emission standards for diesel passenger cars in South Korea
(Unit: g/km)
Application year CO HC NOx PM
1993.1.1 2.11 0.25 0.62 0.12
1996.1.1 2.11 0.25 0.62 0.08
1998.1.1 1.5 0.25 0.62 0.08
2000.1.1 1.2 0.25 0.62 0.05
2002.7.1 0.5 0.01 0.02 0.01
Source: MOE's presentation on May 17, 2002 at public forum.
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The only remaining task to improve the domestic market for diesel passenger cars was
to rationalize or once again lower emission standards to the level of EURO-3 as automakers
and the MOE agreed in 1999 when KIMM prepared the report. They agreed in 1999 that
within two years they would discuss the next emission standards for new diesel passenger
cars again, as the auto industry developed appropriate technology. Hyundai and Kia
believed that as soon as they showed their ability to manufacture competitive diesel
passenger cars for the European market, the MOE would rationalize the emission standards
anyway so that they could actually sell their new diesel passenger cars in South Korea.
However, after two years had passed there was no signal from the MOE about discussing a
new emission standard.
Rationalize standards, please!
It would be a big problem for Hyundai (Kia) if they could not sell their diesel
passenger cars on the South Korean market due to the very emission standards that they
themselves had requested from the MOE. In 2001, Hyundai began to signal publicly to the
government that there was a problem. In public symposiums, they argued that the
government should loosen the emission standards for diesel passenger cars so that Hyundai
might sell diesel passenger cars in the domestic market. However, the task of rationalizing
emission standards proved not that easy, as KIMM warned in its report in 1999. The
tension between the MOE and Hyundai (Kia) on emission standards continued until 2002.
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Unexpected problem for Hyundai (Kia)
While Hyundai and Kia proceeded well with the new plan for diesel passenger cars in
2000, something else was going on in the MOE. The MOE's 2000 amendment of the Clean
Air Conservation Act included other two important regulatory changes: 1) change of
definition of vehicle categories (Table 6-5), and 2) change of the definition of multiple-
purpose vehicles (Table 6-6). Vehicle categories and the regulatory definition of vehicles
are very important, since those factors decide which emission standards should apply to a
certain vehicle. According to the vehicle categories and the definitions, some vehicles may
be subject to stricter emission standards than others.
Table 6-5. Change of definition of vehicle categories for passenger car type- 1147
Before the advance notice On the public notice Final amendment
of amendment (2000.4.24) (2000.10.30)
Passenger car type-1 means a motor vehicle with...
* Displacement of more * Displacement of more * Displacement of more
than 800 cc than 800 cc than 800 cc
* Weight of less than * Weight of less than * Weight of less than 3.5
tons. tons tons
* In addition, wagons, * In addition, vans with the * In addition, vans with the
vans, designed to carry width of less than width of less than
less than 8 passengers, and the hei hto at mm and the height of at
and multi-purpose less than I less than m,
passenger cars designed to carry less designed to carry less
than 8 passengers than 8 passengers
147 The Amendment of Clean Air Conservation Act. Article 7 (1).
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Table 6-6. Amendment on the definition of multiple purpose vehicles (01.1.2)148
Before amendment( before 2001.1.2) 1 After amendment ( after 2001.1.2)
Multi-purpose passenger car (including jeep) means a motor vehicle...
Equipped with four-wheel drive for off- Equipped with appropriate frame
road operation. structure for off-road operation. It should
have a four-wheel drive, or LSD (Limited
Ship Differential)
In a nutshell, the MOE's objective in these amendments was to prevent the number of
diesel recreational vehicles (RV) from increasing by 1) changing the definition of multi-
purpose vehicles, which would go into effect on January 1, 2001, 2) changing the definition
of passenger cars into two new categories: passenger car type-1, which excluded multi-
purpose vehicles, and passenger car type-2, which included multi-purpose vehicles instead,
and 3) formulating emission standards for newly manufactured diesel vehicles according to
the new vehicle categories, which would go into effect on July 1, 2002. The most
demanding emission standards for diesel passenger cars were supposed to apply to
passenger car type-1 (Table 6-7).
Table 6-7. Change of definition of vehicle categories and multi-purpose passenger car
Until 2000.1231 Amendment
2001.1.2-2002.6.30 After 2002.7.1
Type Classification pe Classification Type Classification
Passenger * Displacement Passenger * Displacement Passenger * Displacement
car of more than car of more than car type-1 of more than
800 cc 800 cc 800 cc
Weigt of less * Weigt of less * Weigt of less
than M tons. than M tons. than M tons
In addition, In addition, vans
148 The Amendment of Clean Air Conservation Act. Article 7 (5).
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wagons, vans,
designed to carry
less than 8
passengpers, and
multi-purpose
passenger cars,
equipped with
four-wheel drive
for off-road
operation.
Multi-
purpose
passenger
car
With appropriate
frame structure
for off-road
operation. It
should have a
four-wheel drive,
or LSD (Limited
Ship
Differential) Passenger
car type-2
with the width of
less than 2000
mm and the
height of at less
than 00 mm,
designed to carry
less than 8
passengers
Multi-purpose
passenger car
With appropriate
frame structure
for off-road
operation. It
should have a
four-wheel drive,
or LSD (Limited
Ship
Differential)
with
displacement of
more than 800 cc
with weight of
less than 3.5 tons
When Hyundai and Kia reviewed the MOE's proposal in the period of public notice
in April 2000, there seemed to be no problem at all in terms of the change of definition of
vehicle categories and multi-purpose vehicles. Thus, they did not raise any complaint
during the comment period. However, when the proposal was submitted to the office of
legislation for its review on September 7, 2000 and when the proposal was finalized as the
new regulation on October 30, 2000, they found that the definition of passenger car type-i
had been changed from that of original version in the MOE's proposal that they reviewed
during the notice and comment period. The specifications of passenger car type-i were
extended from 1,800 mm wide and 1,700 tall vans to 2,000 mm wide and 1,800 mm tall
vans (Table 6-5). What was worse, the definition of multi-purpose vehicles had been
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changed to include motor vehicles with frame structures for off-road operation (Table 6-6).
Diesel passenger car or multi-purpose vehicle?
For Hyundai and Kia, those sudden changes meant that they could not manufacture
several models of diesel RVs beginning July 1, 2002. Considering the specifications of the
new models of RVs at that time (Table 6-8), two models from Hyundai and one model from
Kia belonged to the new category of passenger car type-1, to which the new, but
unreasonably tough, diesel passenger car emission standards would apply starting on July 1,
2002. The width, height, and weight of those recreational vehicles were below the
maximum levels of passenger car type- 1. Furthermore, those recreational vehicles did not
have the frame structure that met the definition of multi-purpose vehicles.
Table 6-8. Specifications of diesel Recreational Vehicles (RVs) in South Korea
Model Length (mm) Weight Certificate Issue of
Width Height (Kg) application certificate
Carens I (Kia) 1,750 1,610 2,015 2001.4.10 2001.11.19
SantaFe (Hyundai) 1,845 1,730 2,295 2000.2.29 2000.10.26
Trazet (Hyundai) 1,840 1,710 2,330 2000.2.20 2000.10.26
Grand Voyager 1,997 1,749 2,555 2001.11.19 2002.4.23
(Chrysler)
Free Lander 1,800 1,700 1,895 2000.11.10 2001.4.24
(Land Rover)
The termination of those diesel RVs represented an enormous blow to Hyundai and
Kia. They had invested at least two years of time and energy in developing these models.
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The cost of marketing and advertising could not be ignored. 149 With relatively very cheap
diesel fuel, SanteFe and Trazet had been big hits among consumers. 50 It was estimated that
the loss due to the termination of SanteFe, Trazet, and Carens could amount to USD 1.2
billion. 15 1
This was an issue not only for auto manufacturers, but also for automobile parts
industries. KAMA and parts companies argued that the termination of these diesel RVs
would cause almost 250 autoparts firms to lose more than USD 0.3 billion investment plus
USD 0.15 billion from monthly sales.' 52Another potential problem was the possibility of a
class-action suit by a group of consumers, who had already signed contracts to buy those
diesel RVs frjom Hyundai or Kia, but would be unable to get them due to the regulation
after July 1, 2002. Especially, in the case of Kia's Carens, Kia had applied to the MOE for
the manufacturing certification already on April 10, 2001, meaning that Kia already knew
the sales of Carens would be in jeopardy due to the new regulation, 153 but did not announce
this problem to consumers.
However, for Hyundai and Kia, it seemed very unfair that the MOE abruptly changed
the definition of vehicle categories right after the comment period without consulting with
the auto industries. There seemed to be two solutions to these problems. First, it might be
possible to rationalize emissions standards for diesel passenger cars as soon as possible so
149 Kyunghyang Sinmoon (2002.3.23. p.8).
150 Hankook Kyungjae Sinmoon (2002.5.17. p.13).
151 Financial News (2002.5.21. p4).
152 Moonhwa Ilbo (2002.5.18)
153 The applications for the certificate of manufacturing SantaFe and Trazet were made before the amendment
was finalized on Oct 30, 2000. In the case of Carens, the certificate was issued by the MOE on November 19,
2001, but was supposed to be effective only by July 30, 2002.
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that their diesel RVs could be manufactured continuously, even if the vehicles were
categorized as passenger cars. Second, it might be possible to change the definition or
classification of vehicles so that those diesel RVs could be classified as multi-purpose
vehicles, which would fall under the lower emissions standards.
Based upon the agreement between the MOE and auto industries, when KAMA
prepared the policy report in 1999,154 the MOE should have started a discussion with
Hyundai (Kia) aimed to rationalize the emission standards for diesel passenger cars.
However, there were no signals from the MOE. Although Hyundai and Kia kept
complaining to the MOE through private meetings with enforcement officials after the
MOE announced the final amendment on October 30, 2000, the MOE only warned KAMA
and import motor associations on March 23, 2002 that models of diesel passenger cars
unable to meet the new emission standards should not be manufactured after July 1, 2002.
In the meantime, Hyundai planned to invest USD 1.5 billion to establish
manufacturing lines to produce at many as 1.5 million diesel passenger cars by 2003,155
believing that the MOE would have to rationalize the emission standards soon. However,
the MOE's stiff position on the emission standards meant that Hyundai's huge investment
in its diesel engine manufacturing facility might not be made.
What about other automakers?
These challenges to Hyundai and Kia were opportunities for their competitors such as
154 A Study on the Establishment of Vehicle Emissions Standards after 2000 (2000.3). The MOE and auto
industries agreed that they would revisit the emission standards when auto industries could manufacture clean
diesel engines, which could satisfy the Euro-3 standards.
155 Maeil Kyungje Sinmoon (2002.4.11. p.13).
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Daewoo and Ssangyong. Daewoo, with no diesel vehicle models, sent the MOE an
official letter encouraging the Ministry to stick to the original emission standards for diesel
passenger cars, citing the serious air pollution attributable to high levels of particulate
matters from diesel vehicles. 56 Ssangyong motor company was in the same page with
Daewoo, in promoting this competitive windfall against Hyundai and Kia. Even though
Ssangyong manufactured diesel RVs, such as Rexton and Musso, those vehicles had a
frame structure corresponding to passenger car type-2 categories, having a lower emission
standard. KAMA's position became very awkward, because it could not represent the
interests of all member companies in an effective way.
Change in Policy stream and challenges for Hyundai and Kia
So far, this chapter has shown how changes in the policy stream occurred around the
advent of the new millennium and how those changes brought turmoil to the stakeholders in
the issue of urban air pollution. Automakers developed clean diesel engines and wanted to
sell those cars by changing the image of conventional diesel vehicles into more
environmentally friendly ones. However, given the seriousness of urban air pollution, this
was a difficult task.
Facing these problems, Hyundai and Kia, as key players in South Korean auto
industries, as well as in the national economy, worked hard to postpone the implementation
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156 Joongang Ilbo (2002.5.3)
of the regulation establishing new requirements for diesel RVs until 2004 so that they could
sell more diesel RVs, and to rationalize the new emission standards for diesel passenger
cars so that they could sell diesel passenger cars domestically. The conventional ways
Hyundai and Kia could influence policy was to continue pleading their case through the
media, public forums, and private meetings with the MOE officials, and to extensively
lobby higher ups in the government 157 (Box 6-1, Table 6-9, and Figure 6-1.)
157 Naewoi Kyungje Sinmoon (2002.5.10. P.19)
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Box 6-1. Summary of problems for Hyundai and Kia
Problems
For Hyundai and Kia, diesel passenger cars were a strategic choice for future auto
markets. They needed to create the demand in the domestic market as a foundation to
bolster exports to European market. But, due to the strict emission standards for diesel
passenger cars, and the MOE's strategic regulatory move to block diesel RVs from the
auto market, their plan was in jeopardy. They had to do something by July 1, 2002 when
the new amendment of Clean Air Conservation Act would go into effect.
Issues, positions, and interests
* The emission standards for new diesel passenger cars
o Rationalize the standards into the level similar to Euro-3, which would
go into effect in 2004 for new cars, and in 2005 for operating cars
(KIMM, 2000) so that they could sell diesel passenger cars in South
Korea
* Regulating diesel RVs
o Change the vehicle categories or postpone the implementation of
proposed change of the vehicle categories of diesel RVs until 2004 so
that they could sell more diesel RVs
Strategies
* Advertise the benefits of diesel passenger cars with new technology
* Keep contacting with the MOE's officials to raise the issues
* Lobby strongly and extensively to the higher-ups in the government
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Table 6-9. Part of conflict Assessment matrix with the auto industry (Hyundai and Kia)
Issue Regulating Emission standards for
diesel RVs new diesel passenger cars
Stakeholder (Marketing of dieselpassenger cars)
KAMA * *
Hyundai + Kia * 2004 Euro-3
2005 Euro-4
Daewoo --
not until 2006
Ssangyong --
not until 2006
Samsung •
2005 Euro-4
***
:: he most impo
+: Pro
+/: Conditional Pro
*: Neutral
-/: Conditional Con
--: Con
Note: rtant interest
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Public health concerned -
but related to CO2 regulations
The strict emission standards
for new diesel passenger cars
+
Regulations against diesel RVs
Conflict
Manufacture of
Diesel RVs
Diesel passenger cars
Investment
on diesel engines -40
Conflict
? Profit oriented
Figure 6-1. Stakeholders' power in regulatory process and their issue conflict"'
158 The automakers are regulatory target of the MOE. The MOE sometimes consults with the auto industry but
always tries to command and control the industry. Other automakers, such as Daewoo, Samsung, and
Ssangyong, are much less powerful than Hyundai and Kia in terms of their share and influence in the auto
industry. Hyundai and Kia occupied 70% of the auto market share in South Korea.
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Power in
regulatory
process
Change in policy stream from the side of the MOE
This section introduces another change in the policy stream, this time from the
perspective of the MOE. The Ministry proposed a comprehensive 10-year-long term air
quality management plan for the Seoul metropolitan area in 2002. The program was
designed with a framework totally different from all previous policy tools. The MOE
wanted to make its program not just another symbolic proposal but an implementable
Special Act. The new Act included some policy measures which worried some stakeholders
in industries and businesses.
To understand the content of the Special Act, it is important to recognize the MOE as
a growing power within the South Korean government, and to describe what it hoped to
achieve in addressing the problem of diesel vehicles in the early 2000s. Understanding how
these factors are established will illuminate the significance of the Special Act as part of the
policy stream.
As a growing! power
During the 1960s, the authoritarian political regime under President Park stimulated
modernization of South Korea through consecutive economic development plans starting in
1962. At that time, political leaders saw in the smoke from industrial stacks a symbol of the
nation's economic development. Even though the Pollution Prevention Act was enacted in
1963, there was no agency to properly enforce the law to effectively alleviate the
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environmental problems caused by economic development' 59 (Koo, 1979). In 1967, the
first pollution control section was created in the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Affairs. This section was upgraded to the Pollution Control Division in 1970.
Rapid economic growth since the 1970s had given rise to significant environmental
problems in South Korea. In response, the Environmental Preservation Act was enacted in
1977. Through this Act, the South Korean government, for the first time, set water quality
standards in 1978 and sulfur dioxide (SO 2) standards for air quality in 1979. Subsequently,
in 1980, the government established the Environment Administration (EA) as a sub-cabinet
agency in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs. With the agency, the
government also began to regularly monitor environmental quality and publish an
Environmental White Paper starting in 1982.
Soon after democratization began following the demise of the military regime in 1987,
environmental concerns began to receive more attention from the public. Finally, in 1990,
the Environmental Administration (EA) was upgraded to a cabinet level ministry.160 The
National Assembly passed the Basic Environmental Policy Act, which replaced the
Environmental Preservation Act of 1977, and several other environment-related acts for air
quality prevention, and so forth (Harashima and Morita, 2001).
159 Since 1967, air pollution in the Ulsan industrial district, the first planned industrial area established by the
Korean government has increased, leading to health problems and harm to farm products. Nonetheless, the
government did not launch anti-pollution measures in earnest. At that time, the Korean government usually
took measures on a case-by-case basis. Koo, Y (1979), Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in Korea,
Korean Journal of Comparative Law 7: 1-59.
160 In 1990, ministry of environment was directed by the Prime minister's office.
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In December 1994, the Ministry was given greater authority and increased functions
and manpower as part of a major restructuring of the government. 161 For the 10 years
between 1993 and 2002, the Ministry budget increased by almost eight times (Table 6-10).
However, even with this rapid growth, the MOE remained weak compared to ministries
such as MOCIE and MOCT in terms of budget and influence' 62 (Table 6-11).
Table 6-10. Budget increase for the Ministry of Environment (MOE) in South Korea' 63
Year 1993 1995 1997 1999 2002
Budget (US million $) 192 686 1101 1176 1461
Table 6-11. Comparison of Ministries in budget and manpower in South Korea 2002
Ministry MOE MOCIE MOCT
Budget (US million $) 1461 2744 15539
Manpower (people) 1349 1029 771
MOE: Ministry of Environment
MOCIE: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation
The history of the MOE proceeded along with the democratization of South Korea.
The first "Civil government" (1993-1998) seemed to put more value on environmental
protection; the Ministry of Environment was upgraded to direct report to the President in
1994. However, despite enhancing its budget and manpower, the administration did not
161 Since 1994, the ministry became the current MOE directed by the President.
162 A research on the power of ministry in South Korea assumed that if a ministry produced more elite
personel associated with the ministry to other agencies, the ministry might be more powerful. In that
assumption, the MOCT was the most powerful ministry, and the ministry of finance was the third, and the
MOCIE was the six. The MOE was not in the list. The MOCT had ample budget associated with large
infrastructure projects such as roads, and port construction. (Joongang Ilbo, 2005.9.26).
163 The budget of the MOE accounted for 0.42% of the national GDP. Other advanced countries have about
1% of their GDP for environmental policymakings. (Kim, Sin-Jong, department head of air bureau, 2005).
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seem to give the MOE more opportunities for leadership. The first five Ministers of the
MOE from 1994 to 1999 were politicians, whose experience lay in economics or finance
department in the past administration, rather than in environmental management. It was
believed that the elected president was rewarding them for their support for his political
election.
During the "people's government" (1998-2003), three female non-politicians
Ministers were appointed. It was believed that they were chosen to demonstrate the
administration's commitment to improving womens' right, rather than to the environment.
For example, Ms. Sohn, a famous actress, was appointed as the Minister of Environment in
May 1999 because she had helped the President Kim, Dae-Jung and was the co-president of
the largest environmental NGO in South Korea. She retained her post as Minister for only
one month before being forced to resign in a political scandal. After that, in June 1999, a
person who seemed to have expertise in environmental issues was appointed as the Minister
of the MOE for the first time. Ms. Kim, Myung-Ja was a professor of Chemistry in a
university in South Korea.
Another environmental NGO inside the government
Even if the budget of the MOE was smaller than those of other agencies, and its
leaders were not environmental management professionals, the MOE became increasingly
powerful following the late 1990s. One source of power was the increasingly influential
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activities of environmental NGOs, which often blocked the government-initiated projects164
Accordingly, the MOE became seen as a troublemaker by Ministries such as the
MOCT and MOCIE mandated to implement development projects and boost economic
development. The MOE often tried to delay the implementation of construction projects in
order to do additional environmental impact assessment. The MOE seemed to be on the
same page with environmental NGOs all the time.
The MOE's interest in regulating diesel RVs
The problem of diesel vehicles had always been a priority issue for the air bureau at
the MOE since the early 1990s, because diesel vehicles were major mobile sources for
particulate matter (PM1o), which was the most serious threat to public health among air
pollutants. PMIo levels and NOx levels were not reduced at all, but rather increased from
the late 1990s on.
The MOE designed the CNG bus project and DPF project as major instruments to
cope with the problem. However, these were not implemented as fast and effectively as the
MOE intended. The cause as well as the solution to the diesel vehicle problem did not, in
fact, fall under the MOE's jurisdiction. Relatively cheap diesel fuel was a major driving
force in the popularity of diesel vehicles, and the MOE could not control this factor.
People who went through the financial crisis during 1997 and 1998 became very
sensitive to changes of fuel prices. Given the high price of gasoline relative to diesel and
164 Environmental groups were actively involved in the movement against Saemankeum reclamation project
in mid 1990s. They came to participate in a private-public joint fact-finding committee for the Saemankeum
project in 1999. In 2000, environmental coalition was successful in blocking government-initiated Dong River
dam construction in 2000.
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LPG, vehicles burning those fuels became much more popular. Consumers increasingly
traded their gasoline vehicles in for diesel or LPG vehicles. In any case, the MOE could not
control fuel prices for an environmental rationale alone.
Wanting to curb the increase of diesel RVs on the road, the MOE turned to the only
means in its jurisdiction: emission standards. For this reason, the MOE changed the
definition of multiple purpose vehicles, and changed the classification of vehicle types in
amending the Clean Air Conservation Act in 2000. With these changes, newly
manufactured diesel RVs would be classified as diesel passenger cars, to which very tough
emissions standards would apply starting July 1, 2002.
The MOE's interest and position on diesel passenger cars
The MOE agreed with the automakers in 1999 that it would strengthen emission
standards for diesel passenger cars to protect South Korean automakers from foreign auto
industries for two years of technology development, and then rationalize the emission
standards on the condition that South Korean automakers, in particular, Hyundai and Kia,
had developed appropriate clean diesel technology.
The promised two years came to an end in 1991. Hyundai and Kia had developed
their diesel engine technology and even started to export them to the European market. If
the MOE revisited and rationalized the emission standards to the level of EURO-3 in 2001
or 2002, Hyundai and Kia could sell their diesel passenger cars right away in South Korea.
In the meantime, in practice, the MOE was giving positive consideration on diesel
passenger cars for several reasons. It would be wrong to conclude that the MOE did not
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want diesel passenger cars at all, even if it seemed that way from the amendment. First,
diesel passenger cars with new technology are different from conventional heavy duty
trucks, buses, and RVs. New diesel passenger cars are equipped with cutting-edge
technology, such as a common-rail system, which reduces many emissions and increases
fuel efficiency compared to conventional diesel engines. Diesel passenger cars could emit
less CO 2 and HC than gasoline vehicles. Reduced CO2 emissions were the most attractive
feature of diesel passenger cars.165
Consider the words of Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa 66, the former director of the Air Quality
Management Bureau (hereafter, the air quality bureau):
"When I was studying in England for a doctoral degree in 1996, I happened to
observe that European countries were strategically promoting small diesel
passenger cars. At that time, France targeted that diesel passenger cars would
share 50/ of the total ofpassenger cars; Germany targeted 30%, England
20%.. .and I thought why such environmentally sensitive people were pursuing
diesel passenger cars...
The answer was the advent of surprising technology in diesel engines. The
technological development for clean diesel engine was unexpected...
Automobiles have complex implications: They are running weapons to kill
people, they are major contributors to air pollution, and they are symbols and
tools for economic development...
While I worked at the air quality bureau since 1998, the staff considered the
future of automobiles. We researchedpolicies for 2010 or 2015, rather than
policies for two or three years from then. There were many options to follow in
terms of air pollution. For example, electric vehicles, fuel cells, ethanol,
165 In 1999, KAMA and EU made an agreement that South Korea automakers should reduce C02 emissions
from automobile up to the level of 140 g/km by 2009 in order to export their vehicles to the European market.
In terms of C02 reduction from mobile source, diesel passenger cars are by far better choice than gasoline
vehicles.
166 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa, April 15, 2005. Mr. Koh, majored in mechanical engineering, became
the head of the Air Quality Policy Department at the Air Quality Management Bureau in May 1998. He had
been dispatched to the Office of the President from March 2000 to March 2002. Then, he stepped up as the
director of the Air Quality Management Bureau starting March 20, 2002 and became involved in the public
dispute on urban air quality management right in no time.
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Natural gas, LPG, biodiesel, solar energy, et cetera. We consulted many experts
on this issue, and read many books on future automobiles...Fuel cells have too
long a way to go. Natural gas is not fit for small passenger cars. LPG has a
limited amount ofproduction. In practice, until 2015, gasoline vehicles and
diesel vehicles are major types of automobiles. Then, all things considered, the
final decision had to be diesel passenger cars on the ground that the technology
could be continuously improved. We concluded that diesel vehicles would emit
less than gasoline vehicles in terms of all air pollutants including NOx and
PMio by around the year 2010. To make these things happen, we had to allow
automakers to sell their cars in the domestic market to expedite technological
development. "
Judging by these remarks, it is certain that the MOE strategically and strongly
endorsed diesel passenger cars in terms of air pollution. So why didn't the MOE rationalize
the emission standards as Hyundai and Kia wished in 2001? There were three reasons for
the MOE to hesitate to lower the emission standards for diesel passenger cars as fast as it
could.
First, given the much lower prices for diesel fuel, the availability of new passenger
vehicles might lead to a sudden and destabilizing sudden shift of consumer choice. Since
1998, when South Korea managed to escape an economic crisis, the number of diesel RVs
increased rapidly, because diesel price was much cheaper than gasoline and automakers
utilized such situations to sell more diesel RVs. People who had bought diesel RVs for
their leisure activities started to use them as commuting vehicles for economic reason. The
new diesel passenger cars, developed by Hyundai, emitted more NOx and PM10 than
gasoline vehicles.
What was worse, the number of diesel RVs had been increased at a higher rate since
2000 than since 1997. While the number of LPG vehicles was smaller than that of diesel
vehicles, the increase in the sales rate of LPG vehicles was higher than that of diesel
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vehicles during the late 1990s. That's because the price of LPG was lower than the price of
diesel (Table 6-12). However, when the government announced the energy policy in 2000,
including an adjustment in the ratio of energy fuel prices from 100:49:29 (Gasoline:
Diesel: LPG) in 2000 to 100:75:60 in 2006167 (Refer to Table 4-8 in Chapter Four:
Proposal to adjust the relative ratio of three transportation fuels (2000)), consumers, who
planned to buy LPG vehicles, decided to buy diesel RVs instead. 168
Table 6-12. Relative ratio of transportation fuel prices between 1997 and 2000
Year Gasoline Diesel LPG
1997 100 45 39
1998 100 49 32
1999 100 44 24
2000 100 49 29
The share of RVs was increasing among the total private vehicles up to 42.2 percent
in 2002, and diesel RVs dominated among the RVs (Table 6-13, Figure 6-2).
167 When the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy announced to increase
diesel and LPG price up to 75% and 60% of gasoline price by 2006, that decision was not based on
environmental concerns. Rather, the decision was more about economic decision. Since 1997, the number of
LPG vehicles increased rapidly due to relatively cheap LPG. Accordingly, the import of LPG fuel increased
so that the national finance was hurt. The focus of the adjustment of the energy fuels in 2000 was on LPG fuel
price. The purpose was to increase LPG price rather than diesel fuel price.
168 Chosun Ilbo (2000.8.6). '[Car Life] "Go way LPG vehicles!" New wind for diesel vehicles.' After the
announcement of the government to increase LPG fuel price, the sale of diesel SUV 'Sportage' by Kia
increased by 22.2% compared to the sale of the previous month.
Chosun Ilbo (2001.1.7). 'Diesel vehicles being sold well.' Hyundai's diesel SUV 'SantaFe' was sold in the
amount of 1606 in November 2000. But, in December 2000, 3424 SantaFes were sold. During one month, the
sale increased by 113%. On the other hand, the sales of LPG santaFe decreased from 2828 in November 2000
to 1597 in December 2000 by 43.5%.
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Table 6-13. Share of Diesel RV
Ratio (%)\Year 1994 1999 2000 2001 2002
RVs among total 7.5 29.5 41 38.3 42.2
private vehicles
Diesel vehicles - 60.6 40.1 69.3 74.4
among total RVs
Source: MOE's presentation in May 2002 at public forum
11111
11111
11111
11111
11111
11111
M Gasoline RVs
O LPG RVs
M Diesel RVs
Year
Figure 6-2. Increasing sales of RVs since 1998
To stop the rapid increase in diesel RVs sales that began in 2000, the MOE needed to
maintain the high emission standards for diesel passenger cars and extend them to apply to
diesel RVs starting July 1, 2002. Second, diesel fuel still had a higher sulfur content (500
ppm) than did the European diesel fuels (10 ppm) in 2001. Third, the MOE had to face the
united and formidable opposition of the environmental groups, if it were to allow diesel
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among private vehicles
private vehicles. The MOE had spent much energy in castigating diesel vehicles as a major
cause of urban air pollution. A sudden endorsement of diesel passenger cars might confuse
the public and environmental groups to whom clean diesel vehicles sounded like an
oxymoron. Furthermore, the most powerful three environmental groups had built a
coalition, "Blue Sky 21," in 2001 to promote awareness of urban air pollution focused on
the 2002 World Cup Soccer Games in South Korea. Environmental groups became very
sensitive to urban air pollution at that time.
Thus, even though the MOE strategically endorsed diesel passenger cars within the
Ministry, it could not proceed without certain conditions. Those conditions were that 1) the
difference between gasoline and diesel prices should be narrowed, 2) there should be social
consensus supporting diesel passenger cars on the streets, and 3) there should be other
ways to mitigate NOx and PM1o from other diesel vehicles to offset additional NOx and
PMlo emissions from new diesel passenger cars.
The words of Mr. Koh corroborates this view: 169
"The problematic situation was too-cheap diesel. The diesel fuel price can be
determined by the energy tax policy, which is the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Finance. When I asked the Ministry of Finance about diesel passenger cars,
they had a strong interest in allowing diesel passenger cars in the domestic
market for the sake of economic development. Thus, the MOE had a card to use
at that time. We wanted to use diesel passenger cars as leverage in order to
make the .Ministry of Finance adjust energy tax and automobile tax. That was a
very important opportunity for us to get what we wanted...
In the meantime, the MOE prepared to propose the Special Act for Seoul
metropolitan air quality management. But, adjusting the energy tax for a more
reasonable diesel fuel price was a much more important issue for us than the
Special Act. Even if we failed to enact the Special Act, the energy tax issue was
interview wltn 1Jv1. Lon, I oon-fiwa, April 13, ZU3.
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110% important for us. "
The MOE could not reveal its real interest in diesel passenger cars, but its public
position was clear. Below is the interview of Mr. Koh with a news media' 70 on September
2001:
"Allowing diesel passenger cars in South Korea does not seem to be easy (not
impossible). As prerequisites for that, we need to have social consensus on this
issue. The difference between gasoline and diesel fuel prices should be much
narrower. And, there should be policy measures to reduce PMAo and NOx in
urban areas. "
The MOE's new focus on the Seoul metropolitan area
The issue of new diesel passenger cars was imposed on the MOE from the outside.
This was an opportunity, as well as a challenge, in that the MOE could negotiate other
policy measures with diesel passenger cars. However, the MOE needed a breakthrough in
dealing with the continuing issue of urban air quality. Also, the MOE knew that it should
prepare new policy proposals for the second 10-year term comprehensive environmental
plan, as well as the third 5-year term plan, which would start in 2003. Former staff officers
described their preparation of the long-term plans for urban air quality management: 171
"When Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa started to head the air quality policy department at
the air quality management bureau of the MOE in May 1998, he first tried to
upgrade scientific backgrounds for advanced air quality management by
conducting research projects on the improvement of emissions inventory, and
atmospheric modeling. Then, he initiated a research seminar on emission
trading systems within his department in 1999. In an effort to make a
170 Hankook Kyungje (2001.9.19).
~7' Interview with the former staff at the department, and current the head of the air quality policy department
in May 2004.
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comprehensive air quality management planfor the next long-term planning,
the officers at the air bureau researched all kinds of air quality management
policies from all around the world and benchmarked other countries'
experiences, especially those of the US and Japan. By the time July 2001, the
program was still not comprehensive and did not have the new framework like
we have now. We started to consult experts in 2002, and kept having
brainstorming sessions with them in an effort to sort out possible policy options
according to criteria of economic and technical feasibility. We knew that we
could not do something meaningful at this time, because the DJ administration
was about to be history at the end of 2002. We had to strike hard for the new
administration in early 2003, when the administration kicks off with a strong
aspiration to achieve their first plans... "
The air bureau began to hint at its new special long-term plan, the so-called, "Clean
Air 21," in March 2002 to prepare the way for a strong campaign the following year for a
comprehensive plan for the Seoul metropolitan area. Then, in July 25, 2002, in the middle
of the complex dispute around diesel passenger cars, the MOE announced its intent to enact
the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan area air quality management (hereafter, the Special
Act) in a public forum for urban air quality management.
The Special Act was special in five aspects. First, it was based on regional air quality
planning, comparable to the South Coast Air Quality Management District in California.
The Act focuses on the Seoul metropolitan areas (Figure 6-3). The Seoul metropolitan area,
only 12 percent of the total national area, was home to 46 percent of the national population
and 42 percent of the total number of vehicles in the nation. The increasing rate of
population growth and automobile ownership in the Seoul metropolitan area clearly called
for special measures (Table 6-14.)
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MetropolitJrl Air Quality
ManJgement District (AQMO)
Figure 6-3. Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Management District (AQMD) (Source:MOE
website).
Table 6-14. The Growth Rate of Population and Vehicles in Seoul metropolitan area
Year 1990 2000 Growth Rate
Population 18,340,000 21,910,000 20%
Number of vehicles 1,790,000 5,577,000 211%
Source: Ministry of Environment 2005
Tables 6-15 and 6-16 show some of the indicators demonstrating how poor the air
quality was in the Seoul metropolitan area compared to other regions of the country.
Table 6-15. The number of violations of NO x and PM,o standards
Pollutant NOx (24 hour: 0.08 ppm)
1999 2000 2001
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Seoul metropolitan area 82 75 204 320 385 1128
Other areas 13 3 9 125 218 500
Table 6-16. Comparison of air pollution between Seoul metropolitan area and other areas in
2001
Pollutant NOx 03 PM
Area (ppb) Number of Ozone (Ltg/m3)
violation Contingency
days days
Seoul Metropolitan area 31 394 24 67
Other areas 22 390 5 53
In addition, the air quality of Seoul compared poorly to that in five other major cities
in the world in terms of PM 10o and NOx concentrations. The levels of these two pollutants
(71 ttg/m3, and 37 ppb) were among the worst of those five cities (Table 6-17).
Table 6-17. Air quality in major cities in the world
Second, the Special Act had a framework for air quality management different from
the previous act. In the past, the MOE had set emission standards for each polluting source,
such as factories, incinerators, and automobiles. This way of regulating proved ineffective
172 The ambient air quality criterion for PM is 70 gLg/m 3 . Seoul recorded 65 gg/m3 in 2000, and 71ig/m3 in
2001. The concentration increased over time. Considering that many monitoring stations are located away
from roads, the real level of PM concentration is likely to be higher than reported one.
173 The ambient air quality criterion for NO2 is 50 ppb.
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because the number of polluting sources increased too fast. The previous emission
standards system was successful in monitoring the pollution level by each emitter but failed
to define the total amount of pollution, which was affected by the increasing number of
emitters. The Special Act introduced a total air pollution load management system, and an
emission trading system, comparable to the US Cap and Trade system.
Third, the Special Act stipulated that fleet owners be required to purchase a certain
number of low emission vehicles. Fourth, the Special Act was to invest 5.2 USD billion by
2012. Considering that the budget for the air bureau was USD 64.7 million in 2002, the
new budget driven by the Special Act was enormous. Its enactment would mean to the
MOE that the air bureau would experience a remarkable increase in policy resources,
including budget and manpower.
Finally, the MOE strategically intended to make these new comprehensive ideas for
air quality management into laws, not just into a program. Programs can be changed,
intercepted, and watered down as political situations change. Law, however, can be more
stable in the presence of external changes. The strategy of the air bureau was to construct a
large framework and to create more detailed regulations later.
Waiting for another battle with other Ministries
The air bureau knew that it would not be easy to enact the Special Act. It would have
to withstand the countervailing interests of other powerful Ministries, such as the MOCIE
(Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy), the MOCT (Ministry of Construction and
Transportation, and the MOF (Ministry of Finance). Even after the Act had passed these
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bureaucratic hurdles, it would have to be reviewed in the National Assembly. Politicians
could reject or alter it up until the very end of the process.
As expected, the MOE got very negative signals from the MOCIE, the MOCT, and
the MOF, when it circulated the proposed Special Act to them in August 31, 2002. The
other ministries agreed that the Special Act was not necessary. The MOF said it would cost
too much to implement. The MOCT commented that the Special Act should not include
any implications for land use or transportation policy. The MOCIE argued that the Special
Act would place too great a burden on businesses and industries in the Seoul metropolitan
area.
To overcome these objections, the MOE needed to enlist the power of environmental
groups. Mr. Koh described building a coalition with them:174
"We (the air bureau) knew that we could not do it alone (to pass the Special
Act). We needed the help of environmental groups...
While I was working in other bureaus, such as waste management, I happened
to contact with NGO peoples. When I was in the Office of President in 2000, I
also had opportunity to have relations with NGO personnels. In short, I came to
build personal trust with some NGO people...
In terms of the Special Act, I explained to them why the Special Act was
important and often asked for their support for the Act... "
Box 6-2, Table 6-18, and Figure 6-4 provide a summary of the MOE's problems, a
conflict-assessment matrix, and a more complex diagram of conflict between multiple
stakeholders. These describe graphically where the MOE stood in relation to many issues
and became engaged in disputes around urban air quality management.
174 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa, April 15, 2005.
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Box 6-2. Summary of problems for the MOE
Problems
For the MOE, diesel passenger cars were strategic choice for future auto markets,
as automakers considered. In the meantime, the MOE did not want to allow diesel RVs
to increase their numbers on the street. However, the MOE should persuade the public,
especially environmental groups in order to lower the emission standards for newly
manufactured diesel passenger cars. They could not allow diesel passenger cars unless
some preconditions were met. Meeting those conditions could not be done by the MOE
itself.
At almost same time, the MOE should muddle through the oppositions from other
Ministries against its move toward the enactment of the Special Act.
Issues, positions, and interests
* The emission standards for new diesel passenger cars
o Rationalize the standards into the level similar to Euro-3, which would go
into effect in 2005, but there should be new diesel passenger cars
satisfying Euro-4 by 2005.
o Achieve preconditions with a leverage of diesel passenger cars: The most
important condition was that diesel price should be up to more than 85%
of gasoline price as soon as possible.
* Regulating diesel RVs
o There were a lot of pressure from many sides to allow Hyundai and Kia to
sell diesel RVs. But, the MOE could do that only if there should be other
measures to offset the increased amounts of PM1o and NOx from
additional diesel RVs.
* Enacting the Special Act
o Enact the Special Act in the first year of the new administration.
Strategies
* Persuade environmental groups in a dialogue setting.
* Negotiate with other Ministries for the adjustment of fuel prices.
* Build a coalition with environmental groups for the Special Act
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Table 6-18. Part of conflict Assessment matrix with auto industries and Ministries
Issue Manufacturing Emission Adjustment of Legislation
Diesel RVs standards fuel price of the
for new diesel (Gasoline: Special
passenger cars Diesel: Act
LPG)
Stakeholder
KAMA * * * +/
Hyundai *
(KIA) * 2004 Euro-3 100:75:60 a
2005 Euro-4
Daewoo -- - 100:75:60 *
Motors until 2006
Ssangyong -- -- 100:75:60 *
until 2006
Samsung * * 100:75:60 *
Motors 2005 Euro-4
MOCIE * * 100:75:60 --
2004 Euro-3
2005 Euro-4
MOCT * * * --
MOF * * 100:75:60 -/
MOE -/+ 2005 Euro-3 100:85-95:47-55 by 2003
and Euro-4
Note: *: Very important interest
+: Pro
+/: Conditional Pro
*: Neutral
-/: Conditional Con
--: Con
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Chapter Seven
The Joint Commission (Round #1)
Previous chapters described how two changes in the policy streams during 1999 and
2001 led major stakeholders, such as automakers, the MOE, and other Ministries onto a
collision course. This chapter delves into how the new mode of participatory dispute
resolution, a consensus-building stream, emerged among the major stakeholders, including
environmental groups. The process of the consensus-building stream will be analyzed in
terms of the initiation factors, as well as the process factors of consensus-building theory,
which were described in Chapter 2. Then, it will be possible to show how conventional
multi-streams affected those factors in consensus building, and how those factors affected
the negotiation process among participants, resulting in emergence of the consensus-
building process. Finally, this chapter traces the final results of the efforts of the Joint
Commission.
The first section introduces environmental NGOs as another important group of
players in this case study.
The advent of environmental groups on urban air quality
South Korea presents a fascinating case of a state that has had a relatively successful
experience with democratic consolidation and the development of a relatively vibrant civil
167
society in a remarkably short period of time. Over a decade, Korea's non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have grown remarkably in size and sophistication and have become a
force that policy makers must reckon with in formulating policy (Schreurs, 2002)175. About
80 percent of the NGOs in South Korea have been established since the 1980s. Almost 90
percent of environmental NGOs came into being during the 1990s (Table 7-1).
Table 7-1. Establishment of NGOs over time in South Korea
Pe Number Pre 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Total
(cases) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Civil society 908 4.9 1.7 5.4 7.6 18.4 62.0 100.0
Local 192 - - - 9.3 31.5 59.2 100.0
Social service 686 1.6 4.1 6.4 7.7 27.4 52.8 100.0
Environment 259 0.4 - 0.8 2.7 8.5 100.0
Culture 563 5.3 2.5 7.6 10.5 23.8 50.3 100.0
Education/Academic 208 2.4 1.9 3.8 7.7 28.8 55.3 100.0
-Religion 97 5.2 - 9.3 21.6 27.8 36.1 100.0
Labor/Agriculture 1997 3.6 4.1 10.7 9.6 25.4 46.7 100.0
Economy 473 2.7 2.7 15.6 15.2 22.2 41.4 100.0
International 42 2.4 4.8 21.4 21.4 19.0 31.0 100.0
Others 18 - 16.7 16.7 - 22.2 44.4 100.0
Total 3643 3.2 2.4 7.2 9.0 21.0 56.5 100.0
Source: Compiled from the Directory of Korean NGOs by the Citizens Movement Communication Center
[http://www.kngo.net/new/pds/pds-cmcc.htm].
However, while the two major South Korean environmental NGOs during the 1990s
and early 2000s focused on many issues, the issue of urban air pollution was not a matter of
high priority until 2001 (Table 7-2). Most of their activities were centered on environmental
catastrophes, such as the polluted river case, and on government-initiated development
projects, such as dam construction, reclamation projects, and canal construction. Those
issues happened in particular areas with a particular set of local stakeholders. However, the
'17 Schreurs, Miranda A. (2002). "Democratic Transition and Environmental Civil Society: Japan and South
Korea Compared." The Good Society 11, no. 2: 57-64.
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urban air pollution problem was not a locale-focused issue; it involved the general public as
polluters and as victims.
Another characteristic of environmental groups' activities was that even when they
seemed to act as a coalition, one specific environmental group, in practice, took the
initiative, masterminded all activities, and dominated in the coalition's activities. Not only
could no one environmental group deal with all environmental issues at the same time with
limited capacity, but also there was often competition among them. 176 For example, KFEM
(Korean Federation of Environmental Movement) had devoted its energy to the
Semankeum reclamation project' 77 during late 1990s and was swamped by opposition
activities against the reclamation project during early 2000s. In 2000, the CMEJ (Citizen's
Movement for Environmental Justice) took the initiative in opposing the construction of the
Kyung-In shipping canal.
Table 7-2. Focus issue of two major environmental groups in South Korea
Year CMEJ KFEM
1992 Established
1993 Established
1994 Nakdong River Phoenol pollution crisis
Opposition to the construction of nuclear waste
storage facility at Kulup Do
'
76 Interview with an environmental enforcement official on May 2005.
177 The name Saemankeum is given to what is claimed to be the world's largest ongoing reclamation: a 40,100
hectare reclamation project at the mouth of the Mankyung and Tongjin Rivers, in Chollabok Do, west
Republic of Korea. Such a reclamation, entailing a 33 km long seawall (56% complete, as of October 1998), it
is suggested will expand the national area, help in the supply of agriculture and industrial water, lead to better
drainage of adjacent land, and allow development of an international harbor. The saemangeum reclamation
project was scheduled to be completed in 2004, but the implementation was stalled due to fierce opposition
from environmental groups to protect ecosystem in the wetlands. For more information, refer to the webpage
[www.kfem.or.kr/engkfem/issue/saemankeum.html]
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1995 Status of air pollution in South Korea and Acid
rain problem
Establishment of Atmosphere Action Network
East Asia (NGO network for transboundary air
pollution)
Movement against the Kulup Do nuclearwaste
storage facility
1996 Metropolitan waste problem Pollution in Sihwa Lake
Pollution problem in Yeocheon industrial Opposition to the construction of golf course
complex near the Kaya Mt. National park
Protection of greenbelt
1997 Opposition to the export of Taiwan nuclear Opposition to the export of Taiwan nuclear
waste to North Korea waste to North Korea
Opposition to the construction of Inje Dam
1998 Protection of greenbelt Opposition to the construction of Dong River
dam
Opposition to genetically transformed
agricultural products
Opposition to the Saemankeum reclamation
project
Protection of greenbelt
1999 Protection of greenbelt
2000 Opposition to the construction of Kyung-In Opposition to the construction of golf course in
shipping canal Nanjido area
Opposition to the haphazardy development in Movement against the Semankeum project
Yong-In city
Energy tax reform
2001 Campaign of Blue Sky 21 for green World Cup The Semankeum project
Soccer games
Movement against the dam construction
Opposition to the construction of tunnel through
Bukhan Mt. National part.
2002 [02.201 Campaign for the reduction of Opposition to the construction of tunnel
automobile emissions through Bukhan Mt. National part.
[03.281 Blue Sky 21 Campaign for green
World Cup Soccer games
[04.26] Report of air quality monitoring in [Novi Opposition to diesel passenger cars
hosting cities
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105.07] March on the international asthma day
Note: CMEJ: Citizen's Movement for Environmental Justice
KFEM: Korean Federation for Environmental Movement
Source: Complied from the webpages from the two environmental organizations [www.eco.or.kr] and
[www.kfem.or.kr].
Since 2001, three environmental groups suddenly became interested in urban air
pollution: CMEJ, Green Transport'7 8 , and KFEM. Their interest was sparked by the
upcoming World Cup Soccer Games in South Korea in 2002. On Earth Day in May 2001,
three NGO groups built a coalition to conduct the "Blue Sky 2002 campaign" to raise the
issue of urban air pollution in the cities hosting World Cup games. At that time, CMEJ took
the initiative in the campaign. "7 9 The coalition planned to monitor air quality in the hosting
cities, and encourage using public transportation. However, to initiate a campaign for a new
subject, they needed to know more about the status of urban air pollution. At the same time,
the MOE also wanted to utilize the World Cup events to raise public awareness of urban air
quality. Officials from the air bureau were invited to give lectures to environmental groups
and helped to prepare the campaign. At this stage, diesel passenger cars were not an
issue. '80
178 Green Trasport is a NGO, which was established in 1992. It works on the issues of transportation safety,
improvement of public transportation, and urban air pollution from automobiles. Green Transport conducted
various campaigns associated with urban air pollution: civil monitoring of air quality in 1996, free emissions
inspection of operating vehicles in 1998, and less driving campaign in 2000. [www.greentrasport.org].
179 Although KFEM participated in the campaign too, it was occupied with the movement against the
Semankeum project at that time.
180 Interview with a leader of CMEJ in April, 2005.
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Imminent danger of MOE's decision to allow diesel passenger cars
In the mean time, a rumor began circulating that automakers wanted to sell diesel
passenger cars in South Korea, and that the MOE would succumb to automaker's request in
late 2001. Several news articles had already featured comments by some executive officers
of the auto industry on the improvement of diesel passenger car engines and their hope to
sell diesel passenger cars in South Korea.' 81 On March 5, 2002, a newspaper headline
captured the attention of the public and foreshadowed two years of conflict around urban
air pollution and diesel passenger vehicles. The headline was "the nerve war between
automakers and the MOE on diesel private vehicles."' 82 The automakers and vehicle
importers began to complain that emission standards for diesel private vehicles were too
tough and requested lowering the standards to a more "rational" level.
About two weeks later, another embarrassing news article appeared asserting that Kia
was trying to get the MOE to exempt its new diesel RV, "Carens II" from being terminated
when the new regulatory classification of vehicle types became effective on July 1, 2002.
Kia argued that the company, having already invested heavily in developing and marketing
this new model, would suffer. 183 When Kia applied to the MOE for a manufacturing
certificate in April 2001, the MOE granted it, but only until June 30, 2002. Kia already
knew that it could not manufacture the model after July 1, 2002. But, as the new model of
RV was not to be introduced until late March, the company requested the MOE to change
181 Chosun Ilbo [2001.9.19].
182 Joongang Ilbo [2002.3.5].
183 Kyunghyang Shinmoon [2002.3.23]. 'Dispute on the classification of vehicle type for Carens (diesel).'
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the regulation. Environmental groups construed this as an ethical breach on the part of
industry, and more evidence that environmental concerns had always been overruled by
economic development and industrial lobbying in South Korea.
Ultimately, the rumor turned out to be true. An officer of the MOE told a newspaper
that the Ministry would consider amending the air conservation law and its regulations to
lower the emission standards for new diesel passenger cars to Euro-3 levels starting January
2004, which meant that diesel passenger cars could be sold in South Korea in 2004184.
The environmental groups saw this as an absurd decision. During late 2001, the MOE
was preparing the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality management. Officials
from the MOE were privately asking environmental groups for their support in enacting the
Special Act, emphasizing the importance of the Special Act for the improvement of air
quality in the Seoul metropolitan area.'"' On one hand, the MOE was trying to make a new
law for air conservation; on the other hand, to appease Kia, the MOE was acting to increase
the number of diesel vehicles, which the Ministry had been blaming for air pollution.
Even though the MOE seemed to stand firm in the matter of the termination of diesel
RVs starting on July 1, 2002'"6, Hyundai and Kia kept pounding them through extensive
and strong lobbying of higher-ups in the government. The objective was to force the MOE
to postpone the implementation of the regulation of the classification of vehicle type for
184 Maeil Kyungje Shinmoon [2002.4.11].
185 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005.
'
86 Joongang Ilbo [2002.5.3]. One official from the MOE criticized Hyundai, and Kia for their inaction toward
the new regulation, saying "the MOE gave them two years to prepare the new regulation, but they did not do
anything for it. It's non-sense."
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diesel RVs until 2004.'87 It was just a matter of time before the MOE lost its ground to
automakers who could proclaim victory in the name of economic development. 188
Being embroiled in the dispute
The situation became much clearer when a high level officer of the MOE visited
environmental groups and revealed the MOE's intent to allow diesel passenger cars to be
sold in South Korea. 89 He explained why new diesel passenger cars were an unavoidable
option for the future and that there was a lot of trade pressure from other countries around
marketing diesel vehicles 90
Environmental groups responded quickly to this imminent issue by building a
"Alliance for diesel passenger cars" (hereafter, the Alliance) comprised of 34 civil
organizations from environmental NGOs to consumer groups on May 15, 2002. Mr. Seo,
Wang-Jin, a leader of the CMEJ and the coalition, described how they built a coalition so
187 Seoul Kyungje Shinmoon [2002.5.6] and Naewoi Kyungje Shinmoon [2002.5.10].
'
88 Naewoi Kyungje Shinmoon [2002.5.10]. In practice, Hyundai and Kia believed that the MOE would
change the regulations as they wished. They told a news reporter, "The MOE looked very stringent on its
surface, but only signature of the Minister of the MOE could change the regulation. So, the MOE eventually
will follow our requests."
189 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005. Mr. Koh, a director of the Air Bureau at that time,
revealed the MOE's intent on diesel passenger cars to the environmental groups in order to figure out how the
environmental group would react on the decision.
190 Given the fact that Hyundai was selling diesel vehicles at an increasing rate in Europe since 2001, there
was lots of pressure on the MOE to lighten the emission standards for new diesel passenger cars. For example,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2002.1.23), the European Union Chamber of
Commerce in Korea (EUCCK) (2002.2.28), and Korea Automobile Importers & Distributors Association
(KAIDA) (2002.3.29) criticized high emission standard as unfair trade condition and Korean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) was afraid that the condition might cause trade conflict with its trade
partners. Also, those trade organizations complained that they could not sell their own diesel RVs, such as
Land Rover (England), and Grand Voyager (US) due to the new classification of the passenger car type-1 and
requested that the MOE reconsider the definition of the vehicle type for diesel RVs.
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quickly: 19'
"We could create the environmental coalition for diesel passenger cars very
quickly. Generally, it was a tradition that environmental groups, especially,
civic groups located in Seoul metropolitan area, worked as a coalition for many
environmental issues. For communicational purpose, there was a permanent
'coalition organization for environment and society NGOs.'
The CMEJ suggested the Alliance for diesel passenger cars to the members of
coalition organization by emails andfaxes, and called them for additional
information on the coalition. 34 civic groups agreed with our suggestion and
discussed the title, purpose, and decision-making rule for the coalition together.
The key members of the coalition were the CMEJ, and Green Transport,
because we had already worked as a coalition for Blue Sky 2002 campaign and
learned many things on urban air quality from the campaign. But, KFEM, the
biggest environmental NGO in South Korea, did not participate in the Alliance
and even criticized the Alliancel92 . That weakened our strength as a coalition. "
Now the environmental groups were ready to fight against the move toward diesel
passenger cars and diesel RVs in order to protect the public from more serious air pollution.
The MOE invited the environmental groups to a public forum on "regulation of emissions
from diesel passenger cars" scheduled on May 17, 2002, in an effort to hear various
stakeholders' opinions on the issues of diesel passenger cars and diesel RVs. However,
grave news came from a newspaper' 93 on May 16, 2002 that the MOE had already decided
to save diesel RVs from the termination by adjusting the regulation again as Hyundai and
Kia requested.
19' Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin on July 16, 2005.
192 There are several hypothetical reasons why KFEM did not participate in the coalition. One possible reason
was that KFEM was so busy with the opposition movement against the Saemankeum project. Another reason
might be the two organizations competed in environmental movement. But, KFEM publicly explained in its
public statement why it did not participate in the Alliance on July 4, 2002. "We did not join in the Alliance,
because there was no sincere, rational, and informed discussion among environmental groups on how to
develop the Alliance and there was not enough time to assess whether KFEM should participate in the
Alliance or not. We could not participate in the Alliance without appropriate information and judgement on
the issue. Also, we highly suspected that the MOE was utilizing environmental groups to justify its urgent
decisionmaking, which would favor the auto industry."
193 Dong-Ah Ilbo [2002.5.17].
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Box 7-1 below summarizes the problems the Alliance faced in early 2002, their
positions and interests on the issues, and their strategies, based on interviews 94 with the
leaders of the Alliance.
194 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ on July 16, 2005. Interview with Mr. Min, Man-Ki,
the leader of Green Transport on June 10, 2005.
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Box 7-1. Summary of problems for the Alliance
Problems
For environmental groups, who should represent the public's interest in
environmental issues, the focus in their movement has not been on urban air pollution so
far, although almost 90% of the public believes that urban air pollution is the most
serious environmental problem. That's partly because urban air pollution issue requires
high level of scientific and technical knowledge to fully understand the issue. Thus,
environmental groups could not notice and follow up such important changes in urban
air pollution policies during 1999-2001.
The striking thing is that the current high emissions standards for diesel passenger
cars were decided by the industry and the MOE in a closed room in the past. For diesel
RVs, the industries did not take any measure although they knew the existence of
regulations to make their diesel RVs terminated in 2002.
The situation in early 2002 is imminent. Always set back by those powerful
economic Ministries, in terms of regulations on automobile pollution so far, the MOE is
about to allow diesel passenger cars and diesel RVs. If the government decision is made
by itself as the final one, it is very hard to change the course by only demonstrations of
the environmental groups on the streets.
Issues, positions, and interests
* The emission standards for new diesel passenger cars should not be lowered and
diesel RVs should be terminated. Agreeing to allow new diesel passenger cars
and diesel RVs is hardly justifiable for the Alliance of the environmental groups,
given the seriousness of urban air quality. But, more fundamental measures
should be taken for the issue of diesel vehicle pollution.
* The situation is so imminent. The Alliance needs more time to response to the
MOE's move toward economic rationale.
Strategies
* Request the MOE to establish a dialogue forum where the Alliance can
participate as citizen representative in order to secure the time to respond and
balance the power against the economic development rationales.
* Make sure that the forum should not be just an advisory meeting, where the
MOE just hears what the Alliance says. If it is not the case, the Alliance should
walk off the forum.
* Let the public know what's happening by apply ordinary tactics of NGOs: write
to the media, demonstrations against the industry, and street performances.
* Directly meet decision makers, such as the Minister, politicians, staff in the Blue
House to persuade them.
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Table 7-3 shows the map of interests among major stakeholders described so far.
Figure 7-1 depicts the distribution of power and relations among stakeholders.
Table 7-3. Part of conflict Assessment matrix with the Alliance
sue Manufacturing Emission Adjustment of Legislation Joint ...
Diesel RVs standards fuel price of the decision-
for new (Gasoline: Special making
diesel Diesel: Act
passenger LPG)
Stakeholder cars
KAMA * +/
Hyundai *
(KIA) * 2004 Euro-3 100:75:60 * 195
2005 Euro-4
Daewoo --- 100:75:60
Motors until 2006
Ssangyong -- -- 100:75:60
until 2006
Samsung * * 100:75:60
Motors 2005 Euro-4
MOCIE * A 100:75:60 -- --
2004 Euro-3
2005 Euro-4
MOCT * - *
MOF * * 100:75:60 -/ --
+/ * * *
MOE -/+ 2005 Euro-3 100:85-95:47- by 2003
and Euro-4 55
The - - * + A
Alliance
· · ·
Note: *: Very important
+: Pro
+/: Conditional Pro
*: Neutral
-/: Conditional Con
--: Con
interest
195 The Auto industry did not want to involve the environmental groups in the decision making process. But,
when the MOE called for them to participate in the Joint Commission, they could not but do that as the
regulatory targets. (Interview with Hyundai officers on June 09, 2005, Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo at
the MOE on June 20, 2005.
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Stakeholders in a Public forum
As the MOE announced, the public forum convened by KAMA and sponsored by the
MOE and the MOCIE for diesel passenger cars was held for four hours on May 17, 2002.
The MOE sponsored the forum in an effort to gauge stakeholders' attitudes, in particular,
environmental groups' attitudes on the controversial issues surrounding diesel passenger
cars and diesel RVs.
Various stakeholding groups participated in the public forum: KAMA, several
journalists, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the MOCIE, the Alliance, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Korean automobile importers and distributors
association (KAIDA), a congressional staff member, an automobile expert from KIMM,
and an air pollution expert from a research institute. The points at issue were whether to
allow diesel passenger cars by alleviating emission standards and whether to allow Hyundai
and Kia to sell their diesel RVs by amending the regulation of classification of vehicle
types.
Analyzing their arguments in the forum reveals those stakeholders' positions on the
two issues (Figure 7-2).
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Figure 7-2. Spectrum of positions from various stakeholders on the two issues in the public
forum on May 17, 2002.
As expected, the MOCIE, the MOFAT, KAMA, KAIDA, and the economic news
paper supported the interests of Hyundai and Kia, arguing in favor of introducing diesel
passenger cars into the domestic market. At the other end of the spectrum, the CCEJ stood
firmly against both issues, criticizing the government. A newspaper and a congressional
staff person with an environmental bend in his career path were against diesel passenger
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cars. Interestingly, the leader of Green Transport, 196 one of the two core organizations in
the Alliance, took the position that diesel passenger cars should be sold as long as certain
preconditions were met through other environmental measures.
The Joint Commission to resolve the dispute associated with diesel
vehicles
Only one day after the public forum on May 17, 2002, the MOE and the Alliance
issued a public announcement to the major media that they would establish a "Joint (Civil
society, Industry, and Government) Commission to resolve the dispute associated with
diesel vehicles" (hereafter, the Joint Commission) on May 18, 2002. According to the
announcement, the Joint Commission would kick off on May 24, 2002 with the government
side (the MOE, the MOCIE, and the MOF), the civic side (the Alliance), the industry side
(major automakers, major oil industries, LP gas industry), and experts participating. The
topics for discussions included:
* Joint-fact finding for additional emissions on the contingency of new diesel
passenger cars on the streets,
* Countermeasures to reduce emissions from diesel vehicles,
196 Mr. Min, Man-Ki, the leader of Green Transport, participated as external adviser in KIMM's controversial
report on the Establishment of Vehicle Emissions Standards after 2000. Thus, he knew that Hyundai and Kia
were developing diesel passenger cars and would request the rationalization of the emission standards around
year 2001. Although he belonged to the Alliance, he could not be in the position to argue that diesel passenger
cars should be banned in any circumstances.
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* Possible projects by automakers to fulfill their social responsibilities and
duties,
* Options in adjusting the energy price system, and
* Options in introductory timing and level of emission standards for new diesel
passenger cars.
The Joint Commission as the first round of Consensus-building stream
The Joint Commission was distinct from previous conventional governmental
decision making efforts in several aspects, especially in terms of dealing with public
disputes. First, conventional governmental policy making for urban air pollution in South
Korea had followed the model of Decide, Announce, Defend, and Amend (DADA). In the
problem stream, the technocrats in the MOE and the experts associated with them usually
diagnosed serious urban air pollution problems. While some private entrepreneurs argued
for some technical solutions, such as DPF installation, in policy streams, developing the list
of options in the policy stream had been in the hands of technocrats and some experts inside
the government. When a decision announced by the MOE faced challenges from industries
and other Ministries, consensus had usually been made at the Ministerial meetings in the
politics stream to amend the MOE decision in consideration of economic factors.
The Joint Commission was created to narrow possible policy options and to develop a
policy proposal before the government finally announced the decision. Thus, the Joint
Commission was designed to function as part of both the conventional policy and politics
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streams. However, in terms of participants, the Joint Commission represented a new stream
distinctly different from the conventional policy stream in which only government officials
and experts participated, as well as from the conventional politics stream in which
government agencies coordinated only with each other to reach a final decision.
Participants in the Joint Commission included civil society groups such as NGOs and
members of the business sector, such as the auto industries and oil industries, as well as
other governmental sectors and experts. Consider the comment of the MOE official on the
MOE's conventional way of developing policy at that time: 197
"Conventionally, when our decisions are challenged by industries and the
MOCIE, we discussed the matters inside the MOE and the decisions should go
through the coordination process with relevant Ministries. We sometimes
consult with experts on the matters, held public forum, and public hearings
before we make afinal draft of the decisions. Then, we put the draft out of a
public notice and comment process. If necessary, we can open a public forum
again. Then, after the process, we implement or amend the regulation. If there
is still a dispute or complaint in society or among stakeholders, there are two
options: suppress them or ignore them. In 2001, it seemed that the MOE was
suppressing Hyundai and Kia with regulations... "
Second, the Joint Commission aimed at building consensus among stakeholders. It
was not just another advisory committee, public forum, or public hearing, where
stakeholders could have the opportunity to just talk to the government and others. Although
the consensus decision would not be the final government decision, participants were
supposed to decide together and build consensus on decision items.
Third, the Joint Commission involved multiple stakeholders considering multiple
issues. Conventionally, the MOE had contacted stakeholders separately and individually,
197 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former director of transportation pollution department at the air
bureau of the MOE on June 20, 2005.
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rather than meet them all together at the same time.
Fourth, the Alliance officially requested the MOE to create a new structure for
decision making"98. It was a bottom-up approach, rather than the conventional top-down
process.
How was the initiation of the Joint Commission possible?
New attempts often incur resistance. There is a lot of inertia, or resistance to change,
in policy processes (Kingdon, 2001). One characteristic of pluralist government is the
ability of a few powerful industry economic interests to insulate themselves from the
influence of large-scale democratic forces through the creation of relatively independent
depoliticized sub-governments. 199 Such systems of limited participation are thought to be
highly resistant to change (Cobb and Elder, 1983).For these reasons, it was expected that
the auto industry, the MOCIE, and the MOF would resist the establishment of a
participatory decision-making venue like the Joint Commission, since they been able to
influence environmental decision making inside the government under the conventional
systems. In the interviews for this research, MOE officials recollected how fierce the
complaints from the MOCIE and even within the MOE were against allowing the Alliance
198 On the public scence, the MOE did not ask the Alliance to come to the new Commission. But, it is not
certain that there was a communication on this form of dialogue between the MOE and the Alliance before
the Joint Commission. The statements from the interviewees were not same in this issue.
199 The succession of terms that scholars have used to describe subsystem politics - from "iron triangles" to
"issue networks" to "advocacy coalitions" - from tightly structured systems of limited participation through
more fluid boundaries and easier access to the incorporation of conflict within the subsystem (Heclo, 1978;
Sabatie, 1988).
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to join the Joint Commission:
"We (the MOE official and the MOCIE official) were flushed with anger in
talking about the Joint Commission. An official from the MOCIE complained
why the MOE was taking the decision issue, which should be solved inside the
government, out of the government. He argued that the government, as the
representative of the public had an authority to make governmental decision
and thus, the decision should not be swayed by NGO's influence. He event
went further to say that the MOE conspired with the Alliance on every issue. I
responded to him with the counter-argument that public decisionmaking was
not dominated by government officials. For example, look at the jury system in
the US. Decision on being guilty or not are made not by judges, but by juries.
Judges only impose sentences according to the gravity ofguilt. I suggested to
him that we needed another model ofdecisionmaking and probably the Joint
Commission was the model. Then, the MOCIE official questioned which
countries were using a model like the Joint Commission. And I just said that
the MOE would go with the Joint Commission. The MOCIE official shouted
that ifso, the MOCIE could not participate in the Joint Commission200 ",
"Even within the MOE, many officials fiercely opposed the idea of the Joint
Commission. Their rationale was almost the same with that of the MOCIE that
the MOE had public power and should execute the power by itself They could
not understand why the MOE seemed to be swayed by environmental
201
groups
Another obstacle to the participatory Joint Commission existed within environmental
groups. All members of environmental groups did not embrace the concept of a
participatory Joint Commission. Inertia also existed in environmental groups who were
accustomed to the confrontational tactics that had characterized their movement. Consider
two comments from leaders of the two major environmental groups in this case study:
"When we (the Alliance) suggested to the MOE that the Joint Commission
should be created on May 17, 2005, we were not certain that the MOE would
accept our proposal. At that time, we suspected that the MOE already had
made the decisions, favorable to the auto industry, due to the pressure from
200 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former director of transportation pollution department at the air
bureau of the MOE on June 20, 2005.
201 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005.
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the MOCIE, and the MOF. Even the MOE official revealed that diesel
passenger cars could be promising alternatives for the future auto market for
environmental reasons. Thus, there was fear inside the Alliance that
environmental groups might be co-opted by the MOE in its effort to justify
already-made decisions and we might play only a supporting role to the
MOE. 202 ,,
"We (KFEM) did not participate in the Alliance. The issue of urban air
pollution associated with diesel passenger cars was a very technical issue,
which required expertise on various fields. Given that environmental groups
lacked such knowledge, it was too risky for them to engage in the dialogue
with the MOE and other industries in too much detail. Furthermore, we
suspected that the MOE had been captured by the auto industry so far.20 3 "
The relevant question is how could such inertia be overcome? To be more specific,
how was the creation of the Joint Commission possible? The creation of the Joint
Commission is traceable to the strategic motives of the MOE and the Alliance with the help
of the politics stream during 2000-2002.
Politics stream to take advantage of (2000-2002)
The political regime in South Korea started to change in 1987. The democratization
process had developed as the government evolved from a "Civil Government" (1993-1997)
to a "People's Government" (1997-2003). During 2000-2002-the later stage of the
"People's Government," there were two major changes in the policy streams (see Chapter
6). The politics stream carried over from the previous government as democratization
continued. Three characteristics of the politics stream during 2000-2002 are useful in
202 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ, on July 16, 2005.
203 Interview with Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon, the leader of KFEM, on July 8, 2004.
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explaining the advent of the Joint Commission in 2002: 1) tension between the MOE and
other development Ministries, 2) countervailing power of environmental groups, and 3)
strategic alliance between the MOE and environmental groups.
These three features of the politics stream facilitated policy entrepreneurs' strategic
action in responding to the two changes in the policy streams during those years.
Tension between the MOE and other economic development ministries
In economic development projects initiated by the government, especially by the
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT), the MOCIE, and the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA), the MOE played the role of troublemaker. The MOE regulatory
process regularly intervened to protect environmental interests during development projects
such as dam construction, tunnel construction, and land reclamation. Sometimes, officials
of those economic Ministries tried to shun MOE officials in governmental meetings 204.
However, when the MOE pursued its goal of improving environmental quality
through its regulatory power, those other Ministries, which outnumbered the MOE in terms
of budget and political resources, were equally obstructive. The issue of diesel RVs and
diesel passenger cars could be addressed with the MOE's regulations. Other important
related issues, such as the change of fuel prices, lay in the jurisdiction of the MOF and
MOCIE.
Finally, it is believed that the turf wars among government agencies becomes fiercer
204 The environmental journalist club (2001). "The reason why salmons do not return."
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when an administration is in its final stage as agencies position themselves for maximum
power before a new administration begins. As the presidential election of December 2002
drew near, some turf wars between a few Ministries were observed. It is not clear that such
tension affected the dispute between the MOE and the MOCIE later on but there had
always been tension between them.
Countervailing power of environmental groups
The power of environmental groups had been exerted in several cases before 2002;
many government-initiated development projects had been blocked by harsh resistance
from environmental groups, through political rallies and litigation brought by NGOs. They
had considerable leverage in any policy discourse associated with environmental concerns.
In 2001, some environmental groups suddenly became interested in urban air
pollution. The motive for their interest was the World Cup Soccer Games to be held in
South Korea in 2002. On Earth Day in May 2001, three NGO groups built a coalition to
conduct a "Blue Sky 2002 campaign" to raise the issue of urban air pollution in the cities
hosting cities World Cup games. They were eager to learn more about urban air pollution.
Strategic alliance between the MOE and environmental NGOs
Among all governmental agencies, the MOE had maintained the closest relationship
with environmental NGOs. Since 2000, the MOE had maintained a regular communication
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channel with environmental groups. In fact, these groups had established their own
coalition organizations in the name of "policy coordination meeting with environmental
groups." Twenty representatives from environmental organizations met with MOE officials
four times a year regularly in order to share information and discuss various environmental
issues. From the MOE, all directors and sometimes the Minister, participated in those
meetings.
Ms. Kim, Myung-Ja, as Minister of Environment during those times, once proclaimed
that the MOE needed "governance," a new, collaborative model of decision making, rather
than "government." 205 The MOE and environmental groups needed each other for strategic
purposes. Environmental groups were always eager to meaningfully participate in
governmental decision making. The MOE needed supporters to combat economic
development rationales, which had always proved more powerful than the MOE's
conservation rationales.
Strategic motives of the MOE and the Alliance
The MOE wanted a new decision-making structure like the Joint Commission (see the
Box 6-2 in Chapter 6) for four reasons. First, the MOE wanted to stave off the anger of the
environmental groups by persuading them to look at the bright side of new diesel passenger
cars through education. The MOE believed that diesel passenger cars would be the
appropriate alternative in automobile transportation as the technology developed. A series
205 In an address to the students at Ewah Women's University, in 2002.
190
of dialogue at the Joint Commission with many experts would be a great opportunity for
that purpose. From this perspective, the MOE could be seen as representing the interests of
the auto industry.
Second, the MOE intended to gain some objectives through trade-offs of some things
the auto industry wanted The MOE was most interested in the adjustment of the energy
price system and the enactment of the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality
management. Without the support of the environmental groups, the MOE could not be sure
of getting those things in the current conventional decision-making system. Thus, the MOE
needed to involve the Alliance in a new decision-making structure like the Joint
Commission. The irony was that the more the Alliance criticized the MOE, the stronger the
MOE became in its fight with the MOCIE and the MOF. It was true that the MOE could
raise its voice more loudly within the government when the environmental groups were
fiercely opposing them.
Third, in the environmental political regime since the DJ administration in South
Korea, environmental groups were exerting very powerful influences on governmental
decisions, such as dam construction. They often succeeded in blocking development
projects initiated by the government. Furthermore, more and more people associated with
civil movements, were being appointed to higher positions in the government. That gave
NGOs more political resources than ever before. The MOE could not just ignore resistance
from environmental groups. In addition, the MOE did not want to damage its good
relationships with the NGOs. A MOE official expressed his concern about the Ministry's
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relationship with the Alliance: 20 6
"When industries cried out that they could not but shut down their factories in
order to comply with certain regulations, the MOE usually adjusted the
regulations to consider their situations. However, the MOE often ignored such
requests. The other day, bus manufacturing had been stopped for about three
months by regulations. But, if the MOE had only taken into consideration the
situation of the auto industry in terms of diesel vehicles at that time, there
would have been much agitation and dispute in society. Civil organizations
would have had rallies on the street everyday and the relationships between
the MOE and environmental groups might have been damaged. "
The fourth reason was "social consensus," as mentioned by Mr. Koh in a newspaper
interview 207 in which he commented on the conditions under which the MOE might
rationalize emission standards for new diesel passenger cars. Perfunctory public hearings or
public forums could not achieve what he meant by social consensus. He wanted the general
public to understand the controversial issue and be given the opportunity to think about
which approaches might be most appropriate. The media provided the mechanism by which
the public could learn the required facts, and the media would cover the discussion of the
Joint Commission. 208 Thus, the MOE wanted to make the issue known to the public by
establishing a new decision-making structure.
For the Alliance, five rationales existed to create a new participatory decision-making
body (see the Box 7-1 in this chapter). First, the Alliance wanted to delay the MOE's
decision and the creation of another decision-making venue would take time; Second, the
Alliance wanted offset pressure on the MOE from the MOCIE, the MOF and auto industry
206 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005.207 Hankook Kyungje (2001.9.19).
208 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005. Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former
director of transportation pollution department at the air bureau of the MOE on June 20, 2005
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lobbyists by participating directly in the Joint Commission. Third, the Alliance wanted to
share the issues with the general public through media coverage of the Joint Commission
process. Fourth, the fact that the Minister of Environment, Ms. Kim, Myungja, was close to
NGOs paved the way for the Alliance to request participatory decision-making. According
to a member of the Alliance, 209 Ms. Kim had good relationships with environmental groups
and they could relate to her. Fifth, environmental groups had been gaining experience in
new governance mechanisms through participation in a few instances of environmental
decision making. For example, environmental groups had participated in the private-public
committee working toward resolution of public disputes around the Dong River dam
construction project, and the Saemankeum reclamation project. They wanted to bring these
new governance techniques to bear on urban air pollution regulations as well. 210
Aiming toward consensus building
The next question is how participants came to choose consensus building as the
decision rule for the Joint Commission. Even in participatory decision making, the decision
rule is not necessarily consensus building. An in-depth interview with a core player in the
creation of the Joint Commission traces the origin of this decision to the individual's
personal experience in previous regulatory processes. Mr. Koh explained in detail how he
209 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ, on July 16, 2005.
210 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ, on July 16, 2005.
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came to cherish consensus building as a decision rule: 2 11
"First ofall, I did not have any opportunity to take a course of consensus
building before. But, Igot my first personal hint on consensus building, when I
went to Japan for a training workshop in the late 1980s. There, I met a
Japanese director of the waste management department in a very small town.
What was impressive to me was that it had taken 20 years to build a sanitary
landfill in that town due to resistance from the town residents. He had been
working therefrom the first dispute to its resolution for 20 years! I heard from
him his experience of dealing with residents. It was more about
methodological aspects...
When I was assigned to the waste department at the MOE in 1991, I tried to
apply what I heardfrom Japan to the case of the Hwa-Sung waste
management facility dispute. The town residents strongly believed that
newborn calves with defection in their town were due to the waste materials
discharged from the facility operated by the MOE. Residents requested that
the facility be closed right away. That case was a Korean version of Love
Canal. When I suggested consensus building through dialogue with residents,
people said non-sense the first time. But, I acknowledged residents as partners
for dialogue first, and then tried to make consensus, however long the
discussion might be...
I proposed to create a six-member committee to build a unanimous consensus
among them. 3 representatives recommended by the residents, 3
representatives from the MOE, and 3 representatives from environmental
groups negotiated until they reached a unanimous final decision to solve the
dispute. When the three resident representatives agreed with the final decision,
there was no more public dispute. I was convinced at that time that consensus
building could work better rather than majority voting...
Thus, the consensus building mechanism was not a result of the request of the
Alliance, or pressure from more participatory government, but purely from my
personal learning, which was built up through my past experience. I believed
that the most important factor in public negotiations was building consensus."
Environmental groups acknowledged the fact that Mr. Koh, as a presider and
facilitator of the Joint Commission, insisted on consensus building as a decision rule from
211 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005.
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the beginning. 212
Initiation factors of the Joint Commission
Previous analysis has explained how events and conditions in the specific politics
stream made it possible for some policy entrepreneurs to initiate the Joint Commission.
This section analyzes how the seven initiation factors of the consensus building stream of
the Joint Commission were constructed. These included
* Il: Use of a neutral skilled facilitator
* 12: Conflict Assessment
* 13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
* 14: Multi clear issue to allow trade-offs across the issue
* 15: Supporting organizations with implementation power
* 16: Financial support for process
* 17: Time pressure and deadline
Many scholars (Susskind et al, 1999) regard those factors as necessary and important
conditions for successful consensus building. Undertaken at the very beginning of the
process, these design factors can affect the outcome of the consensus-building effort. This
section outlines each initiation factor as it operated in the Joint Commission.
212 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ, on July 16, 2005.
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Il1: Use of a neutral skilled facilitator
The use of professional neutral facilitator in managing the process is strongly
recommended in the theory and practice of consensus building (Susskind, 1999). A neutral
facilitator, or a team of neutrals, engaged by conveners with the consent of stakeholder
representatives, can provide impartial assistance in achieving all of the steps necessary to
lead to successful consensus building, such as conflict assessment, ground rules setting,
joint fact-finding, and so on. A skillful facilitator can play a central role in identifying
stakeholders and issues, in ensuring that the parties check back with their constituents, in
ensuring that all stakeholders agree upon needed changes following the consensus, and in
managing the process efficiently and fairly. The motives of convening organizations are
likely to be suspected by stakeholders; neutral and skillful facilitators can overcome such
suspicion.
In the Joint Commission, there was no neutral facilitator. The meetings were
presided over by Mr. Koh from the MOE. He facilitated the process, including setting
ground rules, recognizing speakers, and establishing a private small caucus with
stakeholders. There was no way to judge whether Mr. Koh was professional in facilitating
the meeting. However, it was certain that he was not neutral on the issues associated with
diesel vehicles and urban air pollution. He had specific (possibly hidden) interests in the
Joint Commission.
All stakeholders participating in a consensus-building process have standards for
neutrality. Whether or not Mr. Koh managed the process impartially, if other stakeholders
did not think Mr. Koh was in a neutral position, his neutrality was impaired. Some
196
stakeholders, even the Alliance, suspected that the MOE might have a hidden agenda
throughout the process and that they, as Commission participants, could be utilized in its
purpose. The MOCIE, and other industries argued that the MOE was swayed by the
Alliance in every matter. That kind of distrust could not be helpful in reaching or
implementing any agreement.
12: Conflict Assessment
Conflict assessment is a process which should be conducted by neutrals. It helps to
identify the conflicting issues and legitimate stakeholders, figure out areas of potential
agreements by drawing an issue-stakeholder map, and even propose some initial steps for
consensus building among identified stakeholders. Identifying all relevant stakeholders and
important issue areas is the first and foremost step in a consensus-building process.
Since there were no neutrals in organizing the Joint Commission, there was no
conflict assessment. Instead, the MOE officials had met each stakeholder group in separate
policy meetings to consult with them on various issues before the Joint Commission began.
Also, the MOE used the public forum to figure out how stakeholders would respond to the
MOE's potential decisions. Thus, it might be argued that the MOE had enough information
on what the controversial issues and problems would be in initiating the consensus-building
process before the Joint Commission.
However, even if the MOE could discern the interests and concerns of relevant
stakeholders from these meetings, it could not have acquired as much information as a
neutral facilitator could have gotten from stakeholders through interviews in very friendly
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and neutral settings. Such information would have included who might best represent the
interests of each group; who should not be excluded from the Commission; what might
hinder initiation of the participatory process; how they should address these problems
before the Joint Commission started; which issues were most important and why. If those
concerns and interests in establishing the consensus-building process had been shared and
addressed by circulating a conflict assessment report to all stakeholder groups, stakeholder
representatives would have been more comfortable buying into the Joint Commission
process.
13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
The legitimacy of a consensus-building process depends on the public's perception
that the effort is representative of all interests and all points of view. It gives stability to any
outcome. Otherwise, any agreement is likely to be contested as unrepresentative by
excluded parties.
When the MOE and the Alliance announced on May 17, 2005 that they would agree
to create the Joint Commission, they attached a list of selected participants from various
stakeholder groups (Table 7-4). According to the list, a total of 26 people were selected to
participate in the Joint Commission. Nominated participants included two representatives
from the MOE, two from the MOCIE, one from the MOF, five representatives from the
Alliance, five from different automakers, four from different oil companies, two from
different gas companies, one expert nominated by MOE, two experts nominated by the
Alliance, and two experts nominated by industry. The inclusion seemed quite broad.
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Table 7-4. Selected Participants for the Joint Commission.
Affiliation Association Title Name Remark
MOE Director of the air bureau Koh, Yoon-Hwa
Director of the transportation Ahn, Moon-Soo Government
pollution department secretary
MOCIE Diretor of the transportation Moon, Jae-Do
Government industry department
Director of resource policy Oh, I1-Hwan
department
MOF Director of comsumption tax Yoon, Young-Sun
department
CMEJ First Secretary Seo, Wang-Jin
Green Transport First Secretary Min, Man-Ki
Consumers Secretary General Kim, Ja-Hye
NGO Korea
Green Korea First Secretary Kim, Jae-Nam
Green Consumer Secretary General Lee, Deok-Seung
Network
Hyundai Executive Director Jae, Gal-Gul
Kia Vice President In, Chi-Wang
Automaker Daewoo Executive Director Lee, Sung-Sang
Ssangyong Vice President Lee, Soo-Won
Renault Vice President Jung, Won-Gu
Samsung
LG Executive Director Hong, Hyung-Jong
Oil Industry SK Executive Director Park, Young-Duk
S-Oil Executive Director Nam, Jong-Bae
Incheon Vice President Jun, Ki-Tae
Gas Industy SK Executive Director Shim, Jae-ui
LG Executive Director Kang, Ho-Yeon
Dong-Shin Univ. Professor Jun, Ui-Chan Nominated by
the MOE
Expert Seoul City Univ. Professor Dong, Jong-In Nominated by
Soo-won Univ. Professor Jang, Young-Ki NGOs
Korea Univ. Professor Park, Shim-Soo Nominated by
Kun-Koon Univ. Professor Seon, Woo-Young Industries
Two days after the Alliance proposed this structure, the MOE accepted the proposal
and the two entities announced the creation of the Joint Commission. Thus, the MOE and
the Alliance may be credited with initiating the Joint Commission. They decided on the
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discussion agenda themselves just in a day and announced it on May 17, 2005.213 Since
the MOE intended to trade diesel passenger car sales for other regulations it found more
important such as energy price, and large diesel vehicles, the announced agenda was very
comprehensive, including counter-measures to reduce emissions from diesel vehicles, and
adjustment of energy fuel price. Because the Joint Commission was supposed to deal with
the very comprehensive range issues, the range of stakeholder groups was equally broad,
including the MOCIE, the MOF, oil industries, gas industries, and experts.
The MOE tried to recruit a balanced group of experts by having stakeholder groups to
nominate them. Environmental groups nominated two professors supporting their views,
and auto industries nominated the other two professors supporting theirs.
However, at the first meeting in a civic center near the MOE on May 24, 2005, the
representation of stakeholders was slightly different from the original list of the participants.
First, only 19 participants appeared (Table 7-5). One director from the MOCIE did not
participate. The MOF sent a lower-level official to the meeting instead of the director of the
consumption tax department. From the Alliance, only two core environmental groups and
one consumer group participated. While Hyundai and Kia sent executive-level officials,
other automakers sent their deputy -director-level officials to the meeting. From the oil
industry, only LG Oil participated. An LPG association was added to the list. Two of the
213 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin on on July 16, 2005. CMEJ and Green Transport gathered opinions
from the Alliance on the participants and decision agenda. The MOE was supposed to consult with other
Ministries and industries in those issues.
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experts did not participate in the first meeting. 214
Table 7-5. 19 Participants for the first meeting (May 24, 2005).
Affiliation Association Title Name Remark
MOE Director of the air bureau Koh, Yoon-Hwa
Director of the transportation Ahn, Moon-Soo Government
pollution department secretary
Government MOCIE Diretor of the transportation Moon, Jae-Do
industry department
MOF Secretary at comsumption tax --
department
CMEJ First Secretary Seo, Wang-Jin
NGO Green Transport First Secretary Min, Man-Ki
Green Consumer Secretary General Lee, Deok-Seung
Network
Hyundai Executive Director Jae, Gal-Gul
Kia Vice President In, Chi-Wang
Automaker Daewoo Deputy Director --
Ssangyong Deputy Director
Renault Deputy Director
Samsung
Oil Industry LG Executive Director Hong, Hyung-Jong
SK Executive Director Shim, Jae-ui
Gas Industy LG Executive Director Kang, Ho-Yeon
LPG Executive Director --
Association
Dong-Shin Univ. Professor Jun, Ui-Chan Nominated by
the MOE
Expert Seoul City Univ. Professor Dong, Jong-In Nominated by
NGOs
Korea Univ. Professor Park, Shim-Soo Nominated by
Industries
This balance of representation has very important implications, demonstrating the
degree to which stakeholder groups were eager to participate in the process. While the
MOE had two core officials (Mr. Koh, and Mr. Ahn) in front, the MOCIE and the MOF
214 Mr. Koh commented on the importance of the experts who were participating in the Joint Commission. He
believed that experts could make change, not government officials, because the public tended to think that
governmental officials lack expertise. When it comes to the selction of experts, Mr. Koh emphasized the
balance. First, The MOE suggested the list of experts to the Alliance and then, asked the Alliance to comment
on the list and to recommend anyone whom the Alliance wanted. He told that if experts were excluded from
the list, there would be problem later. (Interview with Mr. Koh on April 15, 2005)
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were not interested, and in fact opposed participatory decision making. Only one director
from the MOCIE was present, and played a reconnaissance role, reporting back to the
MOCIE what was going on in the Joint Commission. The MOF just sent a lower secretary
to the Joint Commission. As for the Alliance, only the two core members (Mr. Seo, and Mr,
Min) of the coalition focused on the process.
As for the industry representatives, it is more accurate to say that they were ordered to
participate rather than to say that they were invited to participate. As regulatory targets of
the MOE, they had to show themselves in the Joint Commission, even though they did not
want to. MOE officials were confident that industries would participate in the Joint
Commission:215
"What if the industries would not want to come to the Joint Commission? I
thought that they would come, because they were our regulatory targets. They
might fear what could happen if they did not show themselves in the meetings.
The MOE was in the position to press the industries on that issue. "
However, the way in which the industries came to the table warrants further scrutiny.
There were other motivations behind industries' decisions to participate in the Joint
Commission. The first incentive was economic. Participation in agreements might lead to
direct cost savings and reductions of liability-related costs, regulatory costs, future
compliance costs, and administrative costs. In other words, companies wanted to reduce the
impact of regulations on their operations. Commission participation was a strategic act, as
participation in voluntary approaches had the potential to shape the policy process. Second,
they were afraid that they would lose any pro-environment image they had by not joining in
215 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa in April 15, 2005.
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the Joint Commission. 216
Third, among the different members of the auto industry, there were different interests.
Each had an incentive to shape final agreements in ways that would enhance their own
competitive position. Hyundai and Kia sent executive-level officials to the first meeting,
because they had a major stake in Joint Commission decisions. Other automakers
dispatched deputy-director-level officials to the meeting, which indicated that its
deliberations were not as important to them as they were to Hyundai and Kia.
One more interesting observation in the representation of industries at the first
meeting of the Joint Commission is that a representative from LPG association volunteered
to participate, and KAMA (Korean Auto Manufacturers Association) did not participate 2 17.
In terms of the number of the participants and the range of representation of the full
range of stakeholders, the Joint Commission seemed to have many people associated with
broad interests associated with comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles at the first
meeting. However, the more important factor in the representation of interests in consensus
building is how well the representatives (participants) could represent the interest of their
groups through willingness to participate (or negotiate) and a definite mandate.
In terms of eagerness, (or willingness) to participate and a definite mandate from
stakeholder groups, the MOCIE, the MOF, and some industries scored much lower than the
MOE and the Alliance. The MOCIE and the MOF did not even accept the concept of
216 Interview with officers from Hyundai Motors on June 9, 2005.
217 According to Mr. Koh, KAMA was not in the position to represent general automakers, because each
automaker had different interest in diesel passenger car manufacturing. Only Hyundai, and Kia could
manufacture diesel passenger car at that time, and other automakers would like to check Hyundai and Kia.
Thus, KAMA could not make a unified argument representing all automakers. (Interview on April 15, 2005)
203
participatory decision making from the beginning. The lower scorers had to be dragged into
the Joint Commission, and had not done much preparation. While they were in their seats at
the meeting, they were not fully participating. In theory, those lower scorers might have
sought ways and settings other than the Joint Commission to achieve their interests.
Also, a major environmental group, KFEM, was not participating in the Alliance.
KFEM criticized the creation of the Joint Commission and there was no effort made to
bring the group into it.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Joint Commission had a meaningful
representation of all relevant interests around diesel passenger cars.
14: Multiple, clear issues
There must be two or more issues on the table so that parties can maximize their
overall interests by trading or bundling issues. If there is less opportunity for trade-offs
stakeholders are likely to resort to options other than negotiation.
Five agenda items were put on the table at the first meeting of the Joint Commission:
1) regulations of Diesel RVs; 2) impact of allowing diesel passenger cars on air pollution;
3) emission reduction strategies for general diesel vehicles; 4) role of automakers in
reducing emissions from diesel vehicles; and 5) adjustment of energy fuel price and fuel
quality.
The first and the second issues were the topic that Hyundai and Kia and other
automakers talked about the most and as soon as possible. The July 1, 2002 deadline for
implementing the regulation on the classification of diesel RVs was looming. The first
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meeting was held on May 24, 2005. The automakers badly needed a final decision on
whether the MOE would change the definition of diesel RVs, or postpone the
implementation of the regulation so that they could keep manufacturing popular diesel RVs.
Also, Hyundai and Kia wanted to know soon when the MOE would lower the emissions
standards for new diesel passenger cars and to what level, because that decision might
affect their investment and marketing strategies.
On the other hand, the MOE and the Alliance were most interested in changing
energy fuel prices (issue 5) and offsetting emissions from diesel RVs and diesel passenger
cars by reducing emissions from other large and operating diesel vehicles (issue 3) and how
automakers themselves could contribute to reducing emissions (issue 4).
So, there were sufficient multiple and clear issues to make negotiating tradeoffs
possible. Furthermore, these trade-offs had to be grounded on calculations, determined
through joint fact finding, of additional emissions from diesel RVs and new diesel
passenger cars in many scenarios (Issue 2). The problem was how to process each decision
item and how to arrange the timing of the discussion: trade-off negotiations could apply to
the priority as well as manner of processing agenda items.
15: Supporting organizations with implementin2 power
The participation of parties with implementation power can be key to the successful
initiation and maintenance of consensus building, because parties must believe that their
agreement will be implemented and that their participation will be worthwhile. The most
significant variable in the likelihood of successfully implementing agreements appears to
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be whether those with the authority to implement the decision support the process
(Bingham, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). If the participating authority has options
other than consensus building to secure their ends, the process may be at risk.
Discussion of implementation power for environmental policy making in South Korea
must be examined in terms of how a decision idea becomes a final decision ready to be
implemented. Because the regulation 218 of the classification of vehicle types was an
administrative rule, an amendment draft could be made with just the signature of the
Minister of Environment. It would not need to be ratified by the National Assembly. The
amendment of the classification of vehicle types in 2000 was made through the following
process:
1. Amendment proposal prepared by the MOE ('00.4.3)
2. Coordination with the MOCIE, and the MOF ('00.4.3.)
3. Public Notice and Comment ('00.4.24)
4. Review of the Regulation Reform Committee (RRC) ('00.6.2)
5. Application of the review of the Ministry of Legislation ('00.10.23)
6. Approval from the Ministry of Legislation ('00.10.23)
7. Announcement ('00.10.30)
218 South Korean legal system has three-layer structure. The first level is a statue (Bup-Ryul). It includes
abstract and general contents of the Act. For example, the Clean Air Conservation Act is a Bup-Ryul. Based
on the Bup-Ryul (statue), regulations can be created. The regulations are called as 'Bup-Ryung,' or 'Shi-
Haeng-Ryung.' Environmental regulations are usually Ministerial Enforcement Ordinance, which are made
by the MOE. The lowest level of the system is administrative rules (Shi-Haeng-Kui-Chik). These rules
specify how to implement regulations in detail. The rules have forms of 'Hun-Ryung (Directive),' 'Yae-Kyu
(Rule),' or 'Ko-si (Notification).'
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Thus, if the MOE decided to change the classification of vehicle types as Hyundai,
and Kia requested, the amendment decision would follow the steps of the process described
above. Even if the MOE was responsible for classifying diesel RVs, and the task of
administrative rule (Si-Haeng-Kyu-Chick) was at the discretion of the MOE, the decision
proposal would have to be coordinated with the MOCIE, and pass the review of the RRC,
where the MOCIE could exercise more influence than any other Ministry.
However, the MOCIE did not support the Joint Commission from the beginning. It
even strongly opposed it. Thus, while the MOE was willing to support a consensus
agreement as a final government decision, it lacked the support of the MOCIE, an
important stakeholder with the potential to block the implementation of the consensus
agreement.
16: Financial support for process
Availability of financial resources can help disadvantaged groups participate on an
equal footing, hire technical consultants, and trusted facilitators. Asking parties to pay for a
facilitator or an outside expert is sometimes one more barrier to participation (McKinney,
1997).
There was no special budget for the operation of the Joint Commission. Even
though the MOE offered some working funds to the Alliance, the Alliance declined the
offer on the ground that they came to the Commission in order to share the decision power
with governments as an equal partner rather than just a consultant. However, any research
effort by experts from any associations was financed by the MOE. Other miscellaneous
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costs for managing the processes were also covered by the MOE.
The source of the supporting fund should be discussed with all stakeholders, because
the neutrality of the source is important to secure neutrality of the outcome, which will be
produced by any activity supported by the fund. Without the designated fund at the
beginning of the process, it was unclear how to fund joint fact-finding research or
experiments to eliminate scientific or technical uncertainty. Such studies were very
expensive, beyond the reach of the MOE budget, a potentially problematic situation.
17: Time pressure and deadline
Time pressure and deadline are sometimes important, because without a deadline,
parties may purposefully delay or fail to focus on reaching a settlement. Time pressure
deadlines can be helpful in making participants in a consensus building process focus better
and use time more effectively. However, overly restrictive deadlines can make it difficult
for the parties to have the meaningful and thorough conversation required to make
decisions informed by the best science and expertise available.
At the second meeting on May 31, 2002, the deadline for operation of the Joint
Commission was set collectively as the end of June 2002. While participants decided that
they could extend the deadline as necessary, according to the outcome of the process,
administrative schedule regarding the regulation of reclassification of diesel RVs, which
would be effective from July 1, 2002, definitely lent time pressure to the proceedings. If
Hyundai (KIA) motors and MOCIE were able to change the content of the regulation to
meet their interests, it had to be done as soon as possible.
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The participants of the Joint Commission had only one month to decide, which
allowed them at most four meetings if they decided to meet once a week. Even if the
Minister of Environment signed off on the amended regulation of classification of vehicle
types at the first meeting, it would take more than one month to be finalized through the
administrative process described above. In this case, Hyundai, Kia and the MOCIE tried to
focus specifically on the issue of reclassification of vehicle types as soon as possible, while
other stakeholders wanted to view the issues as parts of a general and comprehensive
picture. It cannot be said that deadline and time pressure in this case had entirely
beneficial effects on the process.
Deliberation factors of consensus building process
Once the initiation factors were taken care of, the four deliberation factors in the
consensus-building process came into play:
* Dl: Setting a ground rule by participants
* D2: Fair management of the process
* D3: Joint Fact-Finding
* D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
Since those process factors were related to the negotiation process, they will be
analyzed through reviewing the negotiation process from the first meeting to the fourth
meeting of the Joint Commission.
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The first meeting (May 24, 2002)
The first meeting was held at Kwachon civic center near the MOE for four hours on
May 24, 2002 with 18 members participating. The MOE prepared a handout to all
participants to the meeting. The contents of the handout by the MOE included an
operational plan for the Joint Commission, a decision agenda, fact-finding schedule, and
tasks assigned to each stakeholder (Box 7-2).
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Box 7-2. Handout for the first meeting for the Joint Commission
From the handout, participants could ascertain the MOE's position on the decision
agendas:
Due to the administrative schedule for diesel R Vs, let's discuss the issue of
diesel R Vs first and then talk about the diesel passenger car. The MOE would
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* Operating plan
o List of Participants
c Participation of industry representatives will be flexible according to the issues
o Selection of chair person of the Commission and secretary
o Meeting on a weekly basis, establish sub-Committee for decision agenda, if
necessary
* Decision agenda
o 1. Course of action for the classification of diesel RVs (due on July 1, 2002).
* According to the public forum (May 17, 2002) and the public sentiment,
most people do not think that it will be appropriate to terminate vehicle
models, which have been manufactured.
* We have to consider the effect of termination on the auto industry, the
auto parts industry, and the potential trade dispute with other countries.
* However, the final decision whether to allow the manufacture of diesel
RV will depend on the review of the auto industry's emissions reduction
plan.
* Considering that five diesel RVs will be terminated starting July 1, 2002,
this issue should be addressed as soon as possible independently from
the issue of diesel passenger cars.
o 2. Joint Fact-Finding on the effect of allowing diesel passenger cars on air quality
* Scenario analysis of the impact of diesel passenger cars on emissions
change (conducted by the MOE)
o 3. Measures to reduce emissions from general diesel vehicles
* The MOE will prepare the policy measures and present them at the next
meeting.
o 4. Project of the auto industry to fulfill social responsibility and duty.
* The auto industry will prepare and present it later.
o 5. Adjustment of fuel price
* The MOF and the MOCIE will make their proposal. Currently, the joint
research project on the issue is being conducted by the MOE and the
MOF (May - November, 2002).
allow diesel R Vs to be sold continuously. Thus, Hyundai and Kia should
prepare their plan to offset emissions generatedfrom their diesel R Vs.
For diesel passenger cars, the MOE conducted the scenario analysis of
emissions from potential diesel passenger cars and prepared general policy
measures for diesel vehicles. Thus, if there is a problem with it, let the MOE
know that. For fuel price adjustment, there is research going on now. So, wait
for the result of the research.
D1: Setting a ground rule by participants
The importance of setting ground rules is that stakeholders can feel they own the
process by setting ground rules together. However, even though the MOE emphasized the
importance of consensus as a decision rule, participants did not seriously discuss "ground
rules, " regarding agenda setting, deliberation, and implementation together. The MOE just
provided the guideline or announced its decision as to how to operate the process. At the
first meeting, the group decided to have two chairpersons, one from the MOE and one from
the Alliance, to meet once a week, and to create a sub-committee, if necessary. It was
decided also that the participation of representatives should be flexible.
However, participants did not discuss what kinds of attitude the participants should
have during the process. For example, on the same day as the first meeting of the Joint
Commission, the Alliance was operating a street rally in front of the headquarters of
Hyundai, raising the issue of urban air pollution and problematic diesel RVs. Asked a
question about this negotiation strategy of the Alliance, Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin of the Alliance
explained: 219
"The source of negotiation power for the Alliance during negotiations in the
219 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin on on July 16, 2005.
212
Joint Commission was the media. In terms of negotiation strategies in the
Joint Commission, the Alliance decided to conduct continuous street
campaigns and write columns to the media, in order to raise the public
awareness on the issue and make the strong will of the Alliance known to the
government and industries. "
D2: Fair management of the process
Participants appear more satisfied with a negotiated than with a conventional rule-
making process because they feel not only that the substantive outcome will be better, but
also that the process itself is managed fairly (Freeman and Langbein, 2000). The criteria of
fair process may apply from the initiation stage, including agenda setting, ground rule
making, and range of representation, to the implementation state. Also, fair negotiation
processes should empower all the parties in various ways and constrain the most powerful.
To assess fairness, a researcher should ask participants directly how they felt about
the fairness of the process and whether they were satisfied by how it was managed. In
response to these questions, every participant in the Joint Commission answered that they
were given equal opportunity to be heard and respected and to access information. On the
basis of these remarks it may be concluded that Mr. Koh from the MOE and the other
chairperson from the Alliance facilitated discussion or dialogue fairly inside the
negotiation processes.
However, some stakeholders were not satisfied with the agenda setting from the
beginning of the Joint Commission. The opinions of an officer from Hyundai are
illustrative: 220
220 Interview with officers from Hyundai Motors on June 9, 2005.
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"Hyundai is always the weakest party in environmental regulatory decision
making. The MOE can just write a policy with a pen. But, sometimes it means
that a manufacture line will be closed. That's a huge blow to the industry.
Industry has a large stake in negotiations. All economic burdens will be on us
not on environmental groups. Thus, industries cannot but be dragged into the
negotiation table. The problem is that agenda setting is too one-sided. Agenda
is set already through the media by environmental groups and the MOE. Or
they just provide the agenda. They (the MOE and the Alliance) held the
agenda setting power in tight. The MOE can regulate the auto industry, but
the MOE cannot ignore environmental groups, who were so powerful as to
affect the Minister's term. Thus, that's a very unbalanced structure for us."
D3: Joint Fact-Finding
Joint fact-finding can ease tension and disputes aroused by the tendency of
stakeholders to attack the assumptions or methodologies underlying each other's scientific
models.
In the Joint Commission, the major decision agenda was whether to allow continuous
manufacture and sales of a few diesel RVs. The necessary scientific or technical
information for that decision included how much emissions could be generated by the
diesel RVs if they were allowed to be sold continuously, and how much emissions could be
offset by Hyundai (Kia) by which plans.
However, the MOE focused on the issue of diesel passenger cars. The MOE
presented its own scenario analysis of the impact of diesel passenger cars on urban air
quality to the participants in the first meeting, and suggested that a sub-committee be
created to verify the analysis, if necessary (Table 7-6).
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Table 7-6. Scenario analysis on the impact of diesel passenger car on air quality prepared
by the MOE.
Scenario Impact
Scenario 1: * Due to relatively lower diesel fuel price, most
demands for gasoline vehicles will be transferred to
EURO-3 level emission the demands for diesel passenger cars.
standards for new diesel * The level of PM10 and NOx will be radically
passenger cars starting July increased.
I, 2002 when the diesel fuel * Impossible to consider this scenario due to the
price is 50% of the gasoline negative impact on air quality.
price.
Scenario 2: * 60,000 - 390,000 additional diesel passenger cars.
* The reduction of the total emissions from
automobiles.
EURO-3 level emission * The reduction of CO, and HC emissions
standards starting January * Changes of PM1o and NOx emissions will depend
2004 and EURO-4 level on for which mode of vehicles (Diesel RVs, LPG
emission standards starting RVs, and gasoline vehicles) diesel passenger cars
January 2005 when the diesel will be substituted. (The emissions of PM10 and
fuel price will be 66% of the NOx could be lowered)
gasoline price. * Diesel passenger cars will be substituted for 12-
20% of diesel RVs.
* The maximum increase of NOx and PMjo emissions
in this scenario will be by 0.2% and 0.5%,
compared to the case of no diesel passenger cars.
Scenario 3 * Reduction of NOx and PM10 by more than 50%
respectively, compared to the EURO-3 level
EURO-4 level emission standards.
standards starting January * No problem in urban air quality management.
2005, when the diesel fuel
price will be 70% of the
gasoline price.
Conclusion In all scenarios, there will be reduction of the total
emissions (CO + HC + PM1 o + NOx) from automobiles
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However, Professor Dong, Jong-In, nominated by the Alliance as an expert,
questioned the validity of the scenario analysis made by the MOE based on data from the
automaker. (It was not clear what part of the scenario analysis Professor Dong criticized.)
The Alliance, however, had accepted the scenario analysis as the fact on which the next
decision would be made. The MOE and the Alliance decided to create a sub-committee to
review the scenario analysis prepared by the MOE from the second meeting of the Joint
Commission. Thus, the Joint Fact finding was conducted by having one stakeholder
conduct research and another stakeholder review it and raise the question.
There was no discussion of how to verify the impact of emissions from diesel RVs on
air quality, the very information on which the most imminent decision had to be made.
Deliberation in the first meeting
At the first meeting, the MOE presented its position regarding diesel RVs and diesel
passenger cars. The discussion was mostly about the issues related to diesel passenger cars,
rather than diesel RVs.
However, for Hyundai (Kia), the issue of diesel RVs was much more important than
that of diesel passenger cars. They requested that the final decision on diesel RVs be made
in the first meeting due to the urgency of the administrative schedule. The MOE also
suggested that it could proceed with the public notice of adjustment of the classification of
vehicle types on the assumption that the government would support the proposal from the
Joint Commission. At this point, the MOE was focusing more on the issue of diesel
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passenger cars than the diesel RVs issue. The MOE wanted to finish the discussion on the
diesel RVs issue as soon as possible as did Hyundai (Kia).
However, the Alliance argued that they could not make any decision without
discussion on the MOE's measures for general diesel vehicles, the automakers' pledge to
reduce emissions from their vehicles, and adjustment of fuel prices. Given the tension
between the Alliance and Hyundai (Kia), the MOE announced that it would make a
decision on diesel RVs at the second meeting.
The second meeting (May 31, 2002)
A total of 20 participants appeared at the second meeting. Two officials from the
MOE and one official from the MOCIE participated from the government side. Three
leaders from the Alliance; ten officials from industry, including automakers, oil, gas, and
LPG industry; and four experts negotiated for five-and-a-half hours.
D1: Setting a ground rule by participants
As discussed at the first meeting, it was decided that Mr. Koh from the MOE and Mr.
Lee, Duk-Seung from the Alliance should co-chair the Joint Commission. Participants also
decided that the Joint Commission would operate until the end of June and continue the
Commission, if necessary, afterwards. They decided that the outcome of the Joint
Commission with the signatures of co-chairs could be released to the public and the media
by consensus of all participants.
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Deliberation in the second meeting
The first discussion topic at the second meeting was about diesel passenger cars. This
time, the MOE presented policy measures to reduce emissions from diesel vehicles. The
policies included very comprehensive measures for diesel freight trucks and buses;
introduction of zero, or low-emission vehicles; inspection and maintenance for operating
vehicles; DPF installment; improvement of diesel fuel quality; and distribution of biodiesel
fuels. The MOE had prepared these plans long before to reduce automobile emissions. The
implementation of the plan would lead to a 56 percent reduction of emissions from
automobiles compared to 1999 emissions. At the presentation, the MOE revealed that it
planned to apply the EURO-4 level emission standards to new diesel passenger cars and
diesel RVs starting 2005. Hyundai then presented its plan to manufacture and distribute
environmentally friendly vehicles.
Participants decided to review the contents of both presentations and prepare a review
report for the third meeting. MOE then suggested that they discuss fuel quality and price
issues following the conclusions of research projects they had sponsored. However, the
Alliance requested that the MOE state its position on the issues as soon as possible.
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What is the more important issue now?
Lastly, participants began discussing the issue of diesel RVs. Hyundai (Kia) and the
MOCIE strongly felt that a final decision on diesel RVs should be reached in the second
meeting due to the coming administrative schedule set on July 1, 2002. The MOE also
supported them, offering to make an amendment first and then discuss it later. However,
the Alliance declined the MOE's offer and argued that there was no reason to amend
original regulations for diesel RVs. The Alliance demanded that the MOE and Hyundai
(Kia) submit a detailed plan about how to offset emissions from their diesel RVs in support
of their wish to save them from the stringent regulation. Finally, the MOE agreed that it
would present an environmental impact assessment of diesel RVs at the third meeting.
However, the MOE added that it would decide whether it could proceed with an advance
notice of the amendment of regulation for diesel RVs and let the Alliance know its decision
by June 3, prior to the third meeting.
The third meeting (June 7, 2002)
The third meeting was held with a total of 19 participants in a room at the MOE for
three hours and 40 minutes. All representatives who participated in the second meeting
except for one expert appeared at the third meeting.
Now the first discussion agenda became the issue of diesel RVs. The MOE presented
its analysis of the emissions impact of diesel RVs to the participants, and announced its
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plan to change the regulation of the classification of passenger car types in order to save
diesel RVs from being terminated. The MOE explained why it could not change the
regulation:
* There will be the increase of emissions at most by 0.16% (NOx) and by 0.12%
(PM10), even if these diesel RVs can be continuously manufactured after July
1, 2002.
* Even if these diesel RVs are no longer available after July 1, 2002, consumers
will buy other diesel RVs rather than gasoline or LPG vehicles given the low
diesel fuel price.
* If diesel RVs are terminated after July 1, 2002, there will be a trade war,
economic loss for automakers, auto parts industries, and even owners of these
diesel RVs.
* There is general public opinion against the termination of diesel RVs.
The MOE supported the position of automakers and the MOCE, but added the
precondition that Hyundai and Kia should compensate for the emissions generated by the
continuous sales of diesel RVs by reducing emissions from their other vehicles.
D3: Joint Fact-Finding
At this meeting, the MOE circulated a handout on the scenario analysis of emissions
change associated with diesel RVs (Box 7-3). The MOE conducted the analysis with data
from Hyundai and Kia. In its calculation, there were very important assumptions on how
consumers would react to the termination of these three diesel RVs. In the worst case
scenario, the assumption was that all consumers who planned to buy these diesel RVs,
would buy LPG RVs. In that case, Hyundai and Kia would have to take action to prevent
the emission of more than 1,483 tons of NOx and 155.0 tons of PM10. In the second
scenario of probable case scenario, Hyundai (Kia) would have to prevent the emission of
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more than 539.4 tons of NOx and 73.7 tons of PM10. For Hyundai and Kia, the second
scenario was better. However, the Alliance argued that the first scenario should be taken.
Hyundai argued that the first scenario was not a useful measure, in that consumers would
buy another diesel RV, given the low cost of diesel RVs.
The first scenario was eventually accepted, and Hyundai (Kia) agreed even though
they were not satisfied.221 For them, the first option was within the zone of agreement.
They agreed in order to finalize the diesel RVs issue as soon as possible.
221 Interview with officers from Hyundai Motors on June 9, 2005.
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Box 7-3. Scenario analysis of emissions change with diesel RVs
Application period for calculation: From July 1, 2002 to December 31, 2003.
(After 2004, new stringent emission standards will
apply to these diesel RVs)
Scenario 1: Worst case
All consumers, who planned to buy these
Condition Total (tons) CO HC NOx PM1 o
Business as Usual (A) 1,982.1 45.5 45.5 1,736.1 155.0
Terminated (B) 2,882.2 2,442.5 186.9 252.8
Change (B-A) 900.1 (+) 2,397.0 (+) 141.4 (+) 1,483 (-) 155.0 (-)
Scenario 2: Mostprobable case
SanteFe: 30% - LPG RVs; 70% - other diesel RVs
Trazet (7 passengers): 100% - diesel Trazet (9 passengers)
Carens: 50% - LPG RVs; 50% 4 gasoline vehicles
Condition Total (tons) CO HC NOx PM10
Business as Usual (A) 1,982.1 45.5 45.5 1,736.1 155.0
Terminated (B) 2,523.5 1,126.8 118.7 1,196.7 81.3
Change (B-A) 541.4 (+) 1,081.3 (+) 73.2 (+) 539.4 (-) 73.7 (-)
diesel RVs, will buy LPG RVs.
Almost finished, but...
After the Alliance reviewed the scenario analysis and heard the offset plan from
Hyundai (Kia), they agreed that the SanteFe could be manufactured continuously. However,
they argued that the Carens (Kia) should still be terminated after July 1, 2002, on the
ground that Carens diesel RVs were almost like diesel passenger cars and manufacture of
Carens could be seen as a sign that diesel passenger cars would be allowed.
The MOCIE and Hyundai (Kia) strongly opposed the request from the Alliance. They
maintained that the Carens was the cleanest of the three diesel RVs and there would be a
very negative impact on the national economy if it were terminated.
The Alliance counter-offered that if Kia was willing to install DPF on the Carens to
satisfy the EURO-3 level emission standards, it could be manufactured until December 31,
2002. They deferred to Hyundai (Kia) for a final decision on diesel RVs. They decided that
if Hyundai (Kia) accepted the Alliance's suggestion, it would agree and the MOE could
announce the advance notice for the regulatory change soon.
Consensus Agreement!
On June 24, 2002, a document from the MOE was released to the media. The so-
called "Consensus agreement" was to:
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1. Amend the definitions of passenger car type-i and passenger car type-2, according to the
EU's classification
Classification From To
Passenger car type-i More than 800 cc displacement More than 800 cc displacement,
Less than 1 tons weight Less than tons weight,
or, vans with the width of less than Carry less than 8 passengers
mm and the height
of at less than m,
designed to carry less than
8 passengers
Passenger car type-2 Multi-purpose passenger car with Multi-purpose passenger car for
appropriate frame structure for off- off-road operation with appropriate
road operation. It should have a frame structure, or a four-wheel
four-wheel drive, or LSD (Limited drive, or LSD (Limited Ship
Ship Differential) with Differential) with displacement of
displacement of more than 800 cc, more than 800 cc. with weight of
with weight of less than m tons less than 0 tons
2. According to the amendment above, three models of diesel RVs, such as SantaFe
(Hyundai), Free Lander (Land Rover), and Grand Voyager (Chrysler) can be
manufactured, or imported. However, the amendment is contingent upon the automaker's
pledge, or plans to offset more than the amount of emissions, which are expected to
increase due to the sales of those diesel RVs, by reducing emissions from other vehicles
manufactured by Hyundai. (The Joint Commission agreed to exempt Land Rover and
Chrysler from the duty of offsetting emissions, on the ground that the emissions from
those diesel RVs account for only 0.5% of the total emissions from the five diesel RVs
(Carens, SanteFe, Trazet, Land Rover, and Grand Voyager). The number of those
imported diesel RVs is very small.)
* Emissions expected to increase
NOx: 1,070 tons
PM1o: 117 tons
(Assumptions: 1) SanteFe, and two foreign diesel RVs will be
sold from July 1, 2002 to Dember 31, 2003. Carens will be
sold only for 6 months until the end of 2002.
2) All consumers, who planned to buy these diesel R Vs, will
buy LPG RVs.
* Emission reductions proposed by Hyundai (Kia)
NOx: 1,509 tons
PMIo: 194 tons
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Emission reduction plans by Hyundai (Kia)
- Terminate old model diesel RVs, such as 'Sportage' (Kia), 'Retona' (Kia),
and 'Galloper' (Hyundai), earlier than planned.
- Change the engines of five ton-super large trucks with much cleaner engines
earlier than planned.
- Change the engines of 'Starex (Van)' with much cleaner engines.
- Develop 'Sorento' gasoline RVs and sell them from September, 2002 to
substitute Sorento diesel RVs.
- Conduct free emissions tests for a total of 250,000 operating diesel vehicles,
and free maintenance for violating vehicles (approximately 16% of the
inspected vehicles).
3. Carens and Trazet will be terminated starting July 1, 2002. But, if Carens satify the
EURO-3 level emission standards of NOx and PM10, Carens can be sold until the end of
2002. Regarding the question of continuous manufacture and sale of Carens, the Joint
Commission will discuss the issue of diesel passenger cars.
4. Adjustment of transportation fuel prices is a precondition to allow diesel passenger cars.
A private-public commission will have to discuss the issue.
5. To implement this consensus agreement, Hyundai (Kia) should submit the
implementation plan to the MOE. NGOs, experts, and the MOE will monitor together the
implementation. If there is not enough implementation, the government will take
necessary steps.
6. The Joint Commission will contract a MOU of the consensus agreement. Immediately,
the MOE will change the regulations as above.
Who signed the Consensus agreement?
Right after the MOE announced to the press on June 24, 2002 that it would proceed to
solve the issue of diesel RVs according to the consensus agreement from the Joint
Commission, all major newspapers in South Korea delivered the content of the so-called
"consensus agreement document" under headlines such as "Trazet and Carens will be
terminated!"
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However, by the next day, disgruntled stakeholder opinions began to appear. These
opinions, in summary, included:
Hyundai (Kia): "While we will follow the government policy, but we did not agree with
the announced consensus agreement by the MOE. We did not sign the
agreement. Only the MOE and the Alliance signed. While the MOE
argues that 'Galloper' (old model of diesel R V) should be terminated soon,
we can reduce emissions by another methods, rather than by terminating
Gallopers. We will keep manufacturing Galloper222 ...
2, 000, or 3, 000 Carens are being sold in a month. If they are terminated,
USD 20 million, or 30 million a month will be lost223
(Regarding uncertainty on the emission standards for new diesel
passenger cars), The Auto industry is not like fashion businesses. We need
to look ahead at least 3-5 years. We cannot even decide the specification
of new vehicles due to uncertainty of government decision224 ...
Basically, we are very upset about the decision. The MOE is always seeing
how the wind blows from the environmental groups. That's a typical wait-
and-see policy, to study environmental groups 'faces to see if they are
angry...
KFEM: "We did not participate in the Joint Commission, but we cannot agree with the
rough-and-ready consensus agreement. There was no signature of Hyundai and
Kia on the consensus proposal. The MOE already changed the regulations
according to the consensus agreement. However, if the consensus agreement
proposal does not have the signature of Hyundai, there is no way to ensure that
Hyudai will implement their emission offsetting plan. The consensus agreement
would roll back urban air pollution policy aimed at reducing irrationally
increasing diesel RVs, because it would encourage more diesel R Vs with weight
of less than 2.5 tons. SantaFe is polluting more than Trazet, because it weighs
more and has less engine efficiency than Trazet. But, SantaFe was saved instead
of Trazet. The auto industry did not get hurt that much by the consensus
agreement, because Trazet was being sold in small numbers, Carens can be
exported to Europe. Also, Hyundai (Kia) already planned to terminate old diesel
RVs, such as Sportage. Thus, while the auto industies secured their interests by
this consensus agreement, environmental groups only got a promise to keep
222 Naiwoi Kyungje Shinmoon (2002.6.25). 'No termination of Galloper.'
223 Tae-Han Maeil (2002.6.25).224 Kyung-Hyang Shinmoon (2002.6.26). 'Confusion due to half-cooked decision.'
225 Seoul Kyungje Shinmoon (2002.6.25). 'upset auto industry for enormous loss of sales.'
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talking on the issues...
The MOE, already captured by the auto industry ignored public health problems
caused by urban air pollution. SanteFe is being sold at the rate of the maximum
60, 000 a year. It is wrong to save SanteFe...
There should be a new commission, where all environmental NGOs, and
relevant experts can participate. More transparent, more responsible discussion
is necessary. The consensus agreement should have included a content or policy
to curb the increase of diesel RVs fundamentally226"
The Alliance: "We don't understand why Hvundai denied their agreement on Galloper's
termination. The Alliance strongly recommends to the MOE that the MOE
should take sanctions against Hvundai if Hyvndai fail to fulfill the
agreement27...
(Regarding the agreement document without the signature of Hyundai), We
agreed to the consensus proposal, believing that Hyundai also agreed to that.
If Hyundai did not agree to that, it is not consensus. We should do it
aain228. Our interest is in monitoring how Hvundai would keep its
promise to the consensus proposal. The bottom line to decide whether
Hvundai's is credible is the issue of Galloper2 29."
The MOE: "Hvundai also agreed to the consensus proposal in the Joint Commission.
Thus, we will take sanctions against Hyvundai in case Hvundai does not adhere
to the agreement23 ... The issue of Carens diesel R V is not solved yet. So,
Hyundai and Kia cannot but observe the agreement. We will make sure that
Hvundai will sien the MOU of the consensus arreement 31. "
General auto consumers: "The government and industry are saying that they are positive
in the sales of Carens next year. But, environmental groups
keep saying that Carens will be terminated in the next year. We
are very confused about making a decision whether to buy
Carens or not.
What about other diesel R Vs with mechanical diesel engines
like Musso, Korando by Ssangvong? Why will only Sportage
226 Public statement by KFEM on the consensus agreement (2002.7.4).
227 Chosun Ilbo (2002.6.26).228 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.6.26). 'Hyundai did not give up 'Galloper'.'
229 Public statement by the Alliance (2002.6.28).
230 Chosun Ilbo (2002.6.26).
231 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.6.26).
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What about other diesel R Vs with mechanical diesel engineslike Musso, Koran o by Ssangyong? Why will only Sportage
will be terminated?232."
D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
If representatives at the negotiation table are not adequately representing the interests
of their constituencies or communicating with them, the constituencies can challenge any
agreement during or after the negotiation.
The Alliance was participating in the Joint Commission as the representative of the
general public. However, even if it were fighting with industry to secure the public health
associated with urban air pollution and included NGOs related to consumer issues, it is
questionable whether the Alliance could represent the entire public on the issues.
However, the Alliance held their own frequent strategy meetings before and after each
session of the Joint Commission to coordinate their opinions. There was no communication
problem within the Alliance and between the representatives and the members of the
Alliance. However, another influential environmental group, KFEM, was not involved in
their communications, which caused confusion among environmental groups later.
Hyundai representatives did not have a complete mandate from the CEO to negotiate
in the Joint Commission. They never claimed authority to speak for the company; only the
CEO of Hyundai Motors had the centered authority to make decisions. The communication
problem between Hyundai negotiators and the CEO of Hyundai became evident in the
problem of the termination of the "Galloper." The high-level decision maker at Hyundai did
not want to terminate this model, but the consensus agreement included a stipulation that
232 Kyung-Hyang Shinmoon (2002.6.26). 'Confusion due to half-cooked decision.'
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Galloper would be terminated earlier than the company planned.
Deepened dispute
Hyundai was very upset when the MOE revealed the agreement to the media without
consulting their opinion. While the ground rules of the Joint Commission allowed any
decision to be released to the press with only the signatures of the MOE and the Alliance,
Hyundai was embarrassed by the extensive media coverage. The information about
"Galloper's" termination was very critical in affecting consumer choice. Hyundai had been
very careful in handling this kind of information233
On July 8, 2002, two weeks following release of the consensus agreement in the
media, Hyundai fired Mr. Jaegal, an executive director who worked as the negotiation
representative for Hyundai in the Joint Commission and appointed another executive
officer, Mr. Kim, Duk-Mo as the new negotiator for Hyundai. The new negotiator Mr. Kim
maintained that2 34
"Hyundai did not agree to the consensus agreement. The agreement was made
mostly by the MOE and the Alliance. Hyundai will keep manufacturing
Galloper. "
The Alliance also took action against Hyundai's stand. They organized a protest rally,
calling for social responsibility from industries in front of the headquarters of Hyundai
motor company on July 16, 2002.
233 From the interview with officers from Hyundai Motors on June 9, 2002.
234 OhMynews (2002.7.8).
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The fourth meeting and another source of dispute
In the midst of the confusion and agitation, the MOE, the Alliance, and Hyundai (Kia)
kept in touch outside the Joint Commission to prepare the MOU (Memorandum of
Understanding) of the consensus agreement to secure the implementation of Hyundai's
emissions-offsetting plan. The three parties were pursuing a type of voluntary agreement to
solve the issue of diesel RVs.
When the deal was almost finished, the MOCIE sent a memorandum to the MOE on
July 15, 2002, requesting that any agreement should be between the MOE and Hyundai
only. The MOCIE had opposed the participation of environmental groups in the decision
making process from the beginning and intended to prevent environmental groups from
directly influencing the economic activities of industries. According to the MOCIE, two
contracts could be made among three parties: One between the MOE and Hyundai (Kia)
and the other between the MOE and the Alliance.
One day before the fourth meeting, which was supposed to be held on July 24, 2002,
Hyundai (Kia) finally submitted to the MOE the MOU that the two CEOs signed. There
seemed to be no roadblock, at least for the issue of diesel RVs.
At the fourth meeting of the Joint Commission on July 24, 2002, 13 members
participated for two hours (Table 7-7).
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Table 7-7. Participants at the fourth meeting of the Joint Commission
Affiliation Association Title Name Remark
MOE Director of the air bureau Yoon-Hwa Koh
Director of the transportation Moon-Soo Ahn Government
Government pollution department secretary
MOCIE Secretary at the transportation Sang-Ryong Cho
industry department
NGO CMEJ First Secretary Wang-Jin Seo
Green Transport First Secretary Man-Ki Min
Hyundai Executive Director Duk-Mo Kim
Kia Vice President Chi-Wang In
Automaker Ssangyong Vice President Soo-Won Lee
Renault Vice President Won-Gu Jung
Samsung
Oil Industry LG Executive Director Hyung-Jong Hong
Gas Industy LPG association Executive Director --
LG Executive Director Ho-Yeon Kang
Expert Seoul City Univ. Professor Jong-In Dong Nominated by
NGOs
The main agenda at the fourth meeting was to decide the way in which the parties
would enter into the consensus agreement. There was a winning coalition of the MOE, the
Alliance, and other stakeholders for the tripartite agreement among the MOE, the Alliance,
Hyundai (Kia). Only the MOCIE fiercely argued against the tripartite agreement. Consider
how each stakeholder addressed this issue at the fourth meeting: 235
The MOCIE: "There is no precedent of tripartite agreement in which NGOs participated
as a signatory. We certainly oppose any attempt to include NGOs in the
agreement. We are definitely concerned about the ripple effect of this type of
agreement on other industry sectors in the future. "
The MOE: "There are several domestic and foreign cases of tripartite agreements, where
NGOs participated as committee members and signed the agreements. Our
consulted lawyer also said there was no legal problem in the tripartite
agreement. Unless there is problem in the content of the agreement, it is
appropriate that the Alliance should be a member of the agreement as a
235 Meeting minutes of the fourth meeting (MOE)
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stakeholder."
The Alliance: "Definitely, the Alliance should be a member of the agreement. If not, we
should not have participated in the Joint Commission."
Hyundai (Kia): "No comment. "
LPG association: "We don't understand why the format of agreement should be an issue
unless there is a problem in the content of the agreement. "
Althougth the MOCIE renewed its argument at the fourth meeting, it had no allies.
All other participants decided to finalize a version of the signed MOU of the tripartite
agreement in early August and to hold the fifth meeting of the Joint Commission on August
9, 2002.
All participants except the MOCIE agreed it was high time to shift their focus from
diesel RVs to diesel passenger cars. However, the MOE and the Alliance wanted other
participants to look at the issue in a more comprehensive way, including general diesel
vehicles, and energy fuel prices, rather than to focus on diesel passenger cars only. The
Alliance strategically moved first by organizing a street rally on July 26, 2002 to argue for
more comprehensive government control of air pollution.
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Intervention of the Regulation Reform Committee (RRC) 236
Almost self-excluded from the Joint Commission, the MOCIE with Hyundai (Kia)
called in the RRC's help. One of the two chairpersons was the Minister of Commerce,
Industry and Energy (MOCIE) himself. For the MOCIE, the best alternative to participating
in the Joint Commission was to make the RRC intervene in the process at a later stage. On
August 8, 2002, the MOCIE requested that the RRC review the tripartite agreement on
diesel RVs, asserting that the MOCIE could agree to hear environmental groups' opinions
during the public decision-making process, but could not accept them as signatories of the
final decisions. 237 For the MOE, MOCIE's move was totally unexpected.
Set back by the MOCIE's sudden action, the Alliance responded by organizing a
street campaign in which they marched wearing gas masks and holding picket signs, and
issued a public statement to urge the signing of the agreement among the three parties.
Hyundai and Kia sent the MOU to the MOE, but the agreement had not yet been signed by
all three parties together.
While Hyundai (Kia) even cancelled their request for the RRC's review of the
236 This Committee was established as presidential advisory organization in 1998, when South Korea went
through economic crisis. Therefore, the primary purpose of the Committee is to support and encourage
atrophied commerce and industries by reforming irrational regulations, which prevent industries from doing
business efficiently. The Committee seems very strong in that every regulatory effort, such as creating or
changing regulations, by any governmental agency should go through final review of this Committee. Its
decisions such as repeal or readjustment of regulation have legal power. There are 20 committee members.
Among them, six members are from government side. But most of them work for the economic Ministries.
Other civilian members are people who have affiliations with industries.
237 Mr. Hong, Ki-Doo, a director of Capital Goods Industries Bureau, commented on the tripartite consensus
agreement to a newspaper reporter, "Should the government need an approval from NGOs in every issue of
public decision making? This type of decisionmaking is not a small issue. It can make a big ripple effect on
other public decision making. Especially for industry sector, that can play as a new kind of regulation."
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agreement on August 19, 2002, they were yet ready to sign. The MOCIE was pressing
Hyundai and Kia not to sign it at all.
A director from Hyundai remembered the situation at that time: 23 8
"We are willing to reduce air pollution emissions by terminating old models of diesel
R Vs. But, the MOCIE is requesting us not to sign on it. We are caught between the
MOE and the MOCIE. "
In the meantime, the Alliance pressed Hyundai and Kia by issuing a public statement
on August 14, 2002 that the Alliance would not acknowledge the agreement and would go
back to the original position they held prior to the Joint Commission unless Hyundai and
Kia signed by the weekend.
After all the turmoil, the Joint Commission finally announced the consensus
agreement which the MOE, Hyundai (KIA) and the Alliance negotiated over three months
on August 19, 2002. At this time, even the MOCIE signed as a member of the government.
They agreed that 1) high polluting old diesel multi-purpose vehicles and buses should no
longer be manufactured, 2) automakers should gradually expand installation of cleaner
engines, and 3) they would return soon to the issue of whether to allow diesel private
vehicles or not.
By the terms of this agreement, several multi-purpose diesel vehicles including
"Sportage," "Retona," "Galloper," and "Trazet XG (7 passengers)" would no longer be
manufactured, while KIA's "Carens II" would be manufactured until the end of 2002, and
Hyundai's "SanteFe" would be manufactured continuously.
However, on September 3, 2002, the RRC issued a correction to the consensus
238 Interview with officers from Hyundai Motors on June 9, 2002.
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agreement, thus invalidating it as a regulation. The Committee declared that government
could not intensify regulations by making separate agreements with industries or civic
organizations, and that if additional regulations were needed, existing law or regulation
should be amended.
The demise of the Joint Commission
Frustrated by the RRC's decision, the Alliance made a public statement criticizing the
RRC and decided to secede from the Joint Commission on September 17, 2002. The
Alliance's withdrawal from the Joint Commission meant the end of the consensus-building
process. The MOE also criticized the RRC's decision and requested another authoritative
interpretation of the agreement, arguing that because the agreement was voluntary rather
than a regulation the RRC could not overrule the agreement. Furthermore, the MOE
threatened to re-impose the previous harsh regulations on diesel RVs if the consensus
agreement was not acknowledged.
But, save the agreement!
In the meantime, the MOE had two options for responding to the RRC's decision.
First, it could just abandon the voluntary agreement as did the Alliance, and maintain its
original plan to terminate some diesel RV models as they intended. Second, the MOE could
just adjust to the RRC's correction in order to keep the agreement alive. Considering the
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time and energy that the MOE had invested in building consensus on the content of the
agreement which they approved, revoking the agreement just for some controversial
phrases was not a good option for the MOE. Moreover, Hyundai and Kia agreed to comply
with the agreement. Thus, the MOE revisited the agreement, amended a controversial
phrase and submitted it to the RRC for re-interpretation on October 2, 2002. The
amendment changed the content of article 10 of the agreement, which sounded legally
compulsory. It changed the language from "the MOE will revoke automakers'
manufacturing certification in case of their nonfulfillment of the agreement (Article 10 of
the agreement)" to the less binding construction "the MOE can take steps such as
termination of manufacturing by amending regulations in case of..." The MOE also
changed the name of the agreement to "the improved planning" to encourage RRC approval.
To the MOE, the slight amendment was no impediment to achieving its more important
goals. The MOE emphasized that the amendment was only a cosmetic change, and that the
new phrase would not change the penalty level from that of the original version. Finally, on
October 28, 2002, the RRC approved the amended agreement in the name of "the improved
planning as non-threatening to the basic law for administrative regulation." It seemed that
the dispute around diesel RVs was resolved to the satisfaction of the MOE, and Hyundai
(Kia). The MOE wanted to move the discussion toward the issue of diesel passenger cars.
Into the conventional adversarial politics stream
After the Alliance withdrew from the Joint Commission on September, 17, 2002, its
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representatives spent most of their energy in the conventional politics stream by resorting to
adversarial tactics, such as issuing a public statement to the media, 239 holding public rallies,
paying protest visits to government offices or officers, and submitting petitions to the
government 240 (Table 7-8). The Alliance started to argue that the voluntary agreement was
now invalid, and that the MOE should stick to the original plan to terminate diesel RVs,
according to the new emission standards for diesel passenger cars, starting July 1, 2002.
Table 7-8. Activities of the Alliance after their withdrawal from the Joint Commission
(2002.9.17 - 2002.12.26)
Date Activities Event
9.17 Protesting rally against the RRC's decision
10.2 Petitioning to the MOE that it should stick to the The MOE submitted revised
original plan to terminate agreement to the RRC.
10.16 Petitioning the inspection of the RRC to the Board of
Audit and Inspection (MAI) and reporting the
corruption 241 and abusing authority of the RRC chair
and Minister of the MOCIE to the Korea Independent
Commission Against Corruption (KICAC)
Paying a protest visit to the RRC
10.17 Issuing a public statement in order to criticize the
RRC's blockage for the Alliance's request to meet the
chairperson of the RRC
10.29 Issuing a public statement that the Alliance (10.28) The RRC approved the
disqualified the revised agreement which the RRC revised agreement.
approved
11.13 Issuing a public statement that the Alliance would (11.11) The MOE announced
oppose the sale of diesel passenger cars in domestic that it would allow the sale of
239 There are several progressive newspapers, which favor NGOs's points. Those newspaper include
Hankyerhe Shinmoon, and OhMynews.
240 There is idiosyncratic cultural feature of South Korean in solving controversial problem. While, in the US,
people are likely to resort to lawsuit to solve a dispute, South Korean are more like to meet people who are
influential to solve the dispute in person. (See Snyder (1999)). Snyder, S. (1999). Patterns of Negotiation in a
South Korean Cultural Context. Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 3: 394-417.
241 Corruption means the act of any public official's seeking gains for himself/herself or for any third party by
abusing his/her position or authority or violating Acts and subordinate statues in connection with his/her
duties.
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market diesel passenger cars by
lowering emission standards.
11.19 Protesting rally against diesel passenger cars (11.26) The MOE changed its
decision of allowing diesel
passenger cars.
12.13 Issuing a public statement to criticize the lobby of (12.7) KAMA requested the
Hyundai and Kia MOE and the MOCIE to allow
Hyundai and Kia to keep
manufacturing Carens diesel
RV242.
12.26 Issuing a public statement to request the termination of
Carens
The Joint Commission was established in an effort to solve multiple controversial
issues associated with diesel vehicles on May 18, 2002. Exactly four months later, on
September 17, 2002, the Joint Commission was terminated when the Alliance withdrew
from the Commission and returned to the conventional adversarial politics stream.
Although the Joint Commission did not end well and the Alliance did not acknowledge the
consensus agreement at the end, the process did produce a signed consensus agreement, by
which Hyundai and Kia tried to fulfill the agreement in order to save SantaFe and Carens.
However, there still remained many issues to be resolved, such as the issue of the
manufacture of "Carens" after January 1, 2003, and diesel passenger cars. The relationships
among stakeholders became worse than they had been before the Joint Commission. The
level of trust among stakeholders went down. For example, the MOCIE requested the RRC
to review the consensus agreement, which it had signed. The Alliance suspected that the
MOCIE had participated in the Joint Commission in order to block the voluntary agreement
from the beginning.
242 Other automakers, such as GM-Daewoo, Renault-Samsung, and Ssangyong, criticized KAMA's request to
the MOE and the MOCIE, on the ground that KAMA did not consult them and only represented Hyundai and
Kia's interests in its request.
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Stakeholders did not meet together subsequent to the demise of the Joint Commission,
but acted independently to promote their interests. Without any discussion on the issue of
"Carens" the MOE announced that it would terminate the "Carens" diesel RV starting
January 1, 2003.
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Chapter Eight
The Environment Commission (Round #2)
The previous chapter included an analysis of how the Joint Commission was initiated
as a consensus-building stream and an assessment of the initiation and deliberation factors
of consensus-building theory and practices as they functioned in the Joint Commission.
Coupling those factors with the strategic moves of policy entrepreneurs demonstrated why
the Joint Commission failed to resolve the dispute, and even. exacerbated it.
This chapter also uses that analytic framework first to delve into how the
Environment Commission came about, and how consensus building among stakeholders
was approached. The initiation and deliberation factors in consensus-building theory for
this second effort are discussed. The analysis explores how conventional multi-streams
affected the consensus-building factors and how those factors affected the negotiation
process among participants to produce a consensus-building process. Finally, the chapter
outlines the results of the Joint Commission effort. First, it is important to describe the
situation prior to the establishment of the Environment Commission.
Distrust, Dispute, and Delay
Since the Alliance withdrew from the Joint Commission, its members played actively
in the conventional politics stream. Even though Hyundai (Kia) were implementing their
plan according to the consensus agreement, the anger of the Alliance could not be eased.
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The Alliance contended that they could not trust the auto industry and the MOCIE anymore.
A member of the Alliance asserted that243:
"The MOCIE played a hypocrite by signing14" on the consensus agreement, and
taking it to the RRC to repeal it. It's like slapping on the cheek while shaking
hands. How can we fiace them with a smiling fice? From the frilure of the Joint
Commission, we are going to make the case that authoritative bureaucrats
cannot solve anything iJ'thev ignore a consensus with the public. "
Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin claimed that the MOCIE and Hyundai (Kia) had not participated
sincerely from the beginning of the Joint Commission and that they subverted the content
of the agreement by utilizing the RRC's decision.245 The Alliance did not trust the MOE
either. The Alliance made tough compromises in order to reach consensus, only to have the
agreement changed. For them, there was no basis of trust on which to build consensus.
Other than the Joint Commission there was no forum or mechanism in which to
discuss the issues. The MOE had only two options. One was to persuade the Alliance to
come back to the Joint Commission. The other was to make decisions unilaterally without
consulting the Alliance. The MOE tried to persuade the Alliance and the MOCIE to make
things better.246
Hyundai (Kia), wanting to continue manufacturing Carens diesel RVs for the next
year, was getting nervous 247 as time was passing by without any comment on the issue
243 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.12.19). 'Diesel vehicle controversy and the spirit of consensus.'
244 An official from the MOCIE explained that the MOCIE signed on the agreement after the MOE sent to the
MOCIE a memorandum that the MOE would take necessary steps, including changing the content of the
agreement, if the RRC would make a final decision on the agreement. (Yonhap News (2002.8.19)).245 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.12.25). 'Reasons to stop the sales of Carens in South Korea.'246 Mr. Park, Cheon-Kyu, a director of transportation pollution department at the MOE, mentioned that the
MOE had a plan and only had to persuade the Alliance and the MOCIE. (Hankook Kyungje (2002.11.12)).
247 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.12.19), 'Diesel vehicle controversy and the spirit of consensus.' Hankook
Kyungje (2002.11.11). 'Nervous auto industries at the risk of the termination of Carens diesel.'
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from the MOE. If the MOE stuck to the consensus agreement, Carens diesel RVs would be
terminated starting January 1, 2003. Hyundai (Kia) could only lobby government agencies
and politicians to solve this issue and plead their case in the media, which was friendly to
the industrial sector. The auto industry and the MOCIE warned the MOE that the high
emission standards for new diesel passenger cars could lead to a trade war.248 They also
accused the MOE of being subservient to environmental groups and of refusing to take
action while waiting for the coming presidential election. 249
Another round of dispute on diesel passenger cars
If the Joint Commission had been successful in handling the diesel RVs issue as
planned, consecutive meetings could have been held to discuss the issue of diesel passenger
cars in August and September. The Joint Commission could have discussed the issue of
Carens diesel RVs at that time. According to the consensus agreement, the manufacture of
Carens diesel RVs for the year 2003 hinged on the decision of the Joint Commission on
emission standards for new diesel passenger cars.
The MOE, rejected by the Alliance and warned by the MOCIE of a potential trade
war, responded by proclaiming on November 12, 2002 that it would allow the sales of
diesel passenger cars with lower emission standards in the domestic market in 2004 or 2005.
In practice, allowing diesel passenger cars with cleaner technology was not a problem for
248 Hankook Kyungje (2002.11.12).
249 Hankyerhe Shinmoon (2002.12.19). 'Diesel vehicle controversy and the spirit of consensus.'
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the MOE. What mattered was whether other benefits, such as lowered diesel fuel price,
could be obtained in return for allowing diesel passenger cars.
The Alliance immediately confronted the MOE's announcement with a public
statement (November 13, 2002) and a mass rally (November 19, 2002). Consider the
rationales of the Alliance for strong opposition to diesel passenger cars: 250
Environmental policy in South Korea has been swayed by afew Cheobols
(Large conglomerates). Public health had been ignored by the government
captured by large industries. Also, in this case, proposed policies on diesel
passenger cars are only for Hyundai and Kia. It is unfair for other
automakers.
* Although new dieselpassenger cars are better in terms of CO2 emissions,
what matters the most in South Korea is the issue ofPMIo and NOx.
* Given serious air pollution in urban areas, it is nonsense just to allow diesel
passenger cars without counter-measures to address the problem of large
diesel vehicles, diesel R Vs, and high sulfur-content diesel and low diesel fuel
prices. Especially, diesel fuel prices should be at least 85% of the gasoline
price and the sulfur content of the diesel should be lowered from 430 ppm to
15 ppm.
Considering these arguments, the Alliance and the MOE positions appear to have had
much in common; each sought stricter control over diesel vehicles in return for diesel
passenger cars. However, they were talking through the media individually, not in a forum
together.
Two weeks following the MOE's announcement to allow diesel passenger cars, the
Ministry announced on November 26, 2002 that it would postpone the decision to allow the
sales of diesel passenger cars in South Korea by lowering the emissions standards for new
250 OhMyNews (2002.11.18). Column by Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin from the Alliance.
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diesel passenger cars, due to the very different views among the industry, academics, the
MOCIE, the MOE, and environmental groups. Mr. Koh at the MOE declared that the
Ministry would not change regulations without the consent of the Joint Commission. 251
That announcement meant that Carens diesel RV production would have to be terminated
at the end of 2002.
Auto industries make a move
On December 5, 2002, KAMA (Korean Auto Manufacturers Association) officially
petitioned the MOCIE and the MOE, requesting that the MOE allow the sale of diesel
passenger cars in South Korea. Its rationale was that the domestic market was necessary to
achieve economy of scale for auto industries, which were exporting diesel passenger cars to
the European market. However, other automakers strongly contended that the KAMA's
petition was groundless, because KAMA did not consult them and represented only
Hyundai (Kia)'s interests in the petition. With different levels of technical development of
diesel engines, auto industries had different interests'in the emission standards and
introductory timing (Table 8-1).
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251 Yon-Hap News (2002.12.17).
Table 8-1. The interests of auto industries on emission standards on new diesel passenger
cars
Another announcement from the government
As the dispute deepened, frustration mounted in several sectors. Industries needed a
consistent government policy on which to base their business strategies. Consumers also
needed a consistent policy on which to base their decisions to buy new cars. Finally, the
Ministers of the MOCIE, MOF, MOCT, and MOE got together 252 to clarify the issue on
December 26, 2002. The Ministerial meeting was the last one of the departing
administration, as the new administration of Roh, Moo-Hyun's was due to begin on
February 25, 2002.
252 In public decision-making process in South Korea, there is a Ministerial meeting for economic policies,
where the Ministers of the MOF, the MOCIE, the MOCT, and the MOE participate to discuss government
decisions associated with economic policies. Their decisions are not binding as the final government decision,
but suggest the course of actions to follow in terms of certain policies.
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Automaker Emission standards Rationale
& introductory time
Hyundai (Kia) EURO-3 in 2004 To comply with CO2 convention of the EU;
EURO-4 in 2005 To effect the economy of scale for more export;
To develop clean technology of diesel vehecles.
Renault Samsung EURO-4 in 2005 To compete fairly with Hyundai and Kia
(If EURO-3 in 2004, Hyundai and Kia will
dominate the market)
GM Daewoo, and EURO-4 in 2006 To prevent air pollution
Ssangyong (Given lower diesel fuel prices, diesel passenger
cars will increase rapidly);
To compete fairly with Hyundai and Kia
(If EURO-3 in 2004 or 2005, Hyundai and Kia
will dominiate the market)
In the Ministerial meeting, the Ministers made a final decision to lower the emission
standards for new diesel passenger cars to a reasonable level by February 15, 2002, which
implied that diesel passenger cars could be sold in South Korea. However, the Ministers left
room for negotiation over the introductory timing of the emission standards. For the MOE,
the negotiation was very important in its quest to gain other benefits such as the adjustment
of diesel fuel prices. The selection of February 15, 2003 as the date to lower emissions
standards was a political choice, protecting the new administration from having to deal with
such a controversial issue. However, it gave the MOE only one-and-a-half months to sort
out the complex implications of the decision.
The advent of another policy entrepreneur
While decision making about diesel passenger cars failed to progress, a new policy
entrepreneur joined and helped revive the decision making process. The Korean Federation
for Environmental Movements (KFEM),2 53 which had functioned outside and even
criticized the Alliance, issued a public statement on December 17, 2003 proposing to
organize a new discussion forum to build a social consensus on the comprehensive issues
associated with diesel passenger cars.254
The reasons why the KFEM took the initiative to organize a new consensus forum are
threefold. First, the KFEM was the only group in a position to do so, as it was not a
253 KFEM is a leading grassroot organization for civic environmental issue, which was founded in 1993, and
now consists of 25 local branches and more than 25,000 sustaining members.
254 Yon-Hap News (2002.12.10). 'New Commission for diesel passenger cars is possible?'
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member of the Joint Commission. The relationships among the participants in the Joint
Commission were seriously damaged. The Alliance needed a reason to justify rejoining the
Joint Commission though the MOCIE and automakers had not changed their positions since
the Commission had broken up. The MOE tried hard to persuade the Alliance by meeting
each environmental group individually, but in vain.
Second, the KFEM, believed to be a competitor with other environmental groups,
such as the CMEJ and Green Transport, was in a good position to take the initiative. Third,
there was an impending danger that the MOE would allow diesel passenger cars, as
Hyundai (Kia) wished, without securing any countermeasures. Unsupported by any
environmental groups, the MOE seemed to be helpless. 255
The reactions from each stakeholder to the proposal of the KFEM were as below 256:
The MOE: "If there will be a new consensus building forum where the government,
industries, civil organizations, academics, and experts can participate,
stakeholders may actively discuss all the issues soon. There is no reason for
the MOE to oppose the proposal from the KFEM, given the situation where
the MOE should make an advance notice of the regulation of the new emission
standards for diesel passenger cars by June 2003. We don't have much time
for that. "
Auto industries: "It is not time yet for us to make a position on the new Commission. But,
we agree that there should be discussion on diesel passenger cars as
soon as possible. "
The Alliance: "The KFEM proposed a new Commission as a substitute for the Joint
Commission. But, the KFEMshouldfirst enroll in the existing Alliance."
When the KFEM joined the Alliance, it had a new rationale for participating in a new
255 Interview with Professor Jang, Jae-Yeon, a leader of the KFEM, on July 8, 2004. He is a professor at the
department of preventive medicine at Ajou University, as well as a director of civil environmental research
institute of the KFEM.
256 Yon-Hap News (2002.12.10). 'New Commission for diesel passenger cars is possible?'
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consensus-building forum, and a new source of power to deal with the next round of
negotiation around diesel passenger cars. The MOE agreed to organize a new forum as
soon as possible. The new Commission was named the "Environment Commission." The
first meeting was set up on January 11, 2003.
New change in the politics stream: the advent of "participatory
government"
At almost the same time as the proposal for a new consensus-building forum was
made, another big change occurred in the politics stream: the advent of "Participatory
Government." Following the "Civil Government"' of 1993-1997, the election of President
Kim, Dae-Jung marked the first time an opposition leader had been elected as president in
Korea. He named his new government the "Government of the People." However, in 2002,
as the DJ administration's term was closing and the nation was in transition to a new
regime, no one was eager to initiate new programs or regulations. If a conservative and pro-
economy administration were elected, a pro-environment policy initiative developed in a
more progressive regime was likely to lose its momentum.
On December 19, 2002, South Korea opened a new chapter in its political history.
Succeeding Dae-Jung Kim, Moo-Hyun Roh was elected as the 16th President of South
Korea. As the candidate of the dominant "Democratic Party" ("Min-Joo Dang") Noh
defeated the conservative minority leader, Hoi-Chang, Lee by a margin of only 2.5 percent
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(49 percent vs. 46.5 percent). His educational background 25 7 and non-authoritarian political
style was very popular with the general public, fed up with political corruption and party
politics.
His political support came from relatively young people who wanted to change
politics and enjoyed internet communication .258 Many progressive civil organizations also
favored Noh during the presidential election in 2002.259 Calling for political reform and
war against corruption, president-elect Noh dubbed his new administration the
"Participatory Government." By its very name the new government advertised its intent to
be more progressive and based on participatory decision making, which NGOs had
encouraged. It was expected that the new administration would invite civil NGOs into its
core, giving legitimacy to the participatory government by appointing NGO-affiliated
people as government officers.
This political and institutional atmosphere signaled positive or negative messages to
stakeholders relative to their positions in the disputes on diesel passenger cars and the
Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality management. Roh's surprising advance to the
presidency gave the Alliance and the MOE 260 more political resources in negotiations.
However, it raised apprehension among business leaders, especially at large conglomerates,
the "Chae-bols," who anticipated that the new administration would focus on distribution
257 President Noh is only high-school graduate. He passed the bar exam to be a lawyer and became a
politicians.
258 It was said that the new government was established by the support of netizen. (Moon-Hwa Ilbo,
2002.12.23).
259 President-elect Noh emphasized that without my experience in civil movement, he could not be
elected as the President. He added that this presidential campaign was special in that he got lots of
support from civil groups (President-elect office, 2003).
260 The MOE did not hide its anticipation of the support from the new President, who was passed for pro-
environment. (Hankook Kyungje, 2002.12.21) '[Era of Roh, Moo-Hyun] reactions from each Ministry.'
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rather than economic growth.
The impact began to be felt everywhere. For example, a core member of the Alliance
was appointed to the advisory staff for environmental issues in the Office of the President-
Elect, which opened on December 28, 2002.261 Interestingly, the Office adopted the Special
Act as its first-priority issue in environmental policy when the new administration took
office on February 25, 2003262
Initiation factors of the Environment Commission
The second round of consensus building began on January 11, 2003. The newly
named Environment Commission held eight meetings and one public forum in just one
month, concluding February 14, 2003. At the final meeting, participants reached a
consensus agreement. This section describes the initiation factors operative in the second
round of consensus building, the Environment Commission.
II: Use of a neutral skilled facilitator
The Environment Commission did not use a neutral facilitator or a team of
facilitators. Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa, the director of the Air Bureau at the MOE, chaired the
meetings of the Environment Commission. As with the Joint Commission, the framework
of the Environment Commission had been discussed by the MOE and the Alliance.
261 Interview with Mr. Seo, Wang-Jin, the leader of CMEJ, on July 16, 2005.
262 (President-elect Office, 2003)
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Professor Jang, Jae-Yeon, a leader of KFEM, explained his role in initiating the
Environment Commission:263
"When the Alliance participated in the Joint Commission last year, we (the
KFEM) just raised a question on their activities outside the Joint Commission.
However, I think we took the initiative in creating the Environment Commission.
We discussed the structure and decision agenda of the Environment
Commission with the Vice Minister of the Environment and Mr. Koh. So, I think
the actual structure and the decision agenda of the Environment Commission
represented most of our input. "
Thus, without a neutral facilitator, all important initiation factors in consensus-
building theory, including the range of participants and the decision agenda, were
determined by the initiators, the Alliance and the MOE. The consequences are discussed in
the context of other initiation factors analyzed below.
12: Conflict Assessment
There was no conflict assessment before the Environment Commission was
established. While the Joint Commission was originally set up to discuss the same issues
the Environment Commission intended to address, most discussions at the Joint
Commission were centered on the issue of diesel RVs due to the urgent administrative
schedule. For this reason, there was not enough opportunity for each stakeholder in the
Joint Commission to lay out its interests and concerns. Furthermore, after the failure of the
Joint Commission, stakeholders approached the MOE individually, or disclosed their
positions through the media. It is safe to assume that the MOE learned how each
263 Interview with Professor Jang, Jae-Yeon, a leader of the KFEM, on July 8, 2004. He is a professor at the
department of preventive medicine at Ajou University, as well as a director of civil environmental research
institute of the KFEM.
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stakeholder viewed each issue through those mechanisms above.
13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholder
At the Environment Commission, a total of 15 people (three representatives from
MOE, five from the Alliance, and seven from experts, working in academics) participated
in collaboration (Table 8-2).
Table 8-2. Participants in the Environment Commission
Affiliation Title Name Remark
Director of the Air Bureau Koh, Yoon-Hwa Chairperson
The Government Director of the air pollution policy department Ahn, Moon-Soo
(The MOE) Researcher at the Automobile pollution research Ryu, Jung-Ho
center
Director of civil environment research center Jang, Jae-Yeon
(KFEM)
First Secretary (CMEJ) Seo, Wang-Jin
The Alliance First Secretary (Green Transport) Min, Man-Ki
Secretary General (Green Consumer Network) Lee, Duk-Seung
Director (Korean Environment policy and society Shin, Yae-Sup
research institute)
Professor (Seoul City Univ.) Dong, Jong-In Nominated by
Professor (Soo-won Univ.) Jang, Young-Ki the Alliance
Senior researcher (Korea Environment Institute) Cho, Seung-Hun
Experts Researcher (Korea Environment Institute) Kang, Man-Ok Nominated by
Researcher (KIMM) Chung, Yong-I1 the MOE
Professor (Korea Univ.) Park, Shim-Soo Nominated by
Researcher (Industry research institute) Chun, Jae-Wan industries
As observed in the Joint Commission, the drive from the Alliance for a new
collaboration effort was strong; the MOE was also eager to resolve the challenging issues.
However, they totally excluded the MOCIE, the MOF, and the industries, while still calling
their collaboration a "Private-Public partnership." How could they exclude industrial
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stakeholders from the Environment Commission? What were the MOCIE, the MOF, and
other industries doing in creating the Environment Commission?
Their exclusion was already predicted when the KFEM proposed the creation of the
Environment Commission in December 2002. The KFEM requested that the auto industries
should be included only as observers, rather than committee members. 264
The Alliance and the MOE debated three options for organizing a new consensus-
building forum (Box 8-1.)
Source: Communication document between the MOE and Mr. Jang
264 Yon-Hap News (2002.12.10). 'New Commission for diesel passenger cars is possible?'
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Box 8-1. Options on the structure of the Environment Commission
The first option:
* Revive the Joint Commission and add the KFEM as committee member to the
original membership of the Commission
* Organize subcommittees for sub-fields, such as energy fuel price, scenario
analysis of the impact of diesel passenger cars on emissions
The second option:
* Revive the Joint Commission, and add the KFEM as committee member, but
exclude the MOCIE, and industries
The third option:
* Create 'Air quality Environment Forum' where the original committee members
of the Joint Commission, plus other experts and congressional staff can
participate (a total of 26 members)
* Organize a general meeting and sub-Committee meetings
* Sub-Committees will conduct technical fact-findings and committee members in
general meetings will review them.
* Sub-Committees focus on the issue of 1) diesel vehicle (new and operating), 2)
The first option was supported by the original Alliance. The KFEM suggested the
second option, and the MOE proposed the third option. In the debate the KFEM
successfully persuaded the Alliance and the MOE to adopt the second option and changed
the name of the forum from the Joint Commission to the Environment Commission. The
new Environment Commission would exclude the MOCIE and industries from
collaboration.
The rationales for the second option were threefold. First, neither the MOE nor the
KFEM trusted the MOCIE and Hyundai (Kia) as partners, and thought these groups would
only obstruct consensus. 265 Second, they did not have enough time to collaborate and make
a decision by February 15, 2003.266 Too many participants would make the process much
longer. From their experience during the Joint Commission, Mr. Koh and Mr. Ahn from the
MOE recalled the commotion that had taken place among stakeholders at some meetings:
"At the first meeting, I gave to all participants sitting around the round table
the opportunity to make a statement on the issue of diesel passenger cars. The
debates among stakeholders were civil and collegial through meetings in
general. There were no curse words during the meetings. However, the debates
among automakers and between automakers and oil industries were sometimes
very rough because every automaker and oil industry had different interests and
positions... We thought that it would be better to proceed to the next
Commission without industries, who fight among others and the MOCIE, which
is not reliable. 267 ,
"We (the MOE) decided to exclude industries from the Environment
Commission. Instead, we promised to invite them, ifnecessary, during the
meetings and planned to play as a clearinghouse for industries and economic
Ministries. 268 ,,
265 Interview with Professor Jang, Jae-Yeon, a leader of the KFEM, on July 8, 2004.266 Interview with Mr. Min, Man-ki, a leader of Green Transport on June 10, 2005.267 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa on April 15, 2005.268 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former director of transportation pollution department at the air
bureau of the MOE on June 20, 2005.
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Third, the new group was confident that the MOE would communicate adequately
with the MOCIE and other industrial stakeholders in different venues to coordinate all
interests.
The MOE contacted the MOCIE and the MOF with the second option. Mr. Ahn,
Moon-Soo, the former transportation pollution department director, described the situation
when he met with officials from the MOCIE and the MOF about the proposed Environment
Commission; 269
"We (the MOE) explained to them that we, as the representative of the
government, would negotiate with environmental groups and experts, and would
make diesel passenger cars to be sold in the domestic market soon, but only
with some preconditions. Then, I asked them whether they could agree to the
kind of decision-making structure as the proposed Environment Commission,
and accept its proposals. Then, the MOCIE and the MOF agreed to positively
review the proposal from the Environment Commission. That's how the
Environment Commission started without the MOCIE, the MOF, and the
industries."
Thus, the range of stakeholder representation in the Environment Commission came
to look like Figure 8-1.
269 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former director of transportation pollution department at the air
bureau of the MOE on June 20, 2005.
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The Environment Commission
Figure 8-1. Participation structure of the Environment Commission
14: Clarify multiple issues to allow trade-offs
As the Environment Commission took the baton from the Joint Commission for diesel
vehicles, the decision agenda did not change radically. However, subtle changes were
evident: First, the issue of diesel RVs was not on the list anymore, because the decision was
already made. Second, the assessment of public health problems and social costs associated
with automobile emissions was added to the list. Originally, the MOE suggested to the
Alliance the creation of an "Air Quality Environment Forum" as part of option 3 (See Box
8-1) and included the issues of public health and the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air
quality management on the list.
However, the issue of the Special Act was not added to the decision agenda for the
Environment Commission. The decision agenda for the Environment Commission was
finally adjusted through the discussion between the MOE and the Alliance to include:
1) Emission reduction strategies for general diesel vehicles and diesel RVs,
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2) Adjustment of transportation fuel prices,
3) Improvement of fuel quality,
4) Assessment of hazardous impact on public health and social costs associated with
automobile emissions,
5) Scenario analysis of environmental impact of diesel passenger cars, and
6) Responsibility of automakers in reducing emissions from diesel vehicles.
As seen in agenda setting for the Environment Commission, it could be expected that
the MOE would trade lowered emission standards for new diesel passenger cars (Agenda 5)
for adjustments to agenda items 1, 2, and 3. The MOE did not want to link the Special Act
to the issue of diesel passenger cars yet, even though the MOE had considerable difficulty
negotiating with other Ministries within the government during that time. The Alliance
shared many interests in the trade offs involved.
Automakers could be allowed to manufacture diesel passenger cars as soon as
possible by showing the MOE and the Alliance their will to reduce emissions from their
vehicles. However, governmental decisions on fuel prices and fuel quality issues belonged
to the MOCIE and the MOF. And those issues were also very critical to automakers and oil
industries. All decisions hinged on the scenario analysis of environmental impact (Agenda
item 5). There were sufficient multiple and clear issues to enable trade offs among the
negotiating parties.
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15: Supporting organizations with implementation power
Once betrayed by the MOCIE and automakers, the Alliance needed to know from the
MOE exactly what kind of authority the new Commission would have before they decided
to join it. The Alliance did not want the MOCIE and other higher-ups to be able to sabotage
any agreement the Commission might have painstakingly formulated. Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa,
the director of the air bureau at the MOE answered this question: 270
"We should make clear the characteristics, authority, and decision rule of this
Commission first. First, this Commission will strive for consensus. With that
consensus agreement, the MOE will negotiate with other economic Ministries. I
mean the MOE will support the consensus agreement. If there is no consensus
in this Commission, I will make afinal decision. Ifyou don't like to discuss, you
may go. You may make demonstrations or write columns to the media. But, the
final decision will be made by the government. While the Environment
Commission has the MOE as a member, there are other governmental agencies
outside. Let's make a consensus and report it to them. If they don't agree with
that, the MOE will take its own step. "
With strong assurances from the MOE, the Alliance joined the Environment
Commission.
However, while decisions on emission standards could be made by the MOE,
decisions on fuel prices and quality were made by the MOF and the MOCIE. Thus, it was
uncertain whether the MOE could get what it wanted from other Ministries through
negotiations in the Environment Commission. Furthermore, even if the Environment
Commission was successful in making a consensus agreement proposal, the proposal would
have to be reviewed at the RRC and Ministerial meetings for the economy, where economic
rationales dominated the atmosphere.
270 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa on April 15, 2005.
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Even though the MOF and the MOCIE acknowledged the existence of the
Environment Commission and promised to consider any consensus agreement positively,
they could not promise that the consensus proposal would become the final governmental
decision.
16: Financial support for process
There was no special budget earmarked for the operation of the Environment
Commission. Even though the MOE offered some working fees for the Alliance, the
Alliance declined the offer on the ground that they came to the Commission in order to
share decision power with governments as an equal partner rather than as just a consultant.
However, any research effort by experts from any association was financed by the MOE.
Other miscellaneous costs for managing the processes were also covered by the MOE.
17: Time pressure and deadline
The Ministerial meeting for Economy in December 2002 set the deadline for any
conclusion as February 15, 2003. Participants had only one month left to make any progress
in collaboration. This was insufficient time to have experts produce meaningful
scientific and technical information on which effective decisions could be made. The
looming deadline forced committee members to spend more than ten hours a day
collaborating for many days.
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Deliberation factors in the consensus-building process
This section assesses the deliberation factors of the Environment Commission by
reviewing the negotiation process from the first meeting to the final consensus agreement.
The first meeting (January 11, 2003)
The first meeting kicked off with an opening address by the Minister Kim, Myung-Ja
of the MOE on January 11, 2003. In that address, she expressed hope for "social
consensus" on every decision agenda item in the Environment Commission:
"I expect the Environment Commission to mark a turning point in public
administration in South Korea by building a 'social consensus' on every issue
associated with diesel vehicles, as well as fuel prices and industrial
policies...Basically, the MOE has consistent positions on diesel passenger cars.
First, diesel passenger cars cannot be allowed, if those vehicles will affect air
quality negatively. Second, we should adjust the energy price system, improve
fuel quality, andformulate and implement comprehensive policies for general
diesel vehicles as the preconditions for diesel passenger cars. I think that most
government agencies and industries already understand many parts of this story.
The MOE will try its best, when we negotiate with other Ministries, in order to
make sure that any consensus agreement from this Commission can be taken
as much as possible as the final government decision.... Finally, I hope this
Commission will be a model for new Governance based on private-public
partnership."
The first meeting was set up to discuss the name of the Commission, select a
chairperson, finalize a discussion agenda, assign members to each agenda item
according to their expertise, and decide the schedule for upcoming meetings.
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D1: Setting a ground rule by participants
Participants appointed Mr. Koh from the MOE as the chair of the Environment
Commission, set a discussion agenda, and agreed to try to reach consensus. They decided to
meet every week and have additional meetings if necessary. However, they did not discuss
other rules about process management together, such as how to control emotions and how
to raise their concerns. The most important decision rule was to build consensus. Mr. Koh
emphasized the importance of consensus at the first meeting: 271
"We (the participants) talked a lot about decision rule in the Environment
Commission. I emphasized several times that the decision would not be made by
majority vote, but only by consensus. It should be a unanimous consensus. "
The second meeting (January 17, 2003)
The Joint Commission of 2002 took on a comprehensive range of issues regarding
diesel passenger cars and had an accordingly broad group of stakeholders. However, the
detailed discussions at the Joint Commission were mainly about diesel RVs. There was not
enough knowledge or information to discuss diesel passenger cars, especially for
environmental groups. When Mr. Koh tried to persuade the Alliance to join an
Environment Commission, he encouraged them to see how technology was developing and
how emissions would be changed according to the scenarios. In other words, Mr. Koh
271 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa on April 15, 2005.
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thought there needed to be a learning process throughout the deliberation process: 272
"At the negotiation table, people can negotiate only when they have similar
levels of knowledge. The participants should learn technical issues first, from
the structure of diesel engines to characteristics of emissions from diesel
engines, to the death rate associated with PMo1 , to social costs due to air
pollution, and to the trend of technological development of automobiles. "
Thus, from the second meeting, experts were invited to present their knowledge to the
participants. Mr. Chung, Yong-II, a senior researcher from KIMM (the Korea Institute of
Machinery and Materials), presented the intensification of automobile emission standards
in South Korea according to technological development. He also explained the core
technology of the DPF (Diesel Particulate Filter), the current status of DPF development in
South Korea, the comparisons with other countries' situations, and the potential of DPF as
an end-of-pipe technology that could reduce PM 0o emissions from diesel vehicles.
Mr. Chung was the person who wrote the controversial policy report on the future
emission standards for new diesel passenger cars in 1999 for the MOE and KAMA. His
position on diesel passenger cars was clear from his comments in a public forum, in a
policy report, and in his presentation. Basically, he was on the same page with automakers
in that he viewed diesel passenger cars as the future in terms of automobile technology, and
believed the domestic market for diesel passenger cars was necessary to develop export to
European markets. However, he was also concerned about the increase of PM10 and NOx
due to the transition from gasoline passenger cars to diesel, if diesel passenger cars were
allowed to be sold without any countermeasures. For this reason he was also in agreement
272 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa on April 15, 2005.
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with the MOE, believing that there should be a comprehensive framework to reduce PMlo
and NOx emissions from general automobiles. He supported the Special Act for Seoul
metropolitan air quality management for that reason. Finally, he argued that automakers
were willing to invest more money to develop clean technologies for their automobiles.
Considering his comments, his position was very neutral and balanced.
Professor Park, Shim-Soo presented the new technology of clean diesel engines. An
expert on automobile technology, he had been nominated by Hyundai (Kia) as their expert
in the Joint Commission and seemed ti represent their position in the Environment
Commission. He explained HSDI (High Speed Direct Injection) diesel engines and how
clean they were. He showed how European countries favored diesel passenger cars and why
they did. Lastly, he discussed in great detail how automakers planned to reduce emissions
from their diesel vehicles. When he showed how much emissions could be reduced by free
emission inspections, the data was challenged as unclear and unsubstantiated by the expert
from the Alliance.
The next presentation was made by the MOE. An official from the MOE explained
the current energy tax system on fuels and asserted the necessity of adjusting the current
system. However, he acknowledged the potential problems of raising diesel fuel prices.
These included the resistance of freight transportation industries, and increased fares for
public transportation, such as buses. He also showed what other research institutes
suggested in terms of an energy price system (Table 8-3).
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Table 8-3. Comparison of proposals on energy fuel price system
Fuel Current level Government plan KEI and KIET 274
(January 2003) (July 2006) KIPF273
Gasoline 100 100 100 100
Diesel 58 75 85 80-85
LPG 43 60 50 44-47
Note: KEI: Korea Environment Institute
KIPF: Korea Institute of Public Finance
KIET: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade
Also, he announced that the MOE would consult the Korean Gallup poll for market
information on consumer's choice for automobiles according to fuel prices. Based on the
poll, the MOE was supposed to conduct a scenario analysis on the environmental impact of
diesel passenger cars and show the result to the participants in the following meetings.
Finally, he explained the MOE's plan to reduce emissions from general diesel vehicles and
to improve diesel fuel quality from 430 ppm in 2003 to 50 or 30 ppm in the near future.
Control of fuel quality had been in the hands of the MOE since 1991, when the Clean Air
Conservation Act included a stipulation to regulate the quality of fuel associated with
emissions from automobiles.
273 The report was issued in November 2002.
274 The report was issued in November 2002.
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(relative ratio)
The third meeting (January 22, 2003)
The third meeting, held at the YMCA building, lasted seven hours.
D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
In the Environment Commission, the MOE was in a very delicate position. It had to
seek the greatest environmental benefits, but at the same time it represented the government,
including the MOF, and the MOCIE. The MOE was required to communicate and
coordinate with these other Ministries during the Environment Commission. When the
Alliance requested too much, the MOE's role was to lower their expectations. Thus, in this
structure of negotiations, it was very important for the MOE to communicate well with
other Ministries.
The MOE often explained the situation inside the government so that other
Committee members could adjust their discussions. For example, the MOE let the
Environment Commission know the positions of the MOF and the MOCIE regarding the
energy fuel price system.
The MOF already had a government plan to adjust the energy fuel price system,
which aimed at a ratio of 100 (Gasoline): 75 (Diesel): 60 (LPG) by 2006. Because that plan
had been difficult to negotiate with industry, the MOF did not want to amend it before 2006.
If the MOF changed the plan, it would meet strong resistance from bus, taxi, and freight
companies. The MOCIE had to consider the impact on industries. It wanted to decrease the
price of LPG rather than increase diesel price to the level of 100 (Gasoline): 75 (Diesel): 50
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(LPG). The MOCT also argued that increasing diesel fuel prices was impossible. In fact, it
insisted on lowering diesel fuel prices for bus, taxi, and freight companies.
The MOE also explained how industries were thinking about major issues (Table 8-4)
Table 8-4. The positions of industries on diesel passenger cars and energy price system
Industries Name Diesel passenger cars Energy price system
Oil industries SK Neutral, but don't understand Current government
why diesel passenger cars plan (100:75:60) by
should be allowed 2006
But never decrease
LPG price
LG No diesel passenger cars Current government
-concern for air pollution plan (100:75:60) by
-possible burden to improve 2006
diesel fuel quality But never decrease
-economic loss due to LPG price
decreased sales of gasoline
fuels
S-Oil Agree Follow any
government decision
Hyundai Agree Follow any
government decision
LPG SK gas Diesel passenger cars, only if LPG should be 44-
industries LG gas LPG prices down 47% of gasoline price.
-Concerned about decreased
demand of LPG (due to
transition of LPG taxis to
diesel Taxis)
-Taxi account for 50% LPG
demand
Automakers Hyundai (Kia) '04 EURO-3, '05 EURO-4 Current government
To establish domestic market plan (100:75:60) by
for basis for export 2006
To prepare CO2 convention - if diesel fuel price is
To develop clean diesel more than 85% of
technology gasoline price, little
benefit from sales of
diesel passenger cars
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GM Daewoo
Renault
Samsung
Ssangyong
'06 EURO-4
If EURO-3 before 2006, there
will be more air pollution by
increased diesel passenger cars
And unfair competition among
automakers
'05 EURO-4
If EURO-3 before 2005, unfair
competition
'06 EURO-4
If before 06, unfair
competition among
automakers
Current government
plan (100:75:60) by
2006
Current government
plan (100:75:60) by
2006
Current government
plan (100:75:60 by
2006)
D3: Joint Fact-Finding
The most critical decision at the Environment Commission was about 1) which level
of emission standards for new diesel passenger cars should be introduced, 2) when, and 3)
how it would fit into the energy fuel price ratio. To reach rational decisions on this complex
web of issues, Committee members needed to conduct scenario analysis which would show
how emissions would change in various scenarios with three variables (which level, when,
meeting what price-ratio conditions).
The first question was which vehicle types consumers would choose to buy given
certain ratios of fuel prices. The MOE reviewed the report of the Korea Gallup poll
research on the transition rate of vehicle types. However, the Environment Commission but
not automakers reviewed the questionnaire before Korean Gallup conducted the research.
Later, when a staff member had an opportunity to review the questions, he thought the
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questions were designed to induce certain answers; he did not appeal to the Committee
members at that time. 275
The fourth meeting (January 29, 2003)
The fourth meeting was held for four hours and 20 minutes. At this meeting, the MOE
explained its zero-or low-emission vehicles policies to the participants, and proposed long-
term research on environmental impact on public health from automobile emissions with a
budget of US 10 million dollars. Mr. Koh emphasized the importance of this kind of
research as necessary evidence in pursuing air pollution policies.
The fifth meeting (February 4, 2003)
The Committee members spent more than eight hours at the fifth meeting. They
reviewed the scenario analysis presented by the MOE. From this meeting, the MOE seemed
to suggest a ratio of fuel prices at 100 (Gasoline): 85 (Diesel): 50 (LPG). In addition, the
MOE laid out options for each variable: 1) emission standards and introductory time, 2)
transition rate among vehicle types, and 3) energy price system.
1) Scenarios of emission standards and its introductory time
* Scenario 1: In 2004, EURO-3 and in 2006, EURO-4
275 Interview with an officer from Hyundai.
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* Scenario 2: In 2004, EURO-3, but only limited quantity will be sold (by quarter
system) and tax incentive for DPF installation, and in 2006, EURO-4.
* Scenario 3: In 2006, EURO-4
Transition rate among vehicle types according to energe price system
* Transition rate 1: From Korea Gallup poll
Transition Scenario (%)
100:75:60 100:85:50 100:95:55
Gasoline passenger cars -) diesel passenger cars 24.2 9.9 3.7
Diesel RVs - diesel passenger cars 24.0 4.7 1.4
LPG RVs - diesel passenger cars 15.0 6.0 4.5
LPG RVs - diesel RVs 13.4 5.4 4.1
LPG RVs - gasoline passenger cars 16.0 19.8 20.02
Transition rate 2: More realitic transition (adjust to increase transition rate for diesel
passenger cars)
vleset Kvs ~ alesei passenger cars 24.U 4.1 1.4
LPG RVs - diesel passenger cars 15.0 6.0 4.5
LPG RVs - diesel RVs 13.4 5.4 4.1
LPG RVs - gasoline passenger cars 16.0 19.8 20.02
Assumption 1: In the poll, most people, who did not want to buy diesel passenger cars,
indicated that diesel passenger cars would generate dirtier emissions, and have noise
problems. If those people realized that new diesel passenger cars don't have such problems
many more of them might buy more diesel passenger cars in reality.
Assumption 2: For the first year, 50,000 diesel passenger cars will be sold, and for the
second year, 150,000 cars will be sold.
Assumption 3: Adjustment of fuel price will be finished by July 2006.
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With those variables, emissions changes were estimated according to six
encompassing scenarios. (Table 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10).
Table 8-5. Scenario A: 2004 EURO-3, 2006 EURO-4 + no comprehensive policies for
diesel vehicles
2003 2012
100:75:60 100:85:50 100:95:55
Emissions Change Emissions Change Emissions Change
.... Tota . .(Ton) (%) (Ton) (%) (Ton) (%)
Total 829 787 -5.1 812 -2.1 821 -1.0
Transition CO 450 408 -9.3 431 -4.3 439 -2.5
rate 1 HC 52 51 -3.6 52 -0.8 53 0.7
NOx 312 313 314 314
PM 15 16 15 15
Total 829 771 -7.0 785 -5.4 803 -3.1
Transition CO 450 394 -12.4 406 -9.8 422 -6.1
rate 2 HC 52 49 -5.7 50 -4.5 52 -1.7
NOx 312 312 313 314
PM 15 16 16 15
Table 8-6. Scenario B: 2004 EURO-3, 2006 EURO-4 + comprehensive policies for diesel
vehicles
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
2003
829
450
52
312
15
829
450
52
312
15
_i::-l~~~'1n~:li ~
Emissions
775
400
50
312
14
758
384
48
312
14
-6.5
-11.2
-5.4
-a
-8.6
-14.6
-7.9
:001 94:55
Emissions
806
427
52
313
14
11.4 -4.11.4
-6.0
II
774
399
49
313
14
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Change
-2.9
-5.1
-1.6tl
-6.6
Emissions
.(Ton)
817
437
53
313
14
796
418
51
313
14
Change(%)
-1.5
-2.9
0.3
::"--: : i;;;:  i;-_ :1- :_--i;:_ i ; .; _: i i ;-.i;i,;;i ii-;  i: -  -' ::_- :-._   . li·-i-__i:-
Transition
rate 1
Transition
rate 2
:- --;
; i i : . I
i i i:
1001 .50SO
774 -6.6 4.0
t I ,I
-4.0
Table 8-7. Scenario C: 2004 EURO-3 with limited quantity and DPF, 2006 EURO-4 + no
comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles
2003 2012
100:75:60 100:85:50 100:95:55
Emissions Change Emissions Change Emissions Change
(Ton) (%) (Ton) (%) (Ton) (%)
Total 829 787 -5.1 812 -2.1 821 -1.0
Transition CO 450 408 -9.3 431 -4.2 439 -2.4
rate 1 HC 52 51 -3.6 52 -0.9 53 0.5
NOx 312 312 313 314
PM 15 15 15 .15
Total 829 773 -6.8 787 -5.1 805 -2.9
Transition CO 450 396 -12.0 408 -9.3 425 -5.6
rate 2 HC 52 50 -5.5 50 -4.3 52 -1.6
NOx 312 312 313 313
PM 15 16 1 161 15
Table 8-8. Scenario D: 2004 EURO-3 with limited quantity and DPF, 2006 EURO-4 +
comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
2003
829
450
52
312
15
829
450
52
312
15
100:75:60
Emissions
(Ton)
776
400
50
312
14
758
384
48
312
14
Change
(%),
-6.5
-11.0
-5.4
-I
-8.3
-14.0
-7 5
2012
Emissions
(Ton)
804
427
52
313
14
-6.2
-10.6
-5.6
a
402
50
312
14
Change
-3.1
-5.7
-1.7
Emissions
(Ton)
817
438
53
313
14
421
51
313
14
Table 8-9. Scenario E: 2006 EURO-4 + no comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles
2003
100:95:55
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Change
(%)
-1.5
-2.7
0.3A1
-6.4
-2.7
M
Transition
rate 1
Transition
rate 2
100:8 :50 100:95:55
m
777 799 -3.7
Emissions Change Emissions Change Emissions Change
(Ton) (%) (Ton) (%) (Ton) (%)
Total 829 788 -4.9 813 -1.9 823 -0.8
Transition CO 450 410 -8.8 434 -3.7 442 -1.7
rate 1 HC 52 51 -3.4 52 -0.8 53 0.4
NOx 312 312 . 313 0.. 313 01
PM 15 15 15 15
Total 829 769 -7.3 791 -4.7 810 -2.3
Transition CO 450 393 -12.8 413 -8.3 431 -4.2
rate 2 HC 52 49 -6.1 50 -3.9 52 -1.3
NOx 312 311 * 312 312
PM 15 16 15 15
Table 8-10. Scenario F: 2006 EURO-4 + comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
Total
CO
HC
NOx
PM
2003
829
450
52
312
15
829
450
52
312
15
:001 74:60
Emissions
(Ton)
778
403
50
312
14
756
382
48
311
14
Change
(%)
-6.2
-10.5
-5.2
_d
-8.9
-15.0
-R 4
Emissions
(Ton)
809
431
52
312
14
772
2012
Emissions(Ton)
820
441
52
313
14
-6.9 -4.6
-8.0
-4.1A
791
397
49
312
14
Change
(%)
-2.5
-4.3
-1.4|I$
-11.7
-6.7
i
414
50
313
14
According to this scenario analysis, it seems that scenarios A, C, E which included no
comprehensive policies for diesel vehicles, would lead to increased NOx and PM levels in
2012. However, in scenarios with comprehensive policies for diesel vehicies (B, D, F), the
PM level would be reduced in 2012.
In terms of PM10, the ratio of 100:85:50 resulted in more reduction than the ratio of
100:75:60. For NOx, the ratio of 100:75:60 showed better results than the ratio of
100:85:50.
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Change
-1.2
-2.0
0.1
-9
Transition
rate 1
Transition
rate 2
0 
5:48:001
55:59:001
-6.9 - .
Based on the scenario analysis, the Committee temporarily decided to aim at the ratio
of 100:85-95:47-55. However, there were some other options as well. These included:
1) '04 EURO-3, '06 EURO-4 (original scenario):favor Hyundai (Kia)
2) '05 EURO-4 (before 2005, quarter system and certain percentage of DPF) (added
scenario): favor Renault Samsung
3)'06 EURO-4 (original scenario): favor Daewoo and Ssangyong
4)'06 EURO-4 (more than 80% DPF) (added scenario)
5) Only if there is 50 jtg/m 3 in terms of PMlo then consider diesel passenger cars.
(added scenario): favor environmental groups
The new options were created to bolster other automakers' positions. While they
decided to prepare a final draft of the consensus agreement by February 8, 2003, there was
not enough time to conduct scenario analysis for each of the five options.
Public forum (February 6, 2003)
As the Committee members planned, there was a public forum, in which the excluded
parties, such as industries, the MOCIE, and the MOF also participated, on February 6. The
forum continued for three hours and 20 minutes at the Korea Environment Institute.
However the forum was designed to present what the Committee members discussed
so far and to hear what other industries would say about the issues, not to discuss the issues
with them. They did not have time to hear quarrels among industries. Every industry
associated with the issues came to the forum, including automakers, oil industries, and gas
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industries. However, from other Ministries, only one low-level official from the MOCIE
participated as an observer, which showed that other Ministries were either ignoring the
Environment Commission, or misjudging its importance.
The Environment Commission had less than a week to hammer out a consensus and
pass the agreement proposal first to the government and finally to the Ministerial meeting
for a final decision before the new administration began on February 25, 2003. No one
knew what would happen to their decisions if they were reassessed by a new administration.
The sixth meeting (February 8, 2003)
With the deadline coming up, the members of the Environment Commission spent
almost ten hours in the sixth meeting on February 8, 2003. Fortunately, an email, sent by
Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon, a leader of KFEM, and circulated among the Committee members
right before the sixth meeting opened is available. He is believed to be an entrepreneur for
consensus building in the Environment Commission. It is useful to read what he thought
about the process at that time:
"From Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon on February 8, 2003...
For efficient discussion for today's meeting, I think the proposal below is
rational for our consensus agreement. Although I want more as an
environmentalist, but there is always other side and we need coordination. It
should seem rational to the outside too...
[To introduce diesel passenger cars, the PM level should be lowered first. So,
the government should strengthen ambient air quality criteria ofPMlo from 70
,ug/m3 per year to 50 tg/m 3per year. In terms offuel quality, the level of 50
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ppm of sulfur content in dieselfuels should be achieved by at least 2006. To
make sure those policies will be implemented, the government should enact the
Special Act and secure the budget for the Act. In terms of emission standards for
diesel passenger cars, I propose EURO-4 in 2006 with 100.85.50 ratios offuel
prices. But, to force the automakers to develop clean technologies and DPF
technologies, EURO-3 standards can be introduced in 2004 (or 2005) on the
contingent upon ()% of diesel passenger cars with DPF installed, and/or
certain numbers of diesel passenger cars being sold. In that scenario, ( ) (kg)
of emissions will be generated so that there will be no problem for air quality,
or () % increase but very little problem. But given already serious air pollution,
the government should implement special measures to reduce more than that
amount of emissions in 2004 and 2005 with the help of automakers. If there is
more than 50 Pug/m3 in 2006, in spite of these measures, the government should
limit the sales of diesel passenger cars in certain regions, according to the
Special act, or there should be a voluntary agreement between the government
and automakers to limit the production of diesel passenger cars. This is the best
option to improve air quality and induce automakers to be more
environmentally friendly. We request help from other Ministries. The bottom
line is that the government should prepare all kinds of safeguards and resolve
the problem of large diesel and diesel R Vs earlier before diesel passenger cars
can be sold. We also considered the CO2 issue in our deliberation.]"
At the beginning of the meeting, the MOE was informed that the MOF and the
MOCIE did not want to change the original government plan to adjust the energy price
system (by 2006 to 100:76:60) for fear that bus and freight companies would strongly resist
any increase. However, these Ministries were open to adjustment after 2006. That was a
dangerous signal to the Environment Commission.
However, the Committee decided to stick to the option of 100:85:50 by 2006. They
had to re-analyze the scenario analysis of emissions change according to the five options of
emission standards including their potential introduction timing. At that point the
assessment was not yet finished.
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The seventh meeting (February 10, 2003)
At the seventh meeting for three-and-a-half hours, the members of the Commission
confirmed that they wanted an energy price system ratio of 100:85:50. Then, they adjusted
the options of emission standards and their introduction times again:
1) '04 EURO-3, '06 EURO-4
2) '04 EURO-3.5, '06 EURO-4
3) '04 EURO-3.5 (limited quantity), '06 EURO-4
4) '06 EURO-4
5) '06 EURO-4 (more than 80% DPF)
The eighth meeting (February 14, 2003)
Finally, one day was left before the deadline set by the Ministerial meeting for
economy at the end of 2002. The members of the Environment Commission gathered at the
YMCA building to hammer out a consensus agreement on February 14, 2003. It was not
easy to write; the meeting lasted more than seven hours. At almost midnight, Mr. Koh from
the MOE and Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon from the Alliance declared that they had a consensus
agreement (Box 8-2).
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Box 8-2. Consensus Agreement from the Environment Commission
(February 14, 2002)
I.Strengthen ambient air quality criteria of PM 10 from 70 pg/m3 per year to 50 pg/m3 per
year.
2.Implement comprehensive plans to reduce emissions from diesel vehicles.
3.Adjust energy price system to 100 {Gasoline):85 {Diesel):50 (LPG) (Original goven1ment
plan is to achieve 100:75:60 by July 2006) in order to prevent rapid transition from
gasoline to diesel passenger cars and prevent the number of diesel RVs from increasing.
4.Reduce sulfur content of diesel fuels from current 430 ppm to 30 ppm in 2006. Apply
positive incentive as tax exemption for oil industries that achieve 50 ppm sulfur content in
2004 or distributors of such fuels.
5 .Enact the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan area as soon as possible. (Amend the
Environment Improvement Charf!e Act in order to secure the budget for urban air quality
management. At least 50% should be used for urban air quality management. As the mid
or long term, the Environment Improvement Charge should be levied on fuel prices.
6.Amend regulation in order to expand tax reduction, subsidy for Electric Hybrid cars, DPF
diesel cars, CNG, LPG vehicles.
7.If those preconditions are sure to be met, the emission standards for new diesel passenger
cars will be lowered to the level of EURO-4 in 2006. 80% of these dieselpasseneer cars~
should be installed with DPF with tax subsidv policv. (We propose two options of
Phase-in policv of diese/passeneer cars in 2005. 1) 50% of EURO-3 vehicles and 50%
of EURO-4 vehicles and 50% oft/lOse vehicles with DPF: 2) EURO-3 vehicles with
DPF. or EURO-4 vehicles)
Right after the meeting, Mr. lang, lae- Yeon said, "This consensus is very meaningful
in that environmental groups, experts, and the government successfully built social
consensus in formulating public policy decisions for the first time in environmental
regulatory history in South Korea." However, other government agencies were waiting to
. h 276reVIew t e consensus agreement.
276 It is said that the MOE, right before the final agreement by the Environment Commission, offered one
alternative to all auto industries and persuaded them to accept the offer. The offer was I) earlier introduction
of EURO-3 vehicles from July 2004, 2) then since January 2005, EURO-3 and EURO-4 together, but with
quarter system (only 80,000 vehicles with Euro 3 during 2004-2005 to minimize damage to other automakers,
which were not advanced in engine development such as Samsung, Daewoo, Ssangyong. But the other
automakers said no to the offer, because that offer would still damage their companies. This small caucus
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It was hard labor!
At this point, it becomes difficult to ascertain who said exactly what in which
situations in meetings of the Environment Commission. However, it is certain that the
consensus building was very difficult. One might think that consensus building would be
much easier when those clearly in opposition were excluded from the negotiations.
Interviews with the participants demonstrated this supposition to be totally wrong.
First of all, the MOE struggled to mediate between environmental groups and the
MOF and the MOCIE, who did not participate in the Commission. The MOE had to go
back and forth between them, but not to let either know what was going on. Sometimes
members of the Alliance requested too much in return for allowing diesel passenger cars. In
that case, officials had to persuade environmental groups not to press too hard. 277 Mr. Ahn,
Moon-Soo from the MOE confessed several times at the end of the meetings:
"I wished the Commission would be broken, because it was too tough and time
278,,
consuming.
Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon also remembered difficult times:2 79
"Wefinally succeeded in formulating the consensus agreement with almost ten
meetings lasting almost one hundred hours. We sometimes deliberated more
between auto industries and the MOE was convened by the MOE to coordinate auto industries' positions
because there was no unified association representing for all of them. The MOE expected that the
recommendation from the Environment Commission would be altered in some way through economic
ministerial meetings and by pressure from industries. But the MOE's effort was criticized as non-transparent,
given that there was an official channel for negotiation inside the Commission, even though among all 15
people in the Commission, there was none to represent industries.
7 For example, some members of the Alliance argued that energy price should be adjusted to 100:85:50
starting 2005. But, the MOE should say it could not decide the time to change.278 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo on June 20, 2005.279 Interview with Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon on July 8, 2004.
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than ten hours a day up to midnight. I drafted the consensus agreement. At the
critical points when several members of environmental groups and experts did
no want to endorse the consensus agreement and wanted to give up building a
consensus, I did not give up and persuaded them to endorse it to the last point...
Once, four members bluffed among nine members. For some issues, three
members did want to break the Commission."
Mr. Min, Man-Ki, another environmental group leader, hinted why it was difficult to
strike a balance during the Environment Commission2 80 :
"While it could be expected that the negotiation would be easy without the
MOCIE and industries, there was also difficulty in building consensus. There
was a big difference in terms of what is right and wrong to justify something
important. Also there was a different perspective on what was a balance, or
where a balance point was between environment and economy among
participants. "
The list of participants, their statements during the Environment Commission, and the
interviews reveal three or four environmental hardliners, as well as two or three experts
biased toward automakers and other industries. Other experts seemed neutral and had
balanced positions.
D2: Fair management of the process
According to the interviews with participants, the management of the process by the
chair, Mr. Koh, was generally fair. Everyone had an equal opportunity to raise their
concerns and gain the same access to the information that they generated. They felt they
were respected in deliberations.
280 Interview with Mr. Min, Man-Ki on June 10, 2005.
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High-level government meetings alter the agreement
The consensus agreement dated February 14, 2003 fron1 the Environment
Commission went through the review process among other Ministries and was reviewed
again at the Ministerial meeting for Economy. This was also the first Ministerial meeting
for the new administration on March 26, 2003. The agreement was finally submitted to the
first Presidential meeting for economic policy on March 27, 2003.
The next day, the media announced that a final governmental decision had been made
at the Presidential meeting and added that it had been based on the consensus agreement
from the Environment Commission (Table 8-11).
Table 8-11. Comparison between the consensus agreement and the final goven1ment
decision
The Consensus Agreement from The
Environment Commission (February 14,
2003
Strengthen ambient air quality criteria ofPMIO
from 701m3 er ear to 501m3 er ear.
Implement comprehensive plans to reduce
emissions from diesel vehicles.
Adjust energy price system to 100
(Gasoline):85 (Diese/):50 (LPG) (Original
government plan is to achieve 100:75 :60 by July
2006) in order to prevent rapid transition from
gasoline to diesel passenger cars and prevent the
number of diesel RVs from increasing.
Reduce sulfur content of diesel fuels from
current 430 ppm to 30 ppm in 2006. Apply
positive incentives such as tax exemption for oil
industries that achieve 50 ppm sulfur content in
2004 or distributors of such fuels.
Final decision from the Presidential
meeting for economic policy (March 27,
2003
Implement comprehensive plans to reduce
emissions from diesel vehicles.
Adjust energy price system to an international
level. contineent IIDOnthe review of how InallV
'diesel Dasseneer cars are sold in 2005.
Reduce sulfur content of diesel fuels from
current 430 ppm to 30 ppm in 2006. Apply
positive incentives such as tax exemption for oil
industries that achieve 50 ppm sulfur content in
12005or distributors of such fuels.
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Ellact the Special Act for Seollimetropolitan Organize the Task Force, including experts, civic
area as SOOIl as possible. (Amend the groups, and industries in April in order to
Environment Improvement Charee Act in order fonnulate the content of the Special Act for
to secure thc budgct for urban air quality Seoul metropolitan air quality management and
management. At least 500/0 should be used for decide when itwillbe enacted. That decision
urban air quality management. In the mid or shollid be made within 2003 (Prepare the
long tenn, the Environment Improvement blld!!etfor the Special Act through coordination
Charge should be levied on fuel prices. among relevant Ministries)
Amend regulation in order to expand tax Tax support to develop and distribute zero and
reduction, subsidy for Electric Hybrid cars, DPF low emissions vehicles such as CNG, LPG,
diesel cars, CNG, LPG vehicles. electric and electric hybrid vehicles (consider
subsidy to facilitateinstallment of DPF for
diesel passenger cars)
If those preconditions are sure to be met, the Allow the sales of diesel passenger cars in South
emission standards for new diesel passenger cars Korea startin!!2005. In 2005. EURO-3 vehicles
will be lowered to the level of EURO-4 in 2006. will be sold and in 2006. EURO-4 vehicles will
80% of these diesel passen!!er cars shollid be be sold. But, 50% automobile tax reduction for
installed with DPF with tax sllbsidv policv. diesel passenger cars which can satisfy EURO-4
(We propose two options of Phase-in policv of emission standards so that in 2005, EURO-3 and
diesel passen!!er cars in 2005. 1) 50% of EURO-4 diesel passenger cars can be sold
EURO-3 vehicles and 50% ofEURO-4 vehicles together (consider disincentive for diesel
and 50% oft/lOse vehicles with DPF: 2) passenger cars and diesel RV s to prevent rapid
EURO-3 vehicles with DPF. or EURO-4 transition from gasoline passenger ears to diesel
vehicles) passenger cars)
The MOE will amend regulations of the clean
air conservation act by the end of June, 2003.
In fact,the reviews had produced some changes in the original consensus agreement.
Even ifthe MaE promised to support the original consensus agreement at the Environment
Commission, the higher decision-making bodies had changed the content. Had the MaE
lied to the Committee members from the beginning? Or had the MaE just negotiated
poorly with other Ministries? Or had the other Ministries forced the MaE to change the
content?
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Turnover of the key personnel by the new administration (Change in
politics stream)
The questions above can be partly answered by analyzing the political situation at that
time. With the new administration starting on February 25, 2003, each Minister in every
cabinet would be replaced on February 27, 2003. That change of personnel added more
complexity and uncertainty to the system. The new Minister of Environment, Ms. Han,
Myung-Sook took over from Ms. Kim, Myung-Ja. Ms. Han had strong ties to civil NGOs
but she had not had enough time to follow the discussions or expertise regarding these
particular complex issues. In other Ministries, many public officials who oversaw related
issues were replaced, leading to the loss of a great deal of institutional memory.
When the Ministerial meeting was held on March 26, 2003, the Minister of
Environment did not strongly support the original consensus agreement. Even if Mr. Koh, a
director of the air bureau at the MOE, accompanied the Minister, his advice or comment at
the Ministerial meeting was checked and limited by other Ministers. 281
The MOCIE and the MOF take credit
The revisions on the consensus agreement were actually made jointly among the
Ministries before the Ministerial meeting. The issue of adjusting the energy price system
281 Interview with Professor Dong, Jong-In, an expert nominated by the Alliance, on June 2, 2005.
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and fuel quality was coordinated between the MOF and the MOCIE. The issue of the
budget for the Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality management required MOF
review.
Mr. Ahn, a former director at the transportation pollution department of the air bureau,
recollected the situation within the government 282 :
"When we (the MOE) got the consensus agreement from the Environment
Commission, we started negotiating with the MOCIE and the MOF. The first
meeting was between the directors from each Ministry. They just erased several
contents of the consensus agreement with a red pen on the spot. Their revisions
continued to the higher-level meetings with vice Ministers. We (the MOE) felt
that those Ministries bullied us. They (the MOF and the MOCIE) just took the
agreement on the sales of diesel passenger cars but blurred other agreements
associated with preconditions to that decision. There was no assurance to
implement those preconditions. It was more like a person did not pay the money
when he ate delicious food at a restaurant. We were very upset by their
attitude."
Into the conventional politics stream again
Dissatisfied with the announcement of the final government decisions on diesel
passenger cars, all Committee members except three MOE officials began to fiercely resist
the government decisions. Some people said that the Environment Commission had just
been used by the MOE to allow diesel passenger cars when they should have resisted them.
Others in the Alliance argued that if environmental rationales had been trumped by
economic rationales in this, the first case of environmental policy making in the new
administration, the future of environmental policies in this regime would be gloomy. Since
282 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo on June 20, 2005.
282
the Environment Commission did not exist any more, they resorted to tactics common to
the conventional politics stream, utilizing every political resource available.
First, some of the Committee members paid a protest visit 283 to the Office of the
Minister of Environment on April 1, 2003. They criticized Ms. Han for failing to take
responsibility for the agreement. They requested that the MOE try to mandate preconditions
for the sales of diesel passenger cars. They held a public rally with a slogan of "No diesel
passenger cars" on April 2, 2003. The next day, all the Committee member but three MOE
officials held a media conference on April 3, and issued a public statement, criticizing the
government decisions:
"The government announced that the final decision was based on the consensus
agreement of the Environment Commission on February 14, 2003 and air
quality improvement plans associated with the agreement would be
implemented. However, we are very surprised at the careful review of the final
government decisions. First of all, the spirit of the consensus agreement from
the Environment Commission was fundamentally ignored. Second, the
preconditions for the sales of diesel passenger cars were minimalized and
distorted....
If the final governmental decisions are implemented without a change, there
will be more serious air pollution problems, which will be a threat to the public
health and incur enormous social costs. Thus, we feel obliged to make this issue
known to the general public....
The major premise of the Environment Commission was to build a social
consensus on a win-win solution for both environment and economic
development by the principle that diesel passenger cars would be sold after air
283 In an interview with a stakeholder from an industry sector, he criticized the Alliance's activity as well as
the Minister of Environment, in that the MOE was captured by the environmental groups so easily. He
sarcastically commented, "how can environmental groups threaten face-to-face the Minster of Environment of
a nation? and also how can the Minister of Environment be swayed by the environmental groups' pressure?"
He kindly answered his own questions, by saying "You know what, right after Ms. Han, Myung-Sook was
appointed as the Minister of Environment, she went to every office of major environmental groups to greet its
leaders. If the Minister of a nation comes to their office by herself to introduce her, why not environmental
groups think themselves as powerful as the Minister of Environment? Why not other public officials at the
MOE try not to ignore the opinions of the environmental groups as their boss do?"
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quality was improved...
The Committee members considered not only environmental concerns but also
the economic and technical situations of industry sectors...
We proposed to enact The Special Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality
management as soon as possible. But, it was decided that there would be only
discussion for content and the time to enact. In terms of the energy price
system, the government just agreed with the oil industries about maintaining
the status quo. The government ignored the recommended 50:50% quarter
system of EURO-3 and EURO-4 cars with mandatory installment of DPF.
It is very regrettable that the new administration, called, 'Participatory
Government' disregarded the social consensus, reached very painstakingly by
the participation ofprivate-public stakeholders. Especially the Committee
members who spent huge amounts of time in building a consensus feel like they
are being insulted by the government decision...
The announcement from the Ministerial meeting or Presidential meeting is not
binding government decision. The MOE should have its own jurisdiction in
amending the regulation of emission standards for diesel passenger cars. The
MOE should make the right decision, which respects the consensus agreement. "
The Alliance representatives, who had been core members of the Environment
Commission, resisted the government collectively and strategically (Table 8-12). Their
strategies were public rallies, media conferences, and lobbying. The public rallies were
designed to blame automakers, the MOCIE, and the MOF, and to portray diesel passenger
cars as dirty cars.
Table 8-12. Activities of the Alliance in the conventional politics stream since April 2003
Date Activities
4.09 Paying a complaining visit to the MOF and meeting the Assistant Deputy Minister.
4.10 Second protest rally against diesel passenger cars.
4.17 Third public rally, body painting performance.
4.18 Meeting with the Minister of Environment
4.20 Campaign to get public signatures against diesel passenger cars on Earth day.
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4.23 Fourth public rally against diesel passenger cars.
5.06 Fifth public rally on the world asthma day.
Also upset by these decisions, the MOE made several strategic moves. First, on
March 31, 2003, the Ministry released to every media outlet the reference data showing that
the Seoul metropolitan area ranked the worst among major cities in all OECD countries in
terms of air pollution. The next day, major media began broadcasting to the public the
shameful score of the Seoul metropolitan area. One television news program went even
further, saying that the government should not have ignored societal consensus through
private and public partnerships (MBC news, March 28, 2003).
The legislature also took the side of the pro-environmental coalition. On April 14,
2003, the Committee of Environment and Labor at the National Assembly said that the
MOE should delay the amendment of the Clean Air Act for adjusting emission standards
for diesel passenger cars until all safeguard conditions were met. Furthermore, the
Committee decided to adopt a resolution to request the rapid enactment of the Special Act.
Taken aback by the strong resistance of the Alliance, the MOCIE suggested creating a
new task force with the MOE to discuss whether to adopt the Special Act or not by the end
of April 2003. The MOE declined the MOCIE's offer, saying that that the creation of a new
task force to discuss the issue would waste time, given that officials from both ministries
had already had many discussions. One MOE official took this opportunity to say that the
MOE could not postpone the Special Act any more, because it had already compromised
considerably with the MOCIE and industrial sectors on the issue of sales of diesel
passenger cars.
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Even President Noh, on April 2, 2003, promised the Minister of Environment that he
would resolve the disputes by convening an intergovernmental meeting unless consensus
could be reached on the safeguard options. He encouraged her to enact the Special Act at
any cost, because air pollution was a threat to public health that could be remedied. That
was a very decisive political blow to resistance of the MOCIE and the MOF to the Special
Act.
The MOE's linkage politics
Finally, on April 8, 2003, the MOE linked the issue of diesel passenger cars to the
enactment of the Special Act. It announced that if other Ministries would not cooperate in
supporting safeguard measures for allowing diesel passenger cars, the MOE would set aside
the adjustment of emission standards.
Originally, the MOE was not willing to link the Special Act to diesel passenger cars.
However, the Alliance strongly requested the MOE to make that linkage for the sake of
negotiation. Consider the interview with Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon from the Alliance, who took
the initiative in every step at the Environment Commission:
"When we (the Alliance) held a media conference and issued a public statement
on April 3, 2003, 1 drafted the public statement and read it for myself Besides
that, I was on the air in radio stations five times to strongly criticize the
government including the MOE. We met government officials in person and
almost threatened them by revealing the Alliance's potential extreme measures
such as suing the Ministers, and conducting public campaigns to expel
Ministers. We strongly persuaded them (the MOE) to link the Special Act with
diesel passenger cars. Finally, the MOE agreed to our advice and did not
amend the regulations of emission standards for new diesel passenger cars in
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May 2003. "
On April 18, 2003, the MOE conducted a public opinion survey regarding air
pollution in the Seoul metropolitan area and announced the result. Sixty percent of the
residents thought that air pollution in their area had reached a level critical enough to
threaten their health. Most importantly, 86.5 percent of the respondents thought that the
Special Act was necessary and should be enacted and implemented. As promised, the MOE
ignored the issue of adjusting emission standards for diesel passenger cars when it issued
advance notice of the amendment of regulations in the Clean Air Act on May 9, 2003. The
issue of diesel passenger cars and others were still unresolved. The relationships among
stakeholders became worse than before.
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Chapter Nine
Task Force (Round #3)
This chapter focuses on the decision-making process for the enactment of the Special
Act for Seoul metropolitan air quality management (hereafter, the Special Act), which had
been prepared by the MOE in 1999. Chapter 6 presented the MOE's preparation of the
Special Act as one of the two major changes in the policy stream in 1999.
One motivation for the preparation of the Special Act was to have new comprehensive
policy measures in place for a new cycle of long-term planning for 2003-2012. The
establishment of the new measures were designed to strengthen the air bureau of the MOE
with more funding and manpower. Another, more practical reason to pass the Special Act
was to prepare against the future challenge of diesel passenger cars. The MOE already
expected that they would allow the introduction of diesel passenger cars for a few strategic
reasons around 2002. Given the seriousness of air pollution that the MOE had monitored,
the MOE needed several approaches to minimizing the environmental impact of diesel
passenger cars. One major plan for that purpose was the Special Act. That's why the
Special Act included so many provisions on automobile pollution.284
The MOE's efforts to enact the Special Act during 2002 were relatively hidden from
the public, not only because there was more noticeable public dispute around issues of
diesel passenger cars and diesel RVs at almost the same time, but also because the MOE's
284 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo on June 20, 2005.
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moves happened mostly within the government.
However, the Special Act also got the public's attention when the MOE linked the
enactment of Special Act to the issue of whether to lower emission standards for new diesel
passenger cars in early 2003. As a result, the Task Force for the Special Act came into
being in June 2003 to build a consensus on the content of the Special Act.
An account of the conflicts among government Ministries around the Special Act in
the next section provides a background for further discussion of the Task Force
Controversial Special Act
Encouraged by the successful enactment of the Special Act for management of the
four major rivers in January 2002, the Minister of Environment, Ms. Kim, Myung-Ja, could
afford to focus on the MOE's next ambitious plan for urban air quality management
prepared by the air bureau of the MOE. In her annual report on the operations of the MOE
in March 2002, Ms. Kim presented the "Blue Sky 21 plan" (another name for the Special
Act) to President Kim, DJ. The MOE wished to enact the Special Act, if possible, before
this administration came to an end in December 2002, because there was no way to know
what kind of administration would come next, and how it would view air quality
management and related issues.
In the mean time, the air bureau of the MOE had become involved in the Joint
Commission and officials were spending most of their time in that process. The very next
day after the fourth meeting of the Joint Commission (July 24, 2002) in which the MOE
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almost finalized the consensus agreement on the diesel RV issue with automakers and the
Alliance, the MOE held a public forum on the improvement of Seoul metropolitan air
quality and announced the draft of the Special Act. By then, the Ministry had become so
absorbed in the Joint Commission that it could not afford to unilaterally enact the Special
Act.
For policy proposal to be enacted as a new Act, it must pass through more than ten
decision-making steps (Figure 9-1). Unlike an amendment, or creation of administrative
rules or regulations, the enactment of a new Act must be passed through the National
Assembly. Following the public forum, the MOE circulated the draft proposal of the
Special Act among other Ministries to elicit their comments on August 31, 2002. What the
MOE heard from these Ministries were not calls for coordination, but nearly coercive
recommendations not to initiate it.
The main framework of the Special Act was to 1) establish a total air pollution load
management system, 2) introduce an emission-trading system,285 and 3) stipulate
mandatory purchase of low-emission vehicles. To implement the Special Act in stages, the
MOE would need to invest 5.2 billion USD by 2012.
The Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) commented that the new Act was
unnecessary because the Clean Air Conservation Act already existed and that there could
not be a special budget or funding for the Special Act. The MOF also sent a negative signal
on the creation of a new budget for the Special Act. The MOCT lined up in opposition to
the proposal of the Special Act on the grounds that some of its provisions could prevent the
285 It is more like a cap-and-trade system in US Air Quality Management District (AQMD).
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construction in the Seoul metropolitan area of facilities or factories that might contribute to
exceeding the total load of specific air pollutants the Special Act would allow. The MOCT
also requested that all provisions associated with transportation should be removed. The
MOCIE maintained that the total load management system and emission-trading system
would impose a heavy burden on the industry sector located in the Seoul metropolitan area.
The MOCIE argued further that all provisions associated with energy should be erased.
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National Assembly
I More than 10 Assemblymen I Ministry
Coordination among Ministries
Advance Notice of the proposed Act
I Office for Government Policy Coordination
Ministerial meeting for Economy
Cabinet meeting with President
Regulation Reform Committee
Ministry of legislation
Vice Ministerial meeting
Cabinet meeting with President
National Assembly
Public hearing, if necessary
Sub-Committee review
Plenary Session and voting
Pronouncement of the new Act by President
Figure 9-1. Enactment process for a new Act
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Government
Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo, the former enforcement officer at the MOE, recollected his
frustration when he received these comments from other Ministries: 286
"The MOCIE sent almost a book-like report with their comments on every
article and provision. And, most comments said that this was not feasible, that
was not possible, because of this, and that. We (the MOE) were terribly
frustrated with that. We thought it might be impossible to enact this Act."
While the MOE had a hard time managing the Joint Commission due to the
unexpected RRC intervention, it was willing to adjust the Special Act proposal somewhat
based on the comments received in the coordination process. Taking another step toward
the enactment of the Special Act, in October 31, 2002 the MOE made an advance notice of
the proposal of the Special Act in order to elicit comment from the general public.
Soon, a new line of next stakeholder resistance emerged. 287 The Federation of Korean
Industries (FKI) requested that the MOE postpone introducing the total loading
management system of air pollutants until there was certainty in measuring the amount of
emissions from sources, and in establishing fair and objective criteria for the allotment of
total loading amounts to them. The FKI also suggested that if there were to be an Air
Quality Management Commission, the chair should be the Prime Minister rather than the
Minister of Environment. The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), another
industry association, commented that it opposed the enactment of the Special Act, though it
acknowledged the need to improve air quality. Its main reason for opposition was that the
286 Interview with Mr. Ahn, Moon-Soo on June 20, 2005.
287 One interesting comment from a citizen was that there should be a provision for mandatory telework in
order to reduce automobile driving between home and working places.
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regulations of the Special Act would reduce industrial activities with and prevent new
entrepreneurs from opening new businesses; 288 they also said that there was not enough
scientific data and methodology to implement the Special Act. KAMA also opposed
specific provisions regarding mandatory manufacture of low-emission vehicles. The Korea
Petroleum Association was opposed to the Special Act on the grounds that existing
regulations could perform the same functions it included. The most common themes in
comments from industry sectors were that industries needed lead time, that there should be
scientific backup, that compliance would impose too great financial burdens, and that the
chair of the new Commission should be a Prime Minister, not the Minister of Environment.
Many research institutes raise their voices in support of either the MOE or the
industrial sector. For example, the Korea Institute of Industry and Technology Information
(KIET) issued a report objecting to the regulation of industry, which in their view
contributed much less to air pollution than did automobiles.
Faced with such strong resistance, the MOE chose not to abandon its quest to enact
the Special Act within the DJ administration but agreed to adjust its original plan and still
send it to the National Assembly by the end of 2002.
288 The KCCI released its report that the new Act would cost to each industry sector about $2 million as
capital costs and $0.6 million as operational cost.
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Build a coalition with lawmakers!
In defending its rationales for the Special Act against criticism and resistance from
stakeholders, the MOE took a very smart step in building a coalition with lawmakers. As
seen in Figure 10-1, any proposed Act needs to pass the review of the National Assembly.
If individual lawmakers favored the Special Act, it would have a much greater chance to
pass. The MOE contacted Mr. Oh, Sae-Hoon, a new young lawmaker in the minority party
("Han-Na-Ra-Dang") who was interested in the environment.
Politicians at that time were particularly interested in being seen as stewards of the
environment. Given the seriousness of urban air pollution, it seemed natural that lawmakers
would want to do something for the general public. Fortunately, lawmaker Oh, Sae-Hoon
was willing to take the initiative in proposing the bill regarding the improvement of air
quality in the Seoul metropolitan area. Finally, on November 6, 2002, 41 politicians
submitted the proposal for a new Act for the improvement of air quality in Seoul
metropolitan area. The content of the bill proposed by those politicians was almost the
same as the proposal of the Special Act by the MOE. Clearly, the MOE helpd Mr. Oh
prepare the language of his bill for the National Assembly.
Among the 41 sponsoring politicians, eight people belonged to the majority party-
the proposal was a bipartisan effort. On the same day, those politicians submitted another
bill for the adjustment of Environment Improvement Charge Act, which was aimed at
levying a charge on diesel fuels rather than on, the vehicle price and transferring 50 percent
of the collected funds to implement the air quality improvement Act in Seoul metropolitan
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area. In this case, the MOE lobbied politicians successfully to enact the Special Act through
the National Assembly. If the proposal by the MOE died during the government
coordination process, another proposal from those politicians would be shepherded through
the National Assembly.
The Special Act as the MOE's main interest
During the whole consensus-building effort including both the Joint Commission and
the Environment Commission, the MOE's main strategy in negotiation was to hold onto the
emission standards for new diesel passenger cars card as long as possible as leverage to
gain other important policy options such as the adjustment of the energy price system
(increased diesel fuel price) and the Special Act. However, if the MOE had been asked
which of these options would be most valuable, it would have chosen the Special Act. The
adjustment of the energy price system lay in the jurisdiction of the MOF and the MOCIE,
but the implementation of the Special Act would be in the hands of the MOE. Furthermore,
passage of the ambitious Act would bring more funding and manpower to the MOE air
bureau. The MOE was strategically changing its policy focus away from water quality
management toward air quality management. Mr. Koh, the director of the air bureau,
continued to ask environmental groups to support the Special Act, even if the
environmental groups had to give up restrictions on diesel passenger cars. 289
Since 2001, the MOE had made several politically strategic moves to increase its
289 Interview with Mr. Koh, Yoon-Hwa on April 15, 2005.
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negotiating power within the government in order to enact the Special Act:
* Building coalitions with lawmakers,
* Making the Special Act one of the priority policy goals for the new
"Participatory Government" in order to prioritize the issue on the
government's decision agenda, 290
* Persuading environmental groups to support the Special Act, 291 and
* Using the media to show the public how seriously bad the urban air quality in
the Seoul metropolitan area had become (Comparison with other OECD
countries, Social costs associated with public health).2 92
Linkage between the Special Act and diesel passenger cars
The new "Participatory government" raised expectations for the enactment of the
Special Act, though the new set of ministers were less familiar or committed to it.
290 The new government of Noh, Moo-Hyun was said to be established by the support of civil organizations,
because the new president enjoyed many favors by civil NGOs during the presidential election in 2002. The
new government appointed some ministers, of whom some were affiliated to NGOs. This political and
institutional atmosphere started to give the Alliance more political resources in negotiations with other
stakeholders. In reality, a core member of the Alliance was appointed to the staff in the Office of the
President-Elect, which opened on December 28, 2002 and closed on February, 21, 2003. The new
administration continued with the previous DJ administration in terms of tenets and policy goals. Most
interestingly, the Office adopted the Special Act as one of priority policies in its new administration starting
2003.
291 In practice, the consensus agreement from the Environment Commissiosn included the enactment of
Special Act as one of precondition to allow diesel passenger cars in South Korea.
292 In December 2002, MOE reported to the press that social costs associated with air pollution amounted to
US $ 976 million per year, which almost accounts for 4.2% of Seoul metropolitan area's GDP. In addition,
quoting a US research report, MOE argued that the death rate from cerebral infarction might increase 6% due
to degraded air pollution and went further to say that the death toll from air pollution might be three times as
high as that from traffic accident.
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Furthermore , as the consensus agreement from the Environment Commission regarding
diesel passenger cars was watered down (as the Alliance argued), the Committee members,
including environmental groups, jumped into the conventional politics stream, resorting to
polarizing political strategies such as public rallies.
However, because the new Minister of Environment had cultivated very close
relationships with civil organizations before she was appointed, the Alliance could connect
with her easily.293 As a result, the Minister of Environment officially linked the issue of
diesel passenger cars to the Special Act. The message was clear: No Special Act, no diesel
passenger cars in South Korea.
Power game inside the government
The situation inside and outside government was more favorable to the MOE than to
the MOCIE and the MOF. The MOE was able to use this power during negotiation inside
government with other Ministries. First, while the diesel RVs problem was resolved, the
issue of diesel passenger cars had gone nowhere since the issue was raised at the end of
2001. Automakers were getting nervous and complaining that they could not invest
appropriately due to the uncertainty of government policies. Second, even though the
government suggested creating a Task Force to decide on the content and the timing of the
Special Act with the participation of environmental groups, there was fierce pressure from
293 The officials at the MOE were negative on the linkage between the Special Act and diesel passenger cars
on the grounds that diesel passenger cars were national issue, but the Special Act was only for Seoul
metropolitan area, and that there was too much political risk for a new Environmet Minister to resort to
political jujitsu with powerful economic Ministries.
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environmental groups and the Committee members of the Environment Commission to
repeal the Commission's consensus agreement so that diesel passenger cars could not be
sold.
Third, the legislature also took the side of the pro-environmental coalition. On April
14, 2003, the Committee of Environment and Labor at the National Assembly directed the
MOE to delay the Clean Air Act amendment to adjust emission standards for diesel
passenger cars until all safeguard conditions were met. Furthermore, the Committee
decided to adopt a resolution to request the rapid enactment of the Special Act. Fourth,
Even President Noh, on April 2, 2003, promised the Minister of Environment that he would
resolve the disputes by convening an intergovernmental meeting unless a consensus on the
safeguard options could be reached. He encouraged her to achieve the enactment of the
Special Act at any cost, because air pollution was a public health issue that could be solved.
This was a very decisive political blow to the opposition of the MOCIE and the MOF to the
Special Act.
Decisive decision from the Ministerial meeting for Economy (May 30,
2003)
Politically pushed back, the MOF and the MOCIE yielded to the MOE in the
Ministerial meeting for Economy on May 30, 2003. Through a bargaining process based on
a power game in the conventional politics stream, rather than through persuasion or
learning based on scientific assessment, the Ministers made several revisions to their
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previous decisions on March 27, 2003. These incUlTed much criticism frOl11many parts of
society (Table 9-1). For example, the Ministers decided to conduct immediate government
research on the adjustIl1ent of the energy price system, hold public hearings in order to
make a final decision by the end of 2004, and change the regulation in 2005. Most
in1portantly, they decided that the Special Act should be enacted by the end of 2003. The
MOE aln10st achieved its purpose with this decision, and the environmental groups ceased
agitating against the government. The hostility among the actors had died down. Major
disputes were resolved.
Table 9-1. COll1parison of changes in decisions
Issue
Energy price
system
Sulfur content
in diesel fuels
DPF
Installation
The Special Act
Environment
Commission
100:85:50 by July 2006
Incentive for refineries
and distributors of
diesel fuels with less
than 50 ppm starting
2004.
In 2005, more than
50% of diesel
passenger cars
In 2006, more than
800/0 of diesel
assen er cars
Enact the Special Act
as soon as possible and
secure the budget for it
Ministerial meeting
(March 27, 2003)
To the intell1ational
level, but decide in
2005 contingent upon
how many diesel
assen er cars are sold.
Consider the incentive
for refineries and
distributors of diesel
fuels with less than 50
m startin 2005.
Consider incentives for
DPF installation
Establish a Task Force
in order to discuss in
!2003 the content and
the implementation
schedule of the Sp.ecial
~ct
Ministerial meeting
(Ma 30, 2003)
Get right on the review
by conducting
research, and public
hearing and decide by
the end of 2004
Consider the incentive
for refineries and
distributors of diesel
fuels with less than 50
m startin 2004.
Conduct research on
DPF installation in
2003 and make a
decision on the range
of incentives in 2004
Establish a Task Force
in order to finalize
government proposals
by the end of August
and enact the Special
Act at the end of 2003
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The major issues for environmental groups and the MOE had been resolved.
Automakers could begin investing their money in the development and manufacture of
diesel passenger cars, and begin selling them in 2005. The environmental groups had
participated in government decision making as partners and affected the decisions and
secured many measures to offset potential emissions from diesel passenger cars. The MOE
also had also been able to upgrade its air quality management policies and enact the Special
Act.
However, there were still controversial contents in the Special Act that other
Ministries did not want implemented. The struggle was not over. Environmental groups
agreed with the government decision that they could participate in the Task Force for the
Special Act.
Initiation factors of the Task Force
The Task Force started its operations on June 4, 2003. It had to build a consensus on
the content of the Special Act in two months in order to submit the agreement proposal to
the National Assembly. During this period, the Task Force had three plenary meetings and
six sub-committee meetings. At the last meeting on July 25, 2003, Task Force members
declared that they had reached a consensus agreement. This section assesses the initiation
factors as they operated in the Task Force, the third round of consensus building in this case
study.
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I1: Use of a neutral skilled facilitator
The Task Force had (a) neutral facilitator(s), holding contracts with conveners and
stakeholders as consensus-building theory prescribes. However, there was debate on who
should be the chairperson of the Task Force even before the idea of a Task Force was
initiated inside the government.
The idea of Task Force emerged in the Ministerial meeting for Economy on March 23,
2003. To ease the tension associated with the Special Act at that time, the Ministers
developed three options:
* Option 1 (by the MOF): Make a principle that the Act would be enacted, and
establish the Task Force, and conduct pilot projects to assess the feasibility of
a cap-and-trade management system for Seoul metropolitan area.
* Option 2 (by the MOE): Enact the Act first, then discuss when to implement
the Act through careful coordination among Ministries.
* Option 3 (by the MOCIE): Enact another Special Act on the reduction of
automobile emissions, rather than the Special Act on the Seoul metropolitan
area: Focus on automobiles first, then later focus on point sources such as
factories.
After much debate, option 1 was adopted and announced from the Ministerial meeting
on March 27, 2003, which caused lots of turmoil. The idea of the Task Force was first
suggested by the MOF.
In constructing option 1 the MOF suggested its operating scheme, and proposed
nominating the Vice Minister of Finance, or the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance as
the chairperson of the Task Force. However, the MOE argued that the Vice Minister of
Environment should be the chairperson of the Task Force, because the MOE was the main
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agency behind the Special Act. Finally on May 30, 2003, at the Ministerial meeting, it was
decided that the Task Force would be launched with the Vice Minister of Environment as
its Chairperson.
12: Conflict Assessment
There was no conflict assessment by neutral assessor(s) before the Task Force was
launched. Major conflicts on diesel passenger cars and diesel RVs were resolved, or
ignored in the final decision of the Ministerial meeting on May 30, 2003. Even though the
government had just announced that there would be further research on the appropriate
ratio of fuel prices, and policy measures to facilitate DPF installation, environmental groups
and the MOE said that they could live with that decision as long as the Special Act could be
enacted in 2003.
Thus, the most controversial issues were about the content of each provision or
regulation in the Special Act. For example, the questions included:
* What is the range of the air quality management district? Only the Seoul
metropolitan area, or the area including industrial facilities near the Seoul
metropolitan area?
* Which pollutants should be managed with a total loading system?
* When will the Special Act be implemented?
* Etc?
Different interests and positions of other Ministries were sorted out when the MOE
circulated the first draft of the Special Act among other Ministries in August, 2002. Other
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private stakeholders had an opportunity to comment on the proposed Special Act during the
notice and comment period in October, 2002. Furthermore, officials at the air bureau of the
MOE emphasized that they had consulted with many stakeholders by holding public forums
including special regional public forums, and by meeting with industry sectors,
environmental groups, and their counterparts from other Ministries. In interviews they
remembered 294 holding more than 90 meetings associated with the Special Act. In their
view, they had enough information on how stakeholders felt about each stipulation of the
Special Act.
13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
When the MOF proposed operating a Task Force in March, 2003, the MOE suggested
inviting 15 stakeholders: five from government sectors including the MOF, the Ministry of
Planning and Budget (MPB), the MOCT, the MOE, and the MOCIE; three from
environmental groups (CMEJ, Green Transport, and KFEM); two from industrial sectors
(The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (KCCI)); andfive experts from research institutes, each sponsored by one of the
ministries involved.
However, the MOF pointed out the disproportion between the numbers of participants
from the environmental groups and industries and argued that these numbers should be
equal. They decided that industry should have three stakeholder representatives in the Task
Force.
294 Interview with Mr. Park, Kwang-Seok, and Mr. Ahn, Sae-Chang, at the MOE on June 21, 2004.
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Finally, after further discussion within government, it was decided that one more
government official from the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OGPC), and one
from KAMA would participate in the Task Force, and that three experts would be excluded
from the original list of participants. Thus, there remained only two experts: one for the
Alliance and one for the industry sector (Table 9-2).
Table 9-2. Committee members of the Task Force
Affiliation Title Name
The MOE Vice Minister (Chair) Kwak, K Ho
The MOE Director of the air bureau
The OGPC Director of industry division Woo, Joo-Ha
The MOF Director of the economic policy bureau Park, Byung-Won
The MOCT Director of the ground transportation bureau Yang, Sung-Ho
The MOCIE Director of the industrial policy bureau Choi, Jun-Young
The MPBR Diretnor nf indusitrial finance divisinn Rhin Chenl-Rik
CMEJ First Secretary
Green Transport First Secretary S
KFEM Director Jang, Jae-Yeon
The FKI Executive Vice President Lee, Seung-Cheol
The KCCI Executive Vice President Lee, Hyun-Seok
KAMA Executive Vice President Lee, Don -Hwa
Soo-Won University Professor
Joong-Ang University Professor Kim, Jung-In
Note: The highlighted and bold names indicate that they participated from the Joint Commission
through the Environment Commission to Task Force. Mr. Jang, Jae-Yeon also participated in the
Environnment Commission actively.
In terms of the range of stakeholders participating, the Task Force was different from
other previous Commissions. There were seven public officials from all Ministries. In the
Joint Commission and the Environment Commission, officials from the MOE were actively
involved. In terms of government sector stakeholders, the Task Force included a full range
of participation from all Ministries related to the provisions of the Special Act. However, it
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is not certain that the FKI and the KCCI could represent all industry sectors, including taxi,
bus, and freight industries.
14: Multiple, clear issues to allow trade-offs across the issue
The decision agenda for the Task Force was also proposed by the MOE and accepted
by other Ministries. There were two categories of agenda items: One for the Special Act
and one for diesel passenger cars. There were more than 25 controversial provisions in the
Special Act among which the parties could negotiate and trade-off.
In terms of other issues related to diesel passenger cars, there was no concrete plan for
energy price system or for DPF installation in diesel passenger cars. Even though the MOE
and environmental groups did not say much about the decision announced by the
Ministerial meeting on May 30, 2003, they wanted to make sure those policies would be
implemented with a concrete schedule for implementation.
Thus, as the MOE suggested, the decision agenda for the Task Force included:
* Consensus on controversial provisions of the Special Act (In particular, cap-
and-trade policy (a total air pollution load management) for industrial facilities,
* Adjustment of energy price system,
* Incentive measures to facilitate DPF installation for diesel passenger cars, and
* Budget for implementation of the Special Act.
15: Supporting organizations with implementation power
While the MOE convened the Task Force, all governmental agencies had various
implementation powers. They participated in initiating and designing the Task Force and
supported its legitimacy from the beginning.
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16: Financial support for process
There was no special budget earmarked for the operation of the Task Force. However,
all the necessary research was supposed to be done by government-funded research
institutes. No problems were caused by the lack of special funds for the Task Force.
17: Time pressure and deadline
For the Special Act to be enacted by the end of 2003, the members of the Task Force
needed to reach consensus on more than 25 provisions of the Special Act in about one
month and submit it to the National Assembly. For other issues such as adjustment of the
energy price system and DPF installation, which required long-term joint fact finding, there
were no impending deadlines.
While the number of issues to be resolved in only a month seemed very large, in fact
they had been debated among Ministries since August 2002. Those issues were not new to
government stakeholders.
Deliberation factors of the Task Force
This section assesses the status of the deliberation factors in the Task Force by
reviewing the negotiation process from the first meeting to the final consensus agreement.
307
The first plenary meeting (June 4, 2003)
The first plenary meeting was held on June 4, 2003 at the office of the Vice Minister
of Environment for one-and-a-half hours. Usually, the first meeting is for discussion on
how to operate a forum or organization. Likewise, the first meeting of the Task Force was
to discuss how to structure and operate the Task Force. As for the previous Commissions,
the MOE first presented its plan to structure and operate the Task Force and then heard
discussion based on that proposal.
D1: Setting a ground rule by participants
There was no ground rule setting in the first meeting. However, participants talked
about the structure of the Task Force, the decision agenda, and meeting schedules (Figure
9-2). Basically, they decided to adopt consensus as their decision rule.
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Figure 9-2. Structure of the Task Force
D3: Joint Fact-Findin2
The time was too short (one month) to find facts on which decisions could be based
on. So, the discussion was focused on how to generate necessary information on further
decisions. The participants decided that there should be joint research on:
* Total air Pollutant Load Management (TPLM) system
Establishing airshed modeling for air quality management districts
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Plenary meeting:
Participant: Every member of the Task Force
Function: Review and build a consensus
on the decisions proposed by sub-
committees
Schedule: Have a meeting once a month
Sub-Committee
on the Special Act:
Participant: Officials from
all relevant Ministries.
Function: Review on the provisions
of the Special Act and
pilot project of a cap and trade
system for industrial facilities.
Schedule: Hold one or two meetings
by June 14 to make a consensus
and submit to the plenary
meeting on June 27, 2003.
Sub-Committee
on diesel passenger cars:
Participant: five officials from the MOE,
the MOCIE, the MOCT,
the MOF, and the MPB,
five researchers from
government-funded
research institutes sponsored
by each Ministry, three NGO
members, two professors.
Function: Discuss adjustment of the
energy price system, financial
incentives for DPF installation,
zero-, or low-emission vehicles,
and ultra-low sulfur content
diesel fuels.
Schedule: First meeting on July 1, 2003
TPLM for automobile emissions
TPLM for industrial facilities
Pilot projects for TPLM for industrial facilities in 2004
* Energy price system
* Financial incentives for DPF installation, Zero-, or low-emission vehicles,
and ultra low sulfur content diesel fuels.
The group decided who would sponsor each research project and who would
participate in the research (Table 9-3).
Table 9-3. Joint Fact-Finding in the Task Force
Joint research Participants and finance
TPLM system * Research institutes nominated by the MOE, the
MOCIE, and the MOCT
* With USD 0.4 million sponsored by the MOE
* For one year
Energy price system * Research institutes nominated by the MOE, the
MOCIE, and the MOCT, and the MOF
* With USD 0.2 million (equally sponsored by the MOF,
the MOCT, the MOCIE, and the MOE)
* For ten months
Financial incentive for DPF * Research institutes nominated by the MOE, the MOCT,
installation, Zero-, or low- and the MOCIE
emission vehicles, and ultra * With USD 0.1 million by sponsored by the MOE
low sulfur content diesel * For one year
fuels.
Clearly, the Task Force did make a serious effort at joint fact finding.
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The Second plenary meeting (June 27, 2003)
Participants decided at the first meeting that the sub-committee for the Special Act
would meet three times, on June 13, 16 and 23, 2003, to build a consensus on provisions of
the Special Act and that it would submit a discussion report to the Second plenary meeting
on June 27, 2003.
During the three sub-committee meetings, the sub-committee members, who
consisted of government officials, reviewed a total of 51 provisions of the Special Act.
They reached final consensus on 25 provisions without dispute and on 23 provisions after
negotiations. However, they reported that they did not reach consensus on three provisions
associated with the TPLM system for industrial facilities (Table 9-4).
Table 9-4. Three disputed provisions for TPLM system in the Special Act (reported from
the Sub-Committee)
Issue The MOE The MOCIE The OGPC
TPLM air NOx, SOx, and NOx NOx, SOx, and PMlo
pollutant PMlo
Types of Type 1-3 facilities Only power plants Type 1 facilities first, then
facilities belonging to Type 1 review the possibility of
facilities application to Type-2 and
3 facilities
Implementation January 2007 After five years from Type 1 facilities: 2008
schedule the implementation of Type 2, and 3 facilities:
the Act. President will later
decide the year
Note: Type-i facilities (>80 tonnes per year); Type-2 facilities (20 - 80 tonnes per year); Type-3 facilities
(10 - 20 tonnes per year)
Type-i and Type-2 facilities accounted for 99% of the total emissions of SOx and NOx in 2000.
Type-i facilities emitted 99% of the total PM10 in 2000.
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During the sub-committee meetings, the MOCIE continued to argue that SO, and
PM 0o should not be part of the TPLM system, because the level of SOx concentration was
already satisfactory and there was no case of TPLM system for PM10 in the world. The
MOE responded to the MOCIE by saying that SOx should be controlled because SOx could
affect PM levels through conversion to sulfate and that, given the serious PM level in Seoul
metropolitan area, PM should be included in the TPLM system. The MOE added that it had
already postponed its plan to implement the TPLM system from year 2005 to January 2007
in order to give industries lead time to prepare for the new system.
The OGPC mediated between the two Ministries and suggested a compromise option
(Table 10-4).
Conflict between environmental groups and business associations in the
Task Force
The dispute between the MOE and the MOCIE in the sub-committee was transferred
to the plenary meeting, and magnified by the members from environmental groups and
business associations. The environmental groups supported the MOE and the business
associations lined up with the MOCIE (Table 9-5).
Table 9-5. Tension between environment and development
Issue The MOCIE Industries Environmental The MOE
groups
TPLM air NOx NOx NOx, SOx, and NOx, SOx, and
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pollutant PM10  PM 0o
Types of Type 1 facilities Type I facilities Type 1-3 Type 1-3
facilities facilities facilities
(Apply the result
of joint research
for the Type 2
and 3)
Implementation 2008 2008 2007 2007
schedule (Apply the result
of joint research
for the Type 2
and 3)
After negotiation during the first plenary meeting, parties agreed that the TPLM
system would include NOx, SOx, and PM 0o as air pollutants. In terms of implementation
time and types of facilities, they struck a balance between 2007 and 2008 by agreeing to
implement in July 2007 for only type-i facilities, and later discuss the application of TPLM
to type-2 and -3 facilities based on the joint research.
MOE officials and three leaders from environmental groups who had participated
together in the Joint Commission and the Environment Commission built very strong
relationships with the others. According to the MOE officials, this was a negotiation
strategy:295
"It was a kind of role playing. Before we got to the plenary meeting, we had a caucus
in advance. A member from the environmental group should be very harsh and
stringent, and tough on every issue and he should say that the Special Act should be
intensified more. And another member from the environmental group suggests
reasonable options, which actually are favorable to the MOE. "
295 Interview with Mr. Park, Kwang-Seok, and Mr. Ahn, Sae-Chang, at the MOE on June 21, 2004.
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The third plenary meeting (July 3, 2003)
On the third plenary meeting, members of the Task Force reviewed all provisions
discussed that far, and decided to reach a consensus agreement of the Special Act on July 3,
2003. The MOE announced that it would send that consensus agreement proposal to the
RRC and then to the Ministry of legislation for its review, and then submit it to the National
Assembly in September.
D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
It could be said that industries and business sectors were constituents of the MOCIE
and the MOF. The environmental groups were clearly on the same page with the MOE.
However, it is not clear that business associations such as the FKI and the KCCI could fully
represent constituencies including many individual industries and businesses, especially
given the short time the associations had to prepare. In practice, the KCCI submitted a
report with other industries regarding their own policy positions in June 2004.
D2: Fair management of the process
According to interviews with members of the Task Force, the management of the
process by the chairs was generally fair. They commented that they already knew the other
participants and that everybody had sufficient sophistication to control their attitude and
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emotions. 296
Dispute Resolved?
Officially, the consensus agreement was pronounced by the government on July 25,
2003. However, the agreement still had to be scrutinized by the various administrative
groups. First, the agreement was reported to the Cabinet meeting, then to the RRC, then to
the Ministry of Legislation, then to the Deputy minister meeting, then to another Cabinet
meeting, and then to the Committee meeting of the National Assembly, and finally to the
plenary meeting of the National Assembly for passage. Reviewing the government
documents at each stage of administrative process reveals that the MOCIE and business
associations continued to argue against the Special Act throughout this process. One
representative from a business association pointed out that he did not agree to the so-called
consensus document, which means the consensus was not achieved unanimously. Another
interviewee confessed that he continued trying to influence high-level officers in the
government to modify the energy price system. Bones of contention lay everywhere.
There were several revisions after the review of the RRC and at the last stage of the
Vice Ministerial meetings. However, there was no more difficulty surrounding the revisions
among environmental groups and the MOE. Finally, the Special Act was enacted at the
National Assembly on December 31, 2003.
296 In practice, in local settings where residents or general public were involved as stakeholders, there were
many more attitude problems.
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Chapter Ten
Analysis and learning
Analysis
Before applying the new analytic framework (Figure 2-3 and 2-4 in Chapter 2), it is
important to recall the two questions with which this study began: (1) Why did the Joint
Commission and the Environment Commission fail to resolve the disputes on which they
were focused, even though with consensus was reportedly reached? (2) How, then, was
the Task Force able to resolve the same dispute?
Definition of failed dispute resolution
To define a failed dispute resolution effort, it's important to keep several criteria in
mind: the four cited by Susskind (1987) are fairness (in the eyes of the stakeholders),
efficiency (from the standpoint of an independent analyst), wisdom (in light of the
information available at the time) and stability (in terms of the willingness of the parties to
follow through their commitments).
To determine whether these four criteria were met, I solicited the opinions of the
parties who participated in these negotiations.
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The extent to which these three cases of consensus-building met three of the four
criteria (fair, efficient, wise, and stable) (Table 10-1) was determined based on the results
of interviews, news articles, and government records.
Table 10-1. Comparison of the cases according in light of the four criteria of successful
dispute resolution
Criteria Joint Commission Environment Commission Task Force
Fair297  Partly fair Fair Fair
(only in terms of (only in terms of (only in terms of
opportunity to talk opportunity to talk and opportunity to talk and
and access to data) access to data) access to data)
Wise 29s  Partly wise Became wiser Became much wiser
Efficient 299  Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain
Stable No No Yes
Not a failure but not
Judgment Failure Failure necessarily
successful?
It is interesting to note that all three efforts were successful in generating apparent
agreement very quickly. The Joint Commission announced that it had a consensus
agreement on August 19, 2002. The Environment Commission formulated its agreement on
297 The questions were asked only for the participants in the process. So, a party, excluded from the process,
might think the process was unfair.
298 It is not certain that the experts, who participated from the Joint Commission, were the ones who had the
most relevant and renowned expertise on the issues. But, the experts in the commissions were people who
already had ties with the MOE or industries through joint projects before. What is certain is that the data used
in the Joint Commission were mostly produced by the MOE. In the next Environment Commission and the
Task Force, additional experts joined and presented their expertise for mutual learning process. Thus, the
knowledge base became much deeper and broader, as processes went on from the Joint Commission to the
Task Force.
299 In terms of efficiency of the outcome, I cannot assess the consensus agreement was the best one in
achieving the policy goals of urban air quality management, as well as achieving economic development by
selling diesel passenger cars in South Korea. And, in terms of the speed of decision-making, it took only one
month for the Joint Commission and the Environment Commission to make a consensus agreement. However,
I cannot say that a fast decision is always good.
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February 14, 2002, and the Task Force declared that it had reached consensus on July 24,
2003.
However, the aftermath of each agreement was similarly problematic. These so-called
"consensus agreements" were challenged by other stakeholders who were not involved and
even by some of the parties to the process. The participants, who spent their energy and
time building consensus, were very upset about these challenges. The disputed issues,
though seemingly, kept re-emerging. Rifts began to appear in the relationships among the
parties and between stakeholders during the subsequent deliberations. Critical decisions
were delayed, confusing some stakeholders and the general public and threatening various
financial interests.
The consensus agreement decision reached by the Task Force was revised a bit after it
was submitted to the government. However, there was no further apparent turmoil even
though hidden from the public, industry stakeholders were raising concerns about the
consensus agreement. Thus, while the Task Force was hailed as a successful example of
collaborative governance by the President, the media, it cannot be considered 100%
successful. It was, nevertheless, far more successful than the first two efforts.
Pathology of Consensus-building in regulatory process?
Some of the problem discussed above are mentioned by certain scholars as a reason
for arguing that consensus-building is not an appropriate approach to forumlating
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regulatory policy (Coglianese, 2001). They regard the problem of holding agreements
together as a pathology associated with consensus decision-making. Basically, their view is
that public officials often make unrealistic promises about the extent to which negotiated
agreements will shape public policy decisions. Government officials must formally enact
and implement whatever agreements are worked out. In so doing, policy may change -
even slightly - from what the parties thought they had agreed.
These scholars say that in reality, maintaining a consensus throughout the final steps
of policy making can prove difficult. After consensus is forged, other actors -- not party to
the agreement -- may seek to reshape the agreement (Kagan, 1997). They go further to say
that, given this reality, an increased reliance on processes that aim for consensus may well
undermine trust and increase cynicism toward the policy making process.
Those scholars are right in terms of the reality of the policy making process. However,
they do not provide sufficient explanation for how that reality comes about, and why
"others" have the right to reshape agreements reflecting the wishes of all the relevant
stakeholders. Nor do they suggest a way to correct this dynamic.
Part of my objective is to understand why this reality persists by analyzing the first
two cases.
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Clarifications
Two things must be noted. These three cases of attempted consensus building are not
independent. The second involving the Environment Commission was affected by the first
the Joint Commission. The third case under the auspices of the Task Force was affected by
the second case. While the issues the participants faced during each process were different,
all were linked. Some parties were present throughout all three cases, while others were
added or subtracted in one of the cases. Thus, it is not appropriate to compare the three
cases as if they arose from the same initial conditions.
Second, in this treatment "consensus-building efforts" does not refer to the very
sophisticated "consensus-building" procedures theorized in the dispute resolution field by
scholars (Susskind et al., 1999). The parties in Korea did not have an opportunity to absorb
the theory and learn this approach to the practice of "consensus-building." Then, my
analysis is not an attempt to explain why they succeeded or failed in light of the more
sophisticated "consensus-building" models developed by professionals in the public dispute
resolution field, although I do use these models for certain comparisons.
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Case Analyses
The question of why consensus-building failed twice before a qualified success was
achieved is very difficult because more than one or two simple factors were involved.
Indeed, a layer of factors contributed to these outcomes. The same factors are not equally
influential in consensus-building cases even under the most controlled circumstances. For
example, given the same negotiation simulation exercise, different tables will produce
different outcomes, because people are different in terms of their aspirations, attitudes, and
personalities.
This analysis applies a step-back method to analyze the factors when consensus was
announced, the factors during deliberation, and the factors for the initiation of consensus
building in each case.
What is consensus or "social consensus?"
The participants in each consensus-building effort declared at the end that they had
reached consensus or "social consensus." In the Joint Commission, the MOE sent a
document to the media on June 24, 2002 without asking the opinion of Hyundai (Kia). The
media started to broadcast that a consensus had been reached. The content of the document
was shown to the public as if it were a final governmental decision. This document, lacking
the signature of the automakers, caused a considerable problem later on. Also, the MOCIE
in the Joint Commission signed the consensus agreement in August 2002 on the condition
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that the MOE would follow the RRC's decision. Then, the MOCIE requested the RRC to
review the consensus agreement. The RRC's decision to correct the consensus agreement
was the main reason for the environmental group breaking away from the Joint
Commission.
In the case of the Environment Commission, when the Ministerial meeting for
Economy watered the consensus agreement down a little bit, the Committee members were
upset because the Ministerial meeting did not support the social consensus that had been
reached between the private and public partners. The media also criticized the government
for belittling "the social consensus."
What was the "social consensus" in this case? Consensus was achieved only among
participants in the Environment Commission. In theory, consensus hinges on the full
representation of all relevant interests. If such representation was not fully secured, the
consensus is not likely to be complete (in the sense of belonging tothe total society). Even
though the MOE communicated with industries and other Ministries during the
Environment Commission, these groups were excluded from the deliberation processes in
the Environment Commission. It cannot be said that their interests were fully and fairly
represented.
The Task Force also announced a consensus agreement. But this time, the agreement
document did not have the signatures of all parties to the Task Force. When interviewed,
the representatives of industries at the Task Force did not say they agreed to the consensus
agreement proposal. They continued raising problems through the next steps of the
decision-making processes, such as at public hearings convened by the National Assembly.
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Strictly speaking, the Task Force agreement was not a consensus in that all parties could
not say they could live with the agreement.
Clearly, there is a problem in defining and announcing a consensus. If they had a
genuine understanding of the meaning of consensus, they would not have announced it
when they did.
Why did they believe that they had reached consensus? Let's find the answer by
stepping backward.
Deliberation factors in consensus building
This section offers an analysis of the deliberation process in each consensus-building
effort prior to the announcement of a consensus. My objective is to determine how the
operation of each factor affects the outcome of the processes.
D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
D3: Joint Fact-Finding
D2: Fair management of process
D 1: Setting ground rules
D4: Communication between representatives and constituents
This factor is important because representatives (or, negotiators) should represent the
interests of their constituents in a negotiation. If those representatives are not adequately
323
representatives, or those negotiators cannot communicate with their constituents or clients
effectively to discover their real interests, problems can arise. Constituents may not
acknowledge the legitimacy of the consensus agreement and blame their negotiators. The
consensus agreement may not be stable. This is why representatives should be selected by
stakeholder groups themselves, rather than by a convener. The importance of the
communication factor is based on the assumption that there is appropriate representation of
interests.
There was the clear case of this problem in the Joint Commission. Hyundai's
negotiator was fired by the CEO, right after the MOE announced that consensus had been
reached. The controversial issue was whether the "Galloper," an old model of a diesel RV
should be terminated or not. The agreement did not mention the "Galloper" explicitly, but
the media revealed that it was the model which would be terminated according to the terms
of the agreement.
Hyundai's negotiator at the Joint Commission was unsure about this issue. He did not
fully realize the interests of the Hyundai CEO. While this may be taken as a communication
problem within the company, it was actually more a cultural and organizational issue. The
Chaebol, a large conglomerate, is a distinct system of business and industry interests in
South Korea. The CEO is very powerful and the ultimate source of all decision making
authority. The negotiators cannot get complete mandate from the CEO, unless they know
his wishes exactly.
In the Joint Commission, the negotiators from Hyundai did not make the right
decision. To their credit, they said at the time that they could not make a commitment on
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their own and needed to check with a higher ranking person.
In any case, while the MOE should not have announced the consensus agreement to
the media, the miscommunication between the negotiator and the CEO of Hyundai caused
the problem. Thus, in this case, the difficulty was organizational in nature. This was not,
however, a decisive factor in the failure of the Joint Commission.
D3: Joint Fact-Finding
Joint fact finding is very important, particularly in resolving disputes involving
scientific and technical evidence. Without joint fact-finding, the parties are likely to utilize
their own research to promote their own interests, leading to a fruitless "battle of the
experts."
However, joint fact finding requires an expenditure of time and money with the right
sponsors. The right users can be secured by the full representation of interests. Time,
money, and sponsorship are, in turn, affected by other factors. Each case presented a unique
combination.
In the Joint Commission, the participants needed to know how much emissions would
be produced if the manufacturing three diesel RV models were allowed continuously after
July 1, 2002. Based on that calculation, Hyundai (Kia) prepared an emission-offset plan to
satisfy the environmental groups and the MOE. These calculations required a few
assumptions about the transition rate from diesel RVs to LPG vehicles if diesel RVs were
terminated.
The modeling or calculations were done by the MOE, which used data from the
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automakers. The Alliance and the MOE made assumptions which favored their own
interests in that calculation. 300 Hyundai was not satisfied with those assumption, but
tolerated them. The Alliance did not trust the data and assumptions Hyundai was using in
its calculation of potential emission reductions from its emission-offset plan. For example,
when Hyundai maintained that it could reduce the emissions by conducting free emissions
inspections for diesel vehicles, the Alliance distrusted the data. Even the experts nominated
by the Alliance and industries respectively were not neutral but functioned more like
stakeholders. In this case, joint fact finding was not really conducted properly. However,
the result of modeling even with some distrust did not generate a decisive impact on the
outcome of the process. Hyundai and the Alliance ignored those uncertainties in their quest
to make a decision. Why?
One reason was that neither side had enough time to design the research carefully
together and not enough money to do it properly. The other reason was they reduced the
time available by poorly managing the process. They should have reached a decision to
conduct joint fact-finding on the issue of diesel RVs much earlier, but wasted time on other
less important issues.
In the Environment Commission, the participants needed a much more complex
scenario analysis. The scenario analysis was done by the MOE with the help of its own
experts. The analysis included many assumptions, made by mainly the MOE and the
Alliance.
300 They assumed that all consumers, if three diesel RVs were terminated, would buy LPG RVs instead of
those three diesel RVs. But, Hyundai argued that given the cheap diesel fuel, consumers would buy another
diesel RVs, not LPG RVs.
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While the Korea Gallup group conducted a market poll of consumer choice regarding
automobiles under certain fuel price ratios, the questions were adjusted by the Alliance and
the MOE. Later, a staff person from Hyundai confessed that there was a problem with the
questions themselves. In this case also, the MOE mostly conducted the analysis, and then
presented it to the participants for their feedback. However, methodological vagaries did
not make a big difference in the outcome.
The Task Force had enough time to consider the topics for research, select research
institutions, and find sponsors and money to pay for it. In general, the joint fact-finding
process in the Task Force deliberations was pretty good.
D2: Fair process management
Judging the fairness of a process involves many considerations. All the groups who
wanted to participate should be given an adequate chance to do so. All parties should also
have been given access to the technical information they needed. Everybody should have
had an opportunity to express their views. There should be a means whereby a due-process
complaint can be heard at the conclusion of the negotiations (Susskind, 1987). Examples
might be that a convener is from a certain organization associated with certain interest, or
that there are too many participants from certain groups.
For the purposes of this study, the only aspects of this factor studied were 1) the
opportunity each party was gotten to express their views and 2) access to technical
information. My objective is to determine whether this factor affected the failure of the
consensus-building efforts.
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Surprisingly, most interviewees answered that they were given due respect as
participants and had ample opportunity to raise issues and express their views. In other
words, there was no systematic attempt to restrict opportunities to speak during deliberation.
However, when a staff person from Hyundai raised a question about the outcome of the
scenario analysis, the MOE officials scolded him. That was not fair, but Hyundai did not
question it.. Why? Because the MOE is a regulator and Hyundai is a regulatory target. Still,
a person-to-person relationship is shaped by the power relationships between the regulators
and regulated.
D1: Ground rule setting by participants
In none of these cases did participants help to determine the ground rules as
consensus building theory prescribes. They discussed who would be the chair, when they
would meet, what they should talk about and so forth. They did not, however, discuss how
to control their attitudes during deliberation, or how to deal with the media. However, it is
interesting to note that in all three cases, the decision rule was to find consensus, especially
a unanimous one, rather than to settle for a majority vote.
The Alliance continued to hold street rallies while their leaders were negotiating in
the Joint Commission. This strategic choice should have been addressed in setting ground
rules. In general, the lack of ground-rules did not make a big impact on the outcome of the
process.
These constitute the four deliberation factors in a consensus-building process for each
of the dispute resolution attempts (Table 10-2). The next section covers initiation.
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Table 10-2. Analysis of deliberation factors in each process
Deliberation factors Joint Commission Environment Commission Task Force
D4: Communication Hyundrai's Nothing special Nothing
between representatives problematic special
and constituents communication
D3: Joint Fact Finding Poor So so G66BG
D2: Fair process Good Good Good
management
D1: Ground rule setting No No No
by participants
Initiation factors in consensus building
Initiation factors are more important than deliberation factors in building consensus,
because those initial conditions set the tone for the whole process. This study identifies
seven factors associated with the initiation of consensus building:
17: Time pressure and deadline
16: Financial support
15: Participation by organizations with implementing power
14: Multi-clear issues
13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
12: Conflict Assessment
Il: Use of (a) neutral skilled facilitator(s)
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17: Time pressure and deadline
Time pressures or the existence of deadlines for the dispute resolution help
participants spend their time and resources more effectively. Without a deadline, parties
may delay or fail to focus on reaching a settlement. However, a meaningful and effective
deliberation requires enough time to hear the concerns of stakeholders and most of all, to
generate and review the necessary information on which decisions can be substantiated.
The effect of the existence of a deadline is maximized when the participants can figure out
the consequence of reaching no agreement by the deadline. In other words, if they have to
face a worse outcome than they would face with no agreement, they will try to make a
decision before the deadline. In this case, it may be assumed that the participants know
their BATNA (the Best Alternative to No Agreement).
In analyzing this category, it is possible to determine whether there were deadlines (or
pressure to reach consensus in a timely manner) and whether the deadline exerted a positive
or negative influence. In each case reviewed here, a deadline did exist.
The deadline for the Joint Commission was set collectively as the end of June 2002 at
the second meeting, which was held on May 31, 2002. The reason for the June 30 deadline
was the existence of an administrative schedule regarding the regulation of reclassification
of diesel RVs, which would become effective on July 1, 2002.
However, the importance of the deadline was not felt equally among the parties. If
Hyundai (Kia) could not get the regulation amended before the deadline, their three diesel
RVs would be dropped from the manufacturing lines. The MOE actually wanted to finish
this issue as soon as possible and move to a discussion of diesel passenger car issues. Thus,
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Hyundai (Kia) considered the deadline most seriously. The MOCIE, which always
supported Hyundai (Kia), also regarded the deadline very seriously. For environmental
groups the deadline was not so important. The deadline did not stimulate them to focus on
quicker decision making.
From the second meeting (May 31) to the deadline (June 31), only one month was
available to make a decision on diesel RVs. However, the decision agenda from the first
meeting was set as broadly as possible. Environmental groups, which did not share the
importance of the deadline for diesel RVs, wanted to view the issues very broadly.
For the Joint Commission, there was too little time for consensus building before the
deadline. What was worse, the importance of the deadline was not equally applied to the
participants, which caused ineffective discussion. Not until the third meeting did the parties
start negotiation on the diesel RVs, because environmental groups did not want to talk
about that issue first. In this case, the importance of a deadline rather than the timing should
have been agreed upon first.
However, while the deadline factor worked against effective negotiation and
decision making, it cannot be said that this factor was decisive in the failure of the Joint
Commission. Even with enough time to deliberate on the part of the environmental groups
for the significance of the deadline for Hyundai, and Kia, the Joint Commission would have
failed for other reasons.
The Environment Commission also had a deadline for consensus-building. The
deadline was not set by participants who gauged the necessary time and circumstances, but
by the Ministerial meeting for Economy in December 2002. The Ministers decided that any
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decision should be made by February 15, 2003. The date was chosen to keep the timing of
the decision within the current administration.
The Environmental Commission, which kicked off on January 11, 2003, had only one
month to make any progress. This was clearly insufficient time to have experts produce
meaningful scientific and technical information on which effective decisions could be
based. However, incredibly, the committee members collaborated for more than ten hours a
day for ten days and reached agreement. The deadline forced them to spend their energy
and time building a consensus. Unlike the Joint Commission, the parties agreed upon the
importance and meaning of the deadline. They needed a consensus to lend legitimacy to
their final proposal.
Lastly, the Task Force also had only one month for the sub-committee members, who
were all government officials, to review all 51 provisions and submit their opinions to the
plenary meeting. While these government officials appeared to be under tremendous time
pressure, they had, in fact, already coordinated for half a year inside the government. The
deadline was also politically determined, because they wanted the Special Act to be enacted
at the National Assembly by the end of 2003.
All three cases shared two similar characteristics in terms of deadline. First, parties
had only about one month to make a decision. Second, the deadline was set not by
participants, but was determined by outside conditions, such as an administrative schedule
(the Joint Commission), or political considerations (the Environment Commission and the
Task Force).
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16: Financial support
All three consensus-building efforts began without a special budget or funding. The
miscellaneous costs of meetings were covered by the MOE. Also, some contracted research
was funded mostly by the MOE. The environmental groups did not have enough money to
contract any research, nor did they receive any financial support from the MOE for
participating in the Commissions. However, financial support factors did not make much
difference in any of the three cases.
15: Participation by organizations with implementing power
The participation of parties with implementation power can be a key to successful
initiation and maintenance of consensus building, because the parties must believe that their
agreement will be implemented and that their participation will be worthwhile. The most
significant variable in achieving implementation appears to be whether those with the
authority to enforce the decision support the process (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). If
the participating authority has options other than consensus building to secure its interests,
the process may be at risk.
Because it was the most problematic feature of the Joint Commission and the
Environment Commission, this initiation factor may be the most decisive in affecting the
outcome of dispute resolution in this case study. Lack of clear implementation power
rendered the first two consensus agreements unstable. The proposals continued to be
challenged and changed by the government, leading to a proliferation of disputes.
The MOE had implementing power over decisions on the classification of diesel RVs,
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and on the emissions standards for new diesel passenger cars. However, the decisions on
fuel price and budgets for the Special Act, which the MOE and the environment groups
wanted in return, were under the jurisdiction of the MOF and the MOCIE. Thus, even if the
MOE made decisions on the diesel passenger cars, if it did not get concessions from the
MOCIE and the MOF, no trade-off could be accomplished.
The MOCIE and the MOF sent their officials to the first meeting of the Joint
Commission, but no MOF official participated after the second meeting. The MOCIE did
not accept the validity of a decision-making process that included environmental groups. In
other words, neither the MOCIE nor the MOF accepted the concept of a consensus-building
process from the beginning. In such a process, participation would not mean just sitting in a
chair; it would mean participation with the intention to negotiate in good faith. Why was
the MOCIE unwilling to participate in the Joint Commission?
There could be two answers. The first is that the MOCIE did not acknowledge the
right of environmental groups to make decisions together with a government body. The
environmental groups argued that the MOCIE did not know the meaning of New
Governance in which stakeholders (citizens) share the decision-making power with the
government. That explanation seems to be appropriate, because there was controversy even
within the MOE over bringing the environmental groups into the consensus-building
process. For most officials, participation of stakeholders in decision-making meant hearing
their concerns on announced government decisions, not sharing decision-making power
with them.
The second explanation is that the participation of environmental groups meant to the
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MOCIE that the Joint Commission's decision would not favor the MOCIE's interests. The
MOCIE thought that the MOE and the environmental groups were on the same page in
every issue and that together they would dominate the process. Thus, the MOCIE believed
that the decision-making process unbalanced against them. In this case, the MOCIE, as a
party to negotiation, could think of other options to secure their interests outside the
decision-making venue.
The BATNA (Best Alternative to No Agreement) concept is useful in this case. If a
party can secure its interest in other decision-making venues, it is less likely to buy into an
existing decision-making process they think is stacked against them. MOCIE, Hyundai
(Kia) and the MOF (Figure 10-1) had access to other aspects of the administrative process
(Figure 10-1) in South Korea's complex system.
The consensus agreement from the Joint Commission was a just proposal, not a final
government decision. Any government decision associated with regulations had to be
reviewed by the RRC (Regulation Reform Committee), where economic development
considerations dominated decision making. The Minister of MOCIE is one of the two
chairpersons of the RRC. The MOCIE knew it could influence the consensus agreement at
the second level of the RRC.
Thus, a combination of the factors explains why the MOCIE did not like the Joint
Commission from beginning:
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Venue 2: The RRC: (The MOCIE >> The MOE)
Venue 1: The Joint Commission:
The MOE The MOCIE
+ >> +
Environmental groups Hyundai (Kia)
Figure 10-1. Multi-level decision-making and power relationships
The MOE and the environmental groups believed the consensus was a voluntary
agreement rather than the government regulation. Thus, they felt betrayed when the
MOCIE and Hyundai resorted to the RRC. That was the most influential factor in the break
up of the Joint Commission.
The Environment Commission agreement also suffered from an unstable consensus.
In this case, the MOCIE, the MOF, and industries were excluded by the environmental
groups for several reasons. The MOE was supposed to coordinate with the MOCIE, the
MOF, and other industries, but the communication was not effective. The MOE simply
delivered the concerns of the MOCIE and the MOF to the Environment Commission. Even
if there had been coordination inside the government before the MOE let the environmental
groups know the concerns of other Ministries and industries, no negotiation or consensus
building took place between the ends of spectrum. There was merely talk, conveyed
through the MOE.
Because there was no consensus among the MOE, the environmental groups, the
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MOCIE, the MOF, and industries, the consensus agreement from the Environment
Commission could only be unstable. Because the MOE and the environmental groups
dominated the Environment Commission, the consensus agreement clearly represented their
interests over those of the other stakeholders.
What was worse, there were multi-level decision making venues (Figure 10-2), for
example, the Ministerial meeting for Economy. The name of the meeting itself suggests its
business was economic development. Given their mandates, the MOCIE and the MOF
could be more powerful in such a setting. New administrative personnel came into office
during the deliberations of the Environment Commission, but the institutional structure of
multi-level decision making was not affected by that change.
Venue 2: The Ministerial meeting for Economy: (The MOCIE, the MOF >> The MOE)
Venue 1: The Environment Commission:
The MOE + Environmental groups
Figure 10-2. Multi-level decision-making venues and power relations in the case of the
Environment Commission
The action of the Ministerial meeting for Economy on March 27, 2003 was a critical
point in the fate of the Environment Commission. It caused the MOE and other members of
the Commission to take their grievances out of a consensus-building relationship and into
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the stream of conventional adversarial politics.
The Task Force included all government agencies from the beginning. The initiation
of the Task Force was proposed by the MOF. While the Joint Commission and the
Environment Commission happened outside the government and proposed their decisions
to the government, the Task Force was organized inside the government. There was a built-
in willingness and ability to negotiate among the Ministries. It is interesting to note that
Task Force proposals had to pass through even more decision making venues (See Figure
9-1) than did the proposals of the preceding commissions. For the consensus draft of the
Special Act to be enacted at the National Assembly as the final Act, it had to pass more
than 25 reviews in the same number of decision-making venues. Even though several
provisions were adjusted during those steps, there were no further disputes.
This initiation factor in was the main element leading to the failure of consensus
building at the Joint Commission and the Environment Commission.
14: Multi-clear issues
If multiple issues are available for negotiation parties to trade off, agreement is more
likely. However, the correct selection of issues is more important than the number. If
parties to a negotiation cannot find any issue critical to their interests among the agenda
items, the negotiation is not likely to produce an agreement. Thus, it is important to figure
out what issues stakeholders will consider seriously. Without this information, decision
agenda setting is not effective. The identification of such interests is a very important task
in initiating a consensus-building process. That factor can be explained in discussing
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conflict assessment.
Hyundai (Kia) wanted an agreement that would allow them to keep selling their
three diesel RVs, and get approval from the MOE to sell diesel passenger cars. The MOE
wanted to secure its countermeasures to check the increase of the emissions from the three
diesel RVs and diesel passenger cars. Such measures included the adjustment of fuel prices
and the enactment of the Special Act. The Environmental groups also wanted to secure the
countermeasures in order to keep air quality from becoming any worse. This trade-off was
basically the backbone of the negotiations from the initiation of the Joint Commission to
the conclusion of the Task Force.
These considerations dominated the agendas of each consensus-building effort
analyzed in this study. However, this assessment does not focus on how to manage agenda-
setting process. For example, an important question might be which issues to address first.
The original purpose of the Joint Commission was to reach a consensus on comprehensive
issues related to diesel vehicles. In fact, the name of the Commission was "the Joint
Commission to resolve the problems associated with diesel vehicles." So, the broad range
of participants focused on that range of issues from their first meeting on. However, as the
meetings progressed, the Joint Commission became a fixated on the issue of diesel RVs,
setting aside the comprehensive issues associated with diesel passenger cars. As explained
above, that's because the issue of diesel RVs was very urgent and impending. It might be
argued that if there had been an effort to share the issues raised by each stakeholder in
advance a better process could have been structured allowing the group to focus on diesel
RVs first and then move on systematically to other issues. Had this been the case, the Joint
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Commission might have produced a more satisfactory outcome.
13: Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders
This factor also is not about the number of participants, but the inclusive
representation of as many as interests as possible in a public dispute. Inclusion should be
made by voluntary action in good faith. This factor also hinges on the conflict assessment,
which will be addressed in next section.
In the case of the Joint Commission, the consensus agreement was about the issue of
diesel RVs. The relevant stakeholders to the issue were Hyundai (Kia), the MOCIE, the
MOE, and environmental groups. Other automakers, oil industries, and gas industries, and
the MOF were not much interested in the issue of termination of three diesel RVs
manufactured by Hyundai (Kia). However, they participated in the Joint Commission from
the first meeting to the last meeting, because the purpose of the Joint Commission was to
discuss the issues associated with diesel passenger cars. Such issues included the fuel prices
in which the oil and gas industries had major stakes.
In a nutshell, men among this broad range of stakeholders merely observed the
negotiation among Hyundai (Kia), the MOCIE, the MOE, and the environmental groups.
In terms of the will to participate in the Joint Commission, industry sectors were not
invited but ordered to participate, because they were regulatory targets of the MOE. They
did not have enough time to prepare for the negotiation. The environmental groups,
however, were willing to participate in the Joint Commission but not with a good faith to
build a consensus but for another, hidden reason. They also did not have enough time to
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prepare for a negotiation or consensus-building process. There was only participant who
really wanted to build a consensus was Mr. Koh from the MOE, the chairperson presiding
over the proceedings. Also, even though the MOCIE and the MOF were included in the list
of participants, they did not want to negotiate with environmental groups. Furthermore,
while 34 environmental groups had created a coalition in a very short time, they failed to
include the KFEM, one of the most influential environmental groups in South Korea. Later,
the KFEM criticized the activity of the Joint Commission, which damaged its legitimacy.
As a rule, while the Joint Commission proposed having a large number of participants,
approximately 26 people from a broad range of stakeholder groups, the quality of their
participation was not at the level considered optimal by consensus-building theorists.
Industries and other governmental agencies were not even included in the
Environment Commission. However, following the failure of the Joint Commission, there
was considerable discussion on how to structure the new effort. Despite the option of
including all the stakeholders including the government agencies and industry sectors, the
option to exclude them was proposed and supported by the environmental group, in
particular, the KFEM. This exclusion was justified, in their view, by the malfeasance of the
MOCIE and Hyundai who tried to influence the RRC to overturn the agreement reached by
the Joint Commission. Thus, in terms of inclusion, the Environment Commission scores
very low.
The Task Force collaboration included 15 members. The important feature of this
group was the participation of all relevant government agencies. This was very important in
securing stability of the decision after the consensus.
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Across the three cases, the selection of interests and stakeholders were made by the
MOE at the Joint Commission, by the MOE and environmental groups at the Environment
Commission, and by the MOF, and the MOE at the Task Force, respectively. However, all
of these selections were made very quickly and not based on a thorough assessment of
conflict.
12: Conflict Assessment
To make a long story short, there was no conflict assessment, as the theory of
consensus building defines it. The assessment of conflict was made in separate meetings
between the MOE and stakeholders, including industry stakeholders, environmental groups,
and other government agencies, where the MOE could hear their concerns. In addition, the
MOE used the public forum to figure out how things were perceived by other stakeholders.
The public media played the role of delivering the concerns of each stakeholder to the other
stakeholders and to the general public. So, the MOE believed that they knew what the
controversial issues were based on the information garnered through such mechanisms.
However, while the MOE heard and knew all stakeholders' concerns, the stakeholders
could not know each other's concerns. They had to puzzle them out during the
negotiation process, which made negotiation very difficult given the very short time period
of one month for each process.
The most important case before the Joint Commission revolved around the legitimacy
of the voluntary agreement or decision-making mechanism based on New Governance. The
environmental groups cherished their equal participation with government officials as an
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important interest and concern from the beginning (Table 10-3). If the MOE had made an
effort to address this difference between the MOCIE and the environmental groups at an
earlier stage of the Joint Commission, the MOCIE might not have deserted the process and
sought the alternative channel of the RCC review.
Table 10-3. Conflict assessment matrix for Diesel Vehicle Regulations and The Special Act
for Seoul metropolitan air quality
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Issue Manufacturing Diesel Trilateral Emission Adjustment Diesel Fuel Legislation
Diesel RVs Private contract reduction of fuel quality of the
vehicles agreement from price improvement Special
Stakeholder other (Gasoline: Act
diesel Diesel:
vehicles LPG)
KAMA * * * + +/
Hyundai * * *
(KIA) - 2004 * * 100:75:60 +
Euro-3
2005
Euro-4
Daewoo -- -- * * 100:75:60 +
Motors until
2006
Ssangyong -- -- * 100:75:60 +
until
2006
Samsung s * * 100:75:60 +
Motors 2005
Euro-4
LG Oil . -- * 100:75:60 -
no lower
LPG
SK Oil * 100:75:60
no lower
LPG
S-Oil
Hyundai * * * --
Oil
SK Gas * +/lower + + **
LPG 100:75:44-
price 47
LG Gas * +/lower + +
LPG 100:75:44-
price 47
MOFAT * * *
MOCIE -- 100:75:60 --
MOCT * . --
MOFE * 100:75:60
MOE +/ 2005 + + 100:85- + by 2003
Euro-3 95:47-55
2005
Euro-4
The * *
Alliance -/ -/ + 100:85- + *+
95:47-55
Note: KAMA: Korean Auto Manufacturer Association
MOFAT: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOCIE: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation
MOFE: Ministry of Finance and Economy
MOE: Ministry of Environment
* #khe most important interest
+: Pro
+/: Conditional Pro
*: Neutral
-/: Conditional Con
--: Con
11: Use of a neutral skilled facilitator
This factor is not necessarily a sufficient condition for successful consensus building.
Sometimes, public officials convene consensus-building processes without hiring (a)
neutral facilitator(s). However, neutral facilitators can overcome stakeholder suspicion of
the motives of a convening organization. According to the theory of consensus building,
neutral(s) can play a central role in identifying stakeholders and their issues by conducting
conflict assessment in a neutral setting.
A skillful facilitator can also ensure that the parties communicate with their
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constituents, and that changes required after consensus are accepted by all stakeholders.
According to the theory of consensus-building, the successful application of all other
initiation and deliberation factors hinges on the first initiation factor of using neutral,
skillful facilitator(s).
Unfortunately, neutrals were not used in facilitating any of the processes in these
three cases. The initiation and the deliberation of the Joint Commission and of the
Environment Commission were dominated by the MOE and the environmental groups. The
initiation and deliberation of those two Commissions were perceived by other stakeholders
as not neutral and partial toward environment rationales. Even at the initiation of the Joint
Commission, the KFEM, which did not participate in the Joint Commission, suspected that
the MOE had a hidden agenda in involving the environmental groups. Not just the
industrial sectors but the environmental groups also thought the MOE was not neutral.
It may be a counterfactual argument that, if there had been neutral, skillful facilitators
in those two consensus-building efforts, the disputes would have been resolved successfully.
However, it is certain that the lack of neutrality in the initiation phase of the process
affected other factors such as conflict assessment, inclusion of stakeholders, including
stakeholders with implementation power, and deliberation factors.
Thus far, this study has analyzed the initiation and deliberation factors prescribed by
the theory of consensus-building for the three cases of consensus-building efforts in the
case study (Table 10-2 and Table 10-3)
Table 10-4. Relative difference of necessary conditions among three rounds
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Joint Commission Environment Task Force
Commission
17: Time pressure and Yes but worked Yes, worked positively for Yes, worked
deadline negatively consensus-building but not positively for
enough time for joint fact consensus-building
finding
16: Financial support No No No
15: Participation by No No Yes
organizations with
implementing power
14: Multi-clear issues Yes Yes Yes
13: Inclusion of a full range of Not really No Good
stakeholders
12: Conflict Assessment No No No
Ii: Use of a neutral skilled No No No
facilitator
It is not possible to judge the importance of each factor just by comparing the three
cases. It cannot be said that the Task Force was successful just because it had good scores
in the 15 and 13 variables compared to the two commissions. The Task Force had these
advantages not only because the most important topics in each effort were different (Diesel
RVs 4 Diesel passenger cars - the Special Act), but also because the composition of each
group of participants was different. In addition, the situations just prior to the initiation of
each effort were different. Before the Joint Commission, uncertainty about the decision-
making processes led to a low threshold for entering the consensus-building effort and a
reasonable level of trust among stakeholders. However, following the failure of the Joint
Commission, the relationships among stakeholders were so severely damaged that certain
stakeholders were excluded from the dialogue at the Environment Commission. Prior to the
initiation of the Task Force, the Ministerial meeting for Economy on May 30, 2003
accepted the request of the MOE and the environmental groups to enact the Special Act by
the end of 2003. Thus, the most controversial issues were almost sorted out before the
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Task Force. Considering this contextual factor, the importance of the I3 and 15 factors can
be discounted.
Further analysis
Why did the first two consensus-building efforts fail? Considering the problems that
followed the first two agreements and analyzing them in light of consensus-building theory,
the lack of participation by organizations with implementation power appears to be the
most influential factor in the failure of the first two consensus-building efforts.
However, further analysis is necessary to answer a more intriguing underlying
question: Why didn't the organizations with implementation power participate? And what
about the other factors prescribed by consensus-building theorists? Why did the first two
processes score so badly on these?
In the first place, people in South Korea were not familiar with the theory and practice
of "consensus-building" as developed in the US. However, it is possible to sort out the next
question by identifying the source of the problematic features in several consensus-building
factors. The task of identifying sources of difficulty in achieving high scores on consensus-
building factors is important, because such analysis might suggest prescriptions for
improving consensus-building efforts.
First, those sources can be found at individual, organizational, institutional, and
cultural levels. In case of the communication problem (D4) between the Hyundai negotiator
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and the CEO in the first effort, the problem could be found in the specific organizational
culture. This issue can be dealt with by educating participants in negotiation skills.
Alternatively, the convenor or facilitators can check the communications in such cases.
Also, process management (D2) skills can be taught by experts. Ground rule setting (D1)
also can be easily learned.
Problems related to the deadline factor (17) indicates more fundamental problems at
the institutional level. In the Joint Commission and Environment Commission cases, the
deadlines were set by political concern or administrative schedule, not by the assessment of
the time needed to prepare for consensus-building, which caused hasty initiation of the
process as well as insufficient time for deliberation and joint fact finding.
Then why not in using a neutral facilitator, hence conflict assessment, and right
participation and issues, which is the most important factor in the theory of consensus
building? To discuss the question above, it is necessary to return to the analytic framework
for consensus building in regulatory decision making described in Chapter 2. This model
includes a new, fourth stream--consensus building--which includes the initiation and
deliberation factors not accounted for in the conventional politics stream. This construction
implies that the initiation of a consensus-building stream must be made, particularly in a
nascent democracy, by a person not by a stipulation or regulation. Who are the initiators?
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Policy entrepreneur
The concept of "policy entrepreneur" is borrowed from Kingdon (1984). Policy
entrepreneurs are people who are willing to invest their resources-time, energy, reputation,
and sometimes, money-in the hope of influencing public policy (Kingdon, 1984). There is
agreement in the literature regarding the importance of policy entrepreneurs as agents of
change in the policy innovation process (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Polsby, 1984; King
and Roberts, 1987; Mintrom, 1997, Minstrom, 2000, Schneider, Teske, and Minstrom,
1995). Policy entrepreneurs can be in or out of the government, in elected or appointed
positions, part of interest groups or research organizations.
One of several functions that policy entrepreneurs play is to strategize. This includes
developing specific tactics to help carve a foothold for a particular policy innovation in the
political arena (Mintrom and Vegari, 1996). Another function is activism, by which policy
entrepreneurs engage in the political marketplace. Entrepreneurs create teams and networks
that have the abilities, connections, resources, and willingness to work together on behalf of
a particular innovation. They are also able to mix in a variety of social and political settings,
so that they can readily acquire valuable information and use their contacts to pursue policy
change. Finally, policy entrepreneurs must be team builders, able to form the type of
coalition best able to support their pursuit of the policy change they desire.
Policy entrepreneurs work for innovation and their own interests, and such innovation
often incurs resistance. Thus, policy entrepreneurs are in many cases found at centers of
controversy.
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Policy entrepreneurs as initiators of consensus building efforts
My analysis of the first two cases suggests that they were initiated by policy
entrepreneurs such as Mr. Koh from the MOE, and Mr. Seo, and Mr. Jang from
environmental groups. While Mr. Koh had a personal belief that consensus was the
appropriate decision rule in dispute resolution, he also took a strategic approach to all
issues.
These policy entrepreneurs were able to take advantage of the three streams - problem,
policy, and politics - to initiate a consensus-building process. In other words, their strategic
motivation led them to believe that a consensus-building process would be advantageous.
These consensus-building efforts were new in air pollution regulatory decision-
making in South Korea. As described in Chapter 4, air pollution policy making had only
been approached through conventional decision-making streams. In the conventional
politics stream, the auto industry, and other single-industry economic interests were able to
insulate themselves from the influence of large-scale democratic forces through the creation
of relatively independent sub-governments, the so-called, "iron-triangle." Such systems of
limited participation are thought to be highly resistant to change (Cobb and Elder, 1983). In
such a system, the MOE was much weaker than the powerful economic Ministries, or than
the auto and oil industries, which were supported by those Ministries. Thus, environmental
decisions were traditionally made in high-level government meetings and influenced by
strong lobbies from the industries.
However, there had been changes in the politics stream since the early 1990s in South
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Korea. These opened the system to greater participation. In other countries, many systems
of limited participation have been quickly and dramatically altered during certain periods of
history. One such period was the mid-1970s in the United States, when policy subsystems
relating to tobacco, pesticides, air and water pollution, airlines, trucking,
telecommunications, and nuclear power were all destroyed or radically altered (Fritschler,
1989; Bosso, 1987; Jones, 1975; Derthick and Quirk, 1985; Campbell, 1988).
Baumgarter and Jones (1991) try to explain how such systems can be altered. They
describe how political actors lobby for a change in the roster of participants involved by
seeking out the most favorable venue for the consideration of that issue. In this process,
both the institutional structures within which policies are made (March and Olsen, 1989)
and the individual strategies ofpolicy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1984) play important roles.
The previous chapters suggested four institutional trends, or changes in the politics
stream, that policy entrepreneurs can take advantage in initiating consensus-building
streams as a new form of decision-making. The first was the increasing power of
environmental groups in debates about major environmental issues. Second, these
progressive environmental groups also altered their approach towards formal politics,
evolving from a rejectionist approach under President Noh, TW (1988-1993) to state
engagement under President Kim, YS (1993-1998) to a state-civil society partnership under
Kim, DJ (1998-2003), and currently President Noh, MH (2003 - 2008). Thus,
environmental groups gained political resources and connections.
Third, the MOE was still weak compared to other Ministries, though it was growing
in size, because there were unbalanced multi-level decision-making venues. Each venue
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carries with it a decisional bias, because both participants and decision-making routines
differ. For example, higher level government meetings were dominated by Ministries or
government entities which were in favor of economic development. These institutions were
the Regulation Reform Committee (RRC), and the Ministerial meeting for Economy. If
certain environmental policies are believed to put too much burden on the economy, they
could be adjusted in these higher decision making venues.
Fourth, the World Cup Soccer Games played a catalytic role in encouraging major
environmental groups to take an interest in urban air pollution, which had been portrayed as
a technical problem. Until then, technocrats in the government and experts had dominated
the decision-making process.
With such an institutional backdrop in the politics stream, Mr. Koh from the MOE
and a few leaders of the Alliance who had not been fully represented in the original closed
system of urban air pollution policy making, had opportunities to overturn what appeared to
be a powerful system of limited participation. In analyzing the negotiation strategies of the
MOE and the Alliance (Chapters 6 and 7), it appears that they were able to appeal to new
institutional arenas of policy making such as the Joint Commission and the Environment
Commission. When the venue for public policy making changes, as often occurs over time,
those who previously dominated the policy process may find themselves in the minority,
and erstwhile losers may be transformed into winners (Baumgarter and Jones, 1991).
This kind of initiative to create a new institutional venue can be viewed as a political
process. Schattschneider' s (1960) conception of conflict expansion provides a useful
explanation of how this works. Schattschneider argued that losers in a policy debate have a
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motive to change the roster of participants by appealing to those not currently involved. If
they can appeal to the right groups, they may be able to change their losing position into a
winning one, as more people become involved in the debate on their side. The MOE was
losing in high-level decision-making venues such as the RRV and the Ministerial meeting
for Economy. Environmental groups had not been involved in decision-making for urban
air quality management. So these two groups wanted to be able to change their losing
position by changing the roster of participants to include environmental groups and exclude
industry.
According to Schattschneider, conflict expansion to new venues can occur in three
ways. The first is the classic loser appeal strategy (the MOE in this case). The second is
action by concerned outsiders (the Alliance in this case), who may or may not be allied
with losers in a policy subsystem. Such outsiders often lack both the credibility and
information to attack the existing subsystem, so making alliances with losers from within
the smaller group can be very important. Third, decision makers (also the MOE) from
another venue can attack an existing policy arrangement in an effort to expand their own
policy jurisdiction.
Clearly these three conflict expansion processes are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
coalitions among all three types of conflict expanders may be expected. This kind of
strategic move by policy entrepreneurs affects the factor of inclusion of stakeholders, and in
particular, of organizations with implementation power.
Cobb and Elder (1983) describe a link between agenda formation, by which they
mean inclusion on the list of issues that compels attention by government, and issue
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expansion, which refers to the number of people mobilized around an issue. They see issue
expansion as the key element in the destruction of systems of limited participation and
argue that as a larger and larger circle of participants is mobilized, the strength of the
subsystem is likely to be weakened. There is a second way by which issues may be
included on an agenda: venue shopping by strategically minded political actors. Well-
placed allies are essential to this process. Strategic policy makers can often be successful in
breaking apart policy-making systems which go against their interests without any direct
appeal to the broader public.
The strategic effort of policy entrepreneurs to initiate consensus building can affect
the selection of agenda items and the range of participants. This can, in turn, make other
parties regard the process as unfair leading them to consider other options rather than to
stay in a consensus-building process.
This model of conflict expansion can be applied when a consensus-building process is
initiated by strategic policy entrepreneurs. In this model, policy entrepreneurs need not
employ a rational decision model or know in advance exactly how their ideas will be
received. Rather, they may search for favorable venues through a trial-and-error process or
an evolutionary search. Those uncomfortable in the current venue have an incentive to seek
more favorable ones. Where they find initial success, they continue to search. It is not
necessary to assume that strategic actors can predict in advance the single most favorable
venue for their policies. Successful efforts to shift venues may often be the result of
evolutionary, rather than rational search. This observation maps perfectly onto the
evolutionary shift from the Joint Commission to the Environment Commission and to the
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Task Force. Policy entrepreneurs sought to win by altering the nature of the decision-
making process, that is, by expanding or contracting the range of participants and agenda
items involved.
Political conflict expansion vs. Depoliticized Consensus-building factors
The addition of the consensus-building stream to the analytic framework in Chapter 2
makes it possible to consider the critical initiation and deliberation factors described in the
theory of consensus building. However, the consensus-building efforts explained in the
case studies were definitely not part of that "consensus-building stream." Rather, they
reflected the process of political conflict expansion described above. Considering the first
initiation factor of classic consensus building reveals the reason why.
The use of a neutral facilitator depoliticizes the strategic use of consensus-building.
That's why neutrality is so important in the theory and practice of consensus building.
Without securing neutrality in initiation and deliberation, the Joint Commission and the
Environment Commission were not able to resolve the dispute. Lacking the neutrality
factor, the dispute had to be resolved through adversarial power maneuvering in the
conventional politics stream.
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Learning and another question
The primary finding in this case study is that policy entrepreneurs can initiate
consensus-building processes through strategic action. Where initiation and deliberation
factors are not secured, dispute resolution is less likely to be effective. The lesson is that
processes that seek consensus can actually make conflict more protracted.
Unbalanced multi-level decision-making venues such as the RRC and the Ministerial
meeting for Environment, and the lack of meaningful participation of civil society in a
nascent democracy, drove policy entrepreneurs to adopt specific strategies for initiating and
deliberating. Even if policy entrepreneurs have the opportunity to learn the importance of a
neutral facilitator, they will hesitate to adopt the idea because they think turning power over
to a neutral means losing it themselves.
Someone might argue that the effectiveness of new governance could be achieved
through the countervailing power of civil groups (Fung, 2002). Or, some might say that the
disputes observed in this case were necessary evils required to strike a balance between
environmental concerns, which have been ignored, and economic development concerns,
which had dominated a rapidly developing country.
The question is whether that is really so. The cost of achieving balanced consensus
building in such a dispute is quite high. The economic cost incurred by delayed decisions,
damaged relationships among stakeholders, and the persistence of dissatisfaction among
some stakeholders were the unfortunate byproducts of these three consensus-building
efforts in South Korea.
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Almost three years have passed since the Special Act was enacted in the National
Assembly in December 2003. The parties to the three experiments may have learned
something through their participation. However, it is unfortunate that they did not
systematically evaluate the processes together to discover what could be improved.
When interviewed, some stakeholders said that they managed to win, but it was very
difficult. Others said that they lost due to one reason or another. Some still did not believe
the consensus agreement would be implemented as planned because of the government's
consistent record of always changing its plan.
However, one environmentalist confessed that environmental groups should not have
stuck to their original positions. He said that there are times environmental groups should
oppose certain measures on principle, even if they believe the measures are reasonable. The
MOCIE might have learned that ignoring consensus building could cause another big
problem, or that resorting to higher decision-making venues did not work well. Automakers
could have learned that they should not have been subservient to the regulators in the
process. The MOE also might have realized that excluding stakeholders might cause
another problem at later stages. All stakeholders might have learned the meaning of
authentic consensus.
One government official argued that the most important thing in public dispute
resolution is the will to reach consensus. However, what is more important is to how to
secure the will to reach consensus in a systematic way. That part is covered by the theory
and practice of consensus building.
357
So, people in South Korea and other rapidly developing countries with similar
characteristics should learn from these cases the efficacy of using neutral facilitators just as
Mr. Koh from the MOE learned from his previous experience that consensus building can
work. They should try to experiment with consensus-building projects using the prescribed
factors that experienced practitioners have found most important. South Korea is likely to
see more cases of commission-type consensus building. However, if those processes are not
initiated with appropriate and rigorous preparation, they will not meet the standards of
authentic consensus building introduced earlier in this study. Furthermore, the inevitable
failures will cause people to be suspicious of the efficacy of consensus building in
regulatory decision making.
Consensus building entrepreneur
To overcome institutional barriers and facilitate experiments in authentic consensus
building, consensus-building entrepreneurs, who spend time, energy, and reputation, (and
possibly money) persuading stakeholders to try experiments; facilitate the distribution of
consensus-building theory; and help stakeholders realize that authentic consensus building
can work in their societies. If there are more and more consensus-building entrepreneurs in
regulatory decision making working to make consensus building more authentic, Kingdon's
multi-stream framework will change and new governance mechanisms will add a fourth
stream to the decision-making process.
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The next relevant question will be who can be neutral consensus-building
entrepreneurs in national environmental policy making in South Korea, and how will they
realize the right version of consensus building process, prescribed by the theory of
consensus building, in actual regulatory practice. Overall, there can be two possible sources
of consensus-building entrepreneurs: 1) inside government and 2) outside government.
Within each category, we can find various candidates. First, inside government, there
are four ways to identify a cadre of consensus building entrepreneurs. The first is
government officials, who have specific policy interests and strategic options as policy
entrepreneurs described above, but have to secure the procedural tenets of the right
consensus building. They should realize that following depoliticized and neutralized
procedural guidelines could secure their interests more effectively than engaging in conflict
expansion strategies. While it might be very impractical to insist that they abandon their
strategic option to make the most of their interests, there are times when they are to
consider becoming procedural leaders, as well as stakeholders, in regulatory decision
making. For an example, Mr. Koh, who initiated the Joint Commission and the
Environment Commission. The MOE should have realized that neutral facilitation
following carefully designed procedures could offset the power imbalances that they
regarded as a rationale for employing politically strategic moves. Such a realization could
be achieved by studying real experiences of successful consensus building efforts, or
through participation in simulations. It would probably be very difficult to change their
minds in a short time period, but through small experiments, new process leaders can be
created.
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The second option for consensus building entrepreneurs within South Korean
government is to establish a new department or bureau in each Ministry that advocates
consensus building within their own Ministries. The officers in such a new department will
need proper education, knowledge, and skill to facilitate and manage regulatory
negotiations. Even if they belong to a specific Ministry, their only interest should be in
helping all stakeholders design and "own" consensus building processes in a neutral way.
The problem for this option is that other stakeholders might view these new leaders as
biased on behalf of their Ministry's interests. The only way to overcome this perception is
to build trust through experiments and show that such agency participants can manage
negotiation processes neutrally. In this scenario, education can be targeted and focused on
the new leaders in new consensus building department in each government sector.
A third option might be the use of the government official(s) who will be accepted as
neutral among all the stakeholders. If there were a roster of such government officials who
know how to apply the theory and practice of consensus building in each Ministry, these
official(s) could help other Ministries resolve public disputes. In other words, each Ministry
might generate new leaders for consensus building who would assist other Ministries. In
this way, the officers are more likely to be accepted as neutral mediators.
Lastly, the South Korean government could enhance the role of the existing Office for
Government Policy Coordination (OGPC) in mediating multi-Ministry and multi-
stakeholder public disputes by making the OGPC more independent from outside pressures.
When it comes to the possibility of using professional neutrals from the private sector,
there might be a belief that they cannot be used as mediators for national regulatory
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decision making, given the view that national regulatory negotiations should be managed
by government bodies. However, given the experience abundant in the world, there is
reason to believe that neutrals from private sector such as academics, or trained dispute
resolution professionals can be utilized as facilitators and mediators in public dispute
resolution in South Korea. Such persons are the ones who are only interested in resolving
disputes and do not advocate any specific interest in any policy controversy. In a much
networked society like South Korea, people are prone to connect people through their
academic affiliations, regional relations, and/or blood ties. Anyone who tries to mediate
may be tested and challenged by those stakeholders who may want to influence them
through those relational ties. Their neutrality can only be established by a track record of
success. This would produce a lot more professional neutrals to work in national regulatory
disputes in South Korea.
Given the strong demand for consensus building in many regulatory decision-making
situations in South Korea, what is important is the quality of facilitators or mediators who
are appropriately skilled in the arts and science of consensus building. Their skills and
knowledge of process management, as mentioned above, can be built up through
experience working on small scale experiments of new innovative procedures. The
government must be willing to make such experiments happen. Just a small number of
successful cases will establish the value of consensus building approach to public dispute
resolution.
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Chapter Eleven
Toward a theory of regulatory decision-making in many rapidly
developing countries
This analysis has addressed the two case-specific questions of why the first and the
second consensus-building efforts failed, while the third one was successful. Based on these
answers, I addressed the first general question posited at the outset of this study. The first
question was what are the main obstacles in nascent democracies, whether at a personal
or institutional level, to meeting the necessary conditions for successful dispute
resolution around urban air pollution. In this final chapter of the thesis, I advance from
the first question to another more generalized question: how could a newly democratized
society improve consensus-building efforts in its regulatory decision making? Put another
way, I intend to generalize a theory of the regulatory policy process in nascent democracies
of rapidly developing countries, such as South Korea.
The need for new model for policy making in newly democratized and
rapidly developing countries
Theories of the policy process explain how policy decisions are affected by interest
politics and policy disputes among many stakeholders. In my analysis, I adopted Kingdon's
Multiple Stream Framework (1984) to explain how complicated policy processes and
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regulatory negotiations in urban air quality management proceed in South Korea. As was
noted earlier, Kingdon's model was developed to encapsulate aspects of policy-making in
advanced post-industrial societies characterized by high degrees of bureaucratization and
professionalization. Thus, the theory does not travel well to other institutional context, such
as those of newly democratized and developing countries.
So, in this chapter, I put the Kingdon's model aside and search for a better model of
regulatory decision making which has more relevance for newly democratized countries
such as South Korea. In so doing, the new model should help us see something we would
not otherwise see.
To generalize my findings beyond urban air quality management, I acknowledge the
influence of exogenous factors in policy making, especially in new democracies in rapidly
developing countries.
Democratization in rapidly developing countries
Since the Third Wave of democratization started by the "Carnation Revolution" in
Portugal, 1974, a quarter century of democratization had added 65 new democracies.
However, many countries that moved away from dictatorial rule cannot be considered
countries in transition toward democracy (Carothers, 2002). Many new democracies
remained in a gray zone while some advance to liberal democracy30o. So with regard to
democratic consolidation, the "wave" concept does not fit very well. New democracies took
301 Larry Diamond noted that out of 104 democracies in the world, 73 democracies may be considered liberal.
Another 31 democracies are electoral but not liberal, 17 regimes are on the blurry boundary between electoral
democracy and competitive authoritarianism, 21 competitive authoritarianism, 25 hegemonic electoral
authoritarian, 25 politically closed authoritarian (Diamond, 2002).
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diverse paths, either advancing toward liberal democracies, or lingering as electoral
democracies with defects, or regressing to competitive authoritarianism. New democracies
are positioned at different stages of consolidation and regression.
In this chapter, however, my focus is on the more than half of new democracies 302 (34
out of 65 countries) which entered in the club of liberal democracies by the end of 2001. In
these new liberal democracies, people and politicians generally no longer worry about
authoritarian subversion or regression they are also part democratic breakdown and erosion.
However, in many of these new liberal democracies, democratic institutions are in play, but
far from firmly-rooted. In these countries, institutional changes have been made to foster a
high degree of accountability, transparency, the rule of law, participation, representation,
and state capacity (Diamond, 2002)
In terms of the degree and speed of institutional transition, rapidly developing
countries have lower levels of social capital, but higher speeds of democratization than
advanced countries. Thus, a new model of policy making for rapidly developing and newly
democratized countries must incorporate this feature of rapid institutional change, which
might influence the dynamics of regulatory decision-making. In case of South Korea, since
the democratic transition in 1987, the country has moved forward very fast in constituting
liberal democracy, even though it was late to join the global wave of democratic transition
(Im, 2005). Recently, Freedom House recognized the advancement of South Korean
democracy and upgraded its rating for the first time since 1993 to 1.5 (it got the highest
302 In general, newly democratized countries are rapidly developing countries, which lead the third world
countries in East and Central Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Those countries may include Poland, the
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia,
Thailand, Mexico, Chile, Guatemala, South Africa, and so forth.
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possible score of I on political rights, but maintained a score of 2 on civil liberties)
(Freedom House, 2004). South Korea has become the most advanced liberal democracy in
Asia, along with Japan and Taiwan.
Power games and resistance to change
These institutional changes mean a victory for some actors and a loss for others,
because rapid institutional change, which has been phenomenal from the early 1990s in
South Korea, influences who has power, who has access to information, and who can form
"winning" coalitions. In the larger institutional context of such power changes, decision-
making process is affected. For example, more and more NGOs have been fighting for a
greater role in public decision-making. Conventional power groups have refused to involve
them. During these power games, policy advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1993) have emerged.
New actors equipped with strong arguments on behalf of good governance and
deepening democracy have overcome their previous weak positions by forming coalitions
with other relatively weak entities and forcing new venues for expanded participation.
In terms of public dispute resolution, this challenge from new actors and resistance
from existing actors sets the context for regulatory decision-making. So, in analyzing
specific regulatory disputes, such as the urban air pollution dispute, these larger struggles
must be taken into account.
Especially in national environmental policy making, civil organizations, which have
gained more and more power, are new actors, searching for possible coalitions to break
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existing power imbalances. In such cases, they have often been successful in pushing for
broaden participatory decision-making. They have also tried to exert excessive powers in
effort to dominate the process, generating protracted public disputes. That can be seen in
my case studies of the Joint Commission and the Environment Commission.
A question of balance
Given the institutional power games that often overshadow specific issues, such as air
pollution, any new theory should suggest how to achieve political equilibrium. In a
transition regime moving toward consolidated democracy, there is a tendency for new and
old actors to stick to the conventional wisdom of political bargaining, since they know no
other means to intervening politically. Thus, I have borrowed the ideas and insights from
the theory and practice of consensus building developed in the west, and offered them as a
new tool for overcoming the power balance game in many rapidly democratizing societies.
As I suggested in the previous chapter, whether the new model offers a better process for
new democracies can only be tested and established through experimentation, evaluation,
and public debate
Implication of the new institutional context for the role of science
The role of science as a definitive and objective source in public policy making has
become increasingly important in resolving science-intensive public disputes. Most
environmental regulatory decisions, for example, require a forecast of certain
environmental impacts associated with various policy measures. If there are not enough
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data or existing data are controversial, these forecasts will be put aside, often leading to
very unwise policy choices.
In terms of urban air quality management, many scientific questions still need to be
addressed in order to produce wise decisions. For example, what are the sources of urban
air pollution and where do they come from? (Emission inventories) How will their
composition change over the next 20 years? (Scenario analysis) How will these pollutants
disperse within the region? (Air pollution modeling) How will these pollutants impact
health? (Health impact analysis)
For analytic purposes, Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) has been used as
an analytic tool in recent years in many other places to try to answer these questions.
However, the use of science in public policy making is located in the turbulent middle
ground between science and politics, because assessments are frequently introduced into
highly contentious and partisan debates. Thus, assessments ought to be presumed biased
unless and until they meet a series of explicit tests of their legitimacy. One way to secure
the legitimacy of any scientific assessment for regulatory decision-making is to involve
more stakeholders jointly in the preparation. This means asking stakeholder to jointly
charge experts to conduct assessments. In so doing, stakeholders will have more confidence
in assessment results and "own" the products.
This kind of joint fact-finding is a necessary condition for 'wise' decision-making and
requires carefully designed procedure for selecting experts, creating appropriate research
questions, securing research funds and reviewing research results. That kind of procedure
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requires lots of preparation time and resources, which are more often than not ignored
because of the political pressure to make quick choices.
The new institutional context in a rapidly developing and newly democratizing
society is likely to undervalue joint fact-finding, because it only makes sense in the context
of a well-managed consensus building process. Assessment processes are likely to be
dominated by certain powerful actors, whether government entities, industries, or
environmental NGOs.
Joint fact finding, owned by all the stakeholders, could be very important tool for
resolving disputes in complex science-intensive environmental regulatory decision-making.
New leaders, or what I call, consensus building entrepreneurs, should be identified as soon
as possible. This is the key to better policy making in the new institutional context in
rapidly developing and newly democratizing countries
The three case studies presented in this dissertation focused heavily on the problems
that arose. However, they also offered some bright spots. Environmental groups were
empowered through their participation in all three cases. They gained knowledge of urban
air pollution and the technology of diesel passenger cars. They moved from outside
government consensus-building efforts (the Joint Commission and the Environment
Commission) to inside consensus building (the Task Force). Despite the lack of true
consensus, they were able to participate in generating satisfactory agreements that allow
diesel passenger cars and implement the Special Act. It would be a valuable to learn more
about the long-term benefits of the consensus-building efforts.
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Second, there should be more discussion of how disputes might be prevented. Why
did the conflicts represented in this case study arise in the first place? Were they avoidable?
Ways of preventing disputes in regulatory policy making deserve further research.
Third, societal relationships display unique cultural features. While people from
western countries are more individualistic, South Korean people think about the needs and
demands of their group or organization. It would be interesting to examine which cultural
features are most favorable to consensus building in the South Korean context.
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